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In this dissertation three research questions relating to collusion and cartel enforcement in 
South Africa were examined. The first question entailed examining the characteristics of 
detected cartels, together with the institutional features of selected key South African cartels. 
The author found that South African cartels incorporated some of the institutional features 
reported in the literature, including compensation schemes, joint ventures, sub-contracting 
arrangements, and entry or expansion deterrence strategies. In some selected key cartels, firms 
participated in collusion at two successive levels of the value chain, giving the cartels greater 
control over pricing throughout the value chain. Communication and monitoring were found 
to often involve a mix of various forms, including firm-level mechanisms (notably sales 
infrastructure) that complemented the centralised communications mechanisms discussed in 
the literature. To help fully explain collusion under conditions of imperfect information, the 
theory should account for the complementarities among various forms of communication and 
monitoring used by cartels. In addition, the author found trade policy to be an inexpensive tool 
used by some cartels to weaken threats from imports. 
The second question concerned the pricing dynamics of a cartel involving multi-product firms 
and where the cartel faces periods of instability, producing distinct collusive phases. Like single 
product cartels, a multi-product cartel raises prices above competitive levels, but to varying 
degrees on different products. Cartel overcharges also vary over collusive phases, influenced 
by the demand and supply conditions in each phase. This suggests that a multi-product cartel 
maximises profits by imposing overcharges that vary by product and over collusive phases in 
response to changing market conditions. The assumptions about the nature of the transition 
between collusion and competition affects overcharge estimates. This dissertation provides 
arguments that penalties and damages estimates, reflecting overcharges, should consider 
product-level and phase-specific overcharges, rather than relying on averages. 
Finally, the dissertation examined the cartel enforcement record from a deterrence perspective, 
focusing on the drivers of cartel enforcement, the duration of cases from initiation to final 
decision, and the subsequent impact on the deterrence-effect of penalties. Leniency, settlements 
and penalties, supported by increased funding for the Competition Commission are considered 
to be the main drivers of cartel enforcement in South Africa. Contrary to expectation, the author 
found that these have not reduced the duration of cases. Instead, case duration increased 




significantly discounted penalties, weakening the deterrence effect of penalties. To preserve 
the deterrence effect of penalties, the author argues that an optimal cartel enforcement policy 
should account for these delays and should focus on higher present-value penalties for those 
firms that delay finalising cases. 
This dissertation, focusing on South Africa, contributes to the body of empirical literature on 
collusion and cartel enforcement. It provides suggestions for further advances in the theory on 
collusion under imperfect information and on overcharge estimation when dealing with multi-
product and multi-period collusion. The dissertation also makes policy contributions that could 





Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek drie vrae wat met samespanning en die toepassing van 
kartelwetgewinig in Suid-Afrika verband hou. Die eerste vraag behels die eienskappe van 
kartelle wat reeds ontbloot is, tesame met die institusionele kenmerke van uitgesoekte kartelle. 
Die proefskrif bevind dat Suid-Afrikaanse kartelle sommige van die institusionele eienskappe 
in die literatuur weerspieël, insluitend vergoedingskemas, gesamentlike ondernemings, 
subkontrakteringsooreenkomste, en strategieë om toetrede of uitbreiding te voorkom. In 
sommige sleutelgevalle word bevind dat firmas op twee opeenvolgende vlakke van ’n 
waardeketting saamspan, ten einde beter beheer oor prys te bekom. Die proefskrif bevind dat 
kommunikasie en monitering dikwels ’n kombinasie van vorme behels, insluitend firma-vlak 
meganismes (insluitend verkoopsinfrastruktuur) wat gesentraliseerde kommunikasie-
meganismes, soos in die literatuur vervat, komplementeer. Die proefskrif bevind dus dat teorie 
samespanning onder toestande van onvolledige inligting beter kan beskryf indien dit vir hierdie 
komplementariteite voorsiening maak. Voorts bevind die proefskrif dat sommige kartelle 
handelsbeleid as ’n goedkoop afweermetode gebruik om die bedreiging van invoere die hoof 
te bied. 
Die tweede vraag hou met die prysdinamika van ’n kartel verband, waar multi-produk-firmas 
saamspan en waar die samespanning periodies onderbreek word. Soos vir samespanninig 
rondom ’n enkele produk, bevind die proefskrif dat ’n multi-produk-kartel pryse bo die 
mededingende vlak verhoog, maar in wisselende mate na gelang van die bepaalde produk. 
Voorts bevind die proefskrif dat pryse oor verskillende fases van samespanning wissel, na 
gelang van veranderende markomstandighede. Aannames omtrent die aard van die oorgang 
tussen fases van samespanning en van mededinging, en die impak daarvan op skattings van 
kartelskade, word ook ondersoek. Die proefskrif betoog dus vir kartelboetes en skadebepaling 
om op produk-vlak en fase-spesifieke-ontledings, eerder as gemiddeldes, staat te maak.  
Laastens ondersoek die proefskrif die karteltoepassingsrekord vanuit ’n 
ontmoedigingsoogpunt. Die soeklig val op die drie plekke, naamlik die vernaamste drywers 
van karteltoepassing, die duur van kartelsake vanaf inisiasie tot finale besluit, en die gevolglike 
impak van hierdie tydsduur op kartelboetes. Aansoeke om toegeeflikheid, 
skikkingsooreenkomste en boetes – sowel as beter befondsing – word as die vernaamste 
drywers van karteltoepassing beskou. Teen verwagting bevind die proefskrif dat hierdie 




die studieperiode, het stelselmatig toegeneem. Die proefskrif bevind voorts dat vertragings in 
die penalisering van firmas die voorkomende effek van boetes verlaag. Ten einde die impak 
van boetes te verbeter behoort karteltoepassing rekening met die kontantwaarde van boetes te 
hou, veral waar firmas die finalisering van kartelsake vertraag.  
Hierdie proefskrif, met ’n fokus op Suid-Afrika, lewer dus bydraes tot die empiriese literatuur 
rondom samespanning en karteltoepassing. Die proefskrif doen voorstelle aan die hand vir 
verdere ontwikkeling van die teorie van samespanning onder onvolledige inligting en die 
skatting van kartelskade waar dit multi-produk- en multi-periode-samespanning aangaan. Die 
proefskrif doen ook voorstelle aan die hand om die doeltreffendheid van kartelbeleid in Suid-
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Collusion has been a pervasive phenomenon across most sectors of the South African economy. 
In some sectors, such as the construction sector, pervasive collusion pushed the Competition 
Commission (Commission) to develop a sector-wide mechanism to resolve the cases that it was 
investigating. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of the Commission’s cartel enforcement 
activities across various sectors, based on the number of firms prosecuted for cartel conduct 
between April 1999 and March 2018. 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of cartel prosecutions across sectors 
 
Source: Prosecutions data used in Chapter 4. 
A significant number of cartels involved collusion across multiple products or in multiple 
markets, in some cases cartelising successive parts of the relevant value chains.1 For example, 
the World Bank (2016) reported that for cartels prosecuted between 2005 and 2015, 63 per cent 
of the cases involved a firm that had also participated in another cartel in a different market of 
the same sector or in another sector. In Chapter 2, it is estimated that at least 42 per cent of 
 









































firms prosecuted between 1999 and 2018 either colluded more than once or belonged to a group 
in which another company was prosecuted for collusion in another market. Network mapping 
used by the World Bank (2016) shows extensive links between firms that partook in collusion 
in the agriculture and food sectors. This suggests that collusion could be a viable rational 
business strategy for multi-product/-market firms. 
Multi-product firms that take part in collusion can cause (a) wide-ranging harm to consumers, 
and (b) medium to long-term damage to competition across markets. It may take a long time 
for the effects of entry barriers enacted by the cartels to dissipate, and to fully restore market 
dynamism. Given the multi-faceted nature of collusion involving multi-product firms, the 
nature and types of consumers that are harmed by the conduct will also likely vary significantly. 
Deterring multi-product collusion requires consideration of the extent of harm caused by the 
cartels, when imposing penalties. This applies also to any follow-on damages that consumers 
may pursue against the cartel members. Both deterrence and damages require a proper 
understanding of the pricing dynamics of a multi-product cartel. Most of the existing studies 
on cartel harm focus on individual product markets and do not examine collusion by multi-
product firms as a portfolio of cartels [see, for example, Kovacic, Marshall, and Meurer 
(2018)]. 
Because of the pervasive nature of collusion in South Africa, the Commission has prioritised 
its resources to enhance its ability to detect and prosecute firms for collusion. This included 
introducing a leniency policy coupled with a settlement procedure, developing a prioritisation 
framework, setting up a standalone Cartels Division, increasing penalties over time, and using 
remedies designed to trigger competition in some of the markets where collusion was detected. 
Evidence supporting the use of active enforcement to end operating cartels includes Levenstein 
and Suslow (2011), who found that increased cartel enforcement aimed at international cartels 
raised the probability of ending cartels. This expansion was enabled by dedicating increased 
resources to competition authorities and by employing policy tools aimed at detecting and 
prosecuting cartels (e.g. leniency and settlement). 
Leniency enhances cartel detection and prosecution by placing firms in asymmetric positions 
through offering avoidance of penalties in exchange for information on cartel conduct [Motta 
(2008)]. Firms are expected to have the incentive to settle cases because it results in lower 
penalties and saves them resources; although, as argued in this study, incentives relating to the 




typically offer to co-operate by supplying information on the conduct of the cartel(s), as well 
as by supplying factual witnesses to enable the competition authority to prosecute fellow cartel 
members. Together, leniency and a settlement procedure are expected to be attractive to both 
firms and the competition authority [Edwards and Padilla (2010)]. 
Leniency and settlement procedures enable firms either to avoid sanction or to face reduced 
penalties, while the competition authority is enabled to detect cartels and to save time and 
financial resources, which it can then divert to detecting other cartels. Time and resource 
savings are expected to flow from the speedier and more effective resolution of cases, as the 
competition authority can gather more complete evidence on the conduct involved. This, in 
turn, is expected to result in the remaining cartel members being more willing to settle cases or 
to face a higher probability of prosecution and penalties. The general expectation is that all 
these enforcement initiatives increase the probability that collusion will be detected and 
prosecuted, and that deterrence will be achieved. As this study shows, leniency and settlements 
have played a major role in cartel enforcement in South Africa. 
Recent evidence suggests that there is a decline in leniency applications, meaning that the 
future of effective cartel enforcement requires innovations in cartel detection. One area of 
innovation in cartel detection relates to cartel organisation and management. Cartels, by nature, 
are secretive. Understanding the characteristics of collusion in South Africa and its institutional 
structure can help competition authorities better identify patterns of firm and industry 
behaviour that are likely to be more consistent with collusion than with the independent actions 
of competing firms. Prosecution decisions and case studies of selected South African cartels 
provide useful information on the organisation and management structure of the cartels. This 
information includes the nature and characteristics of the cartel’s conduct, communication 
within the cartels, information revealing how firms may have maintained incentives for 
collusion, monitored and deterred unilateral defection by cartel members (commonly called 
cheating), and restricted external threats. Examining the characteristics of collusion in South 
Africa and the institutional features of key selected cartels can complement behavioural and 
structural screens in detecting collusion. 
1.2 Problem statement, research goals and questions 
The South African experience with cartels shows that they were widespread across the various 




studies of specific cases suggests that cartels exercised cartel market power. This experience is 
not unique to South Africa. As a result, theoretically, empirically, and from a policy 
perspective, debates have rightly moved on from those in the earlier years of Stigler’s (1964) 
suggestions that collusion is inherently unstable. It has become widely accepted that cartels can 
be stable, and firms have powerful incentives to participate in collusion [e.g. Levenstein and 
Suslow (2006, 2011)]. This success in colluding is partly because cartels develop structures to 
add flexibility and resolve challenges, thereby enhancing their prospects of survival. These 
include using compensation schemes, monitoring mechanisms to detect and deter cheating, and 
raising entry barriers [Levenstein and Suslow (2006)]. 
Some questions remain unanswered in terms of how cartels manage to collude and keep the 
incentive structure intact, especially in those circumstances where there is imperfect 
information/communication or where cartels have an imperfect mechanism for collusion (e.g. 
collusion on list prices or a part of the price mechanism). The answers to these questions may 
lie in the institutional structure of cartels and the compromises that they might make to survive. 
Though the impact of multi-product/-market contact on collusion has been examined in the 
theoretical and empirical literature, the focus has been on single product collusion. Kovacic, 
Marshall and Meurer (2018) argue for the need to advance the theoretical literature beyond 
this, to examine multi-product/-market collusion as comprising cartels that are managing a 
portfolio of cartels rather than separate, individual cartels. The theoretical and empirical 
literature rightly acknowledges that multi-product/-market collusion can make collusion more 
likely and enhance its durability and stability. There is, however, limited work on other aspects 
of multi-product/-market collusion – for example, the pricing dynamics of multi-product 
cartels, and the nature and depth of harm resulting from such cartels. This is important for 
understanding collusion and its impact, and to increase the prospects of ensuring deterrence. 
The widespread nature of collusion in South Africa justifies a proactive and aggressive 
approach to cartel enforcement. This approach has contributed to the detection of an expansive 
number of cartels and to penalties exceeding R7 billion. On the face of it, this suggests that 
cartel enforcement has been effective. However, measuring the effectiveness of cartel 
enforcement requires an appreciation of the full scope of collusion, and interventions that are 
geared towards effective deterrence. Effective cartel enforcement requires deterrence of the 
most durable cartels, some of which go undetected. One question arising from the cartel 




critical examination of the cartel enforcement record and the resulting outcomes, from the 
perspective of deterrence. 
This dissertation explores some of the unresolved issues through three key research questions, 
briefly discussed below. The goals of this dissertation were: (a) to examine, at a macro level, 
the characteristics of South African cartels and the institutional features of key selected South 
African cartels. In doing so, the author examined the extent of their consistency with, and the 
novelty of their features compared to the mainstream theoretical and empirical literature. This 
has important policy implications for cartel enforcement; (b) to examine the pricing behaviour 
of multi-product firms involved in collusion, with a view to estimating overcharges on different 
products and over time; and (c) to critically examine the cartel enforcement record, to evaluate 
its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving deterrence, and to make a case for an optimal cartel 
enforcement policy. 
All three questions are important from an empirical and policy perspective. From a policy 
perspective, the study contributes to the design and implementation of cartel detection and 
enforcement tools. The study also contributes to a more effective policy approach to dealing 
with multi-product/-market collusion, which was prevalent among the detected cartels. In 
addition, it contributes to the empirical methods used to estimate cartel overcharges under 
conditions where there are temporal variations in overcharges – that is, where the cartel 
involves multi-product collusion, and where the price effects may dissipate in different ways 
at the end of the cartel. From a cartel enforcement perspective, the study contributes to the body 
of literature available on evaluating the efficacy of cartel enforcement, by collectively 
examining the drivers of cartel enforcement, the duration of cartel enforcement activities and 
their impact on penalties and deterrence. 
While the dissertation did not directly aim to develop and propose new industrial organisation 
theory on collusion, some of its findings have theoretical implications in that they point to areas 
for further theoretical advancements. For example, given that cartels are found to use 
complementary forms of communication, including those that are not centralised to the cartel 
structure, the study proposes the need for advances in theoretical literature that incorporate 
these complementarities. These complementary forms of communication help cartels reduce 
uncertainties about the behaviour of cartel members and enhance the effectiveness of 
monitoring in cartels thereby contributing to the success of collusion. As such, incorporating 




under circumstances that existing theory does not fully explain. This is consistent with how 
theory develops, starting with observed firm behaviour which then gets incorporated into 
existing theory as an extension or incorporated into the development of new theory. 
1.2.1 Research question 1: what are the characteristics of detected South African cartels, 
and the institutional features of selected key cartels? 
The study reviewed the cartel record using case decisions from the competition authorities and 
other public information relating to the case studies of key selected cartels. The purpose of this 
was to examine the characteristics of South African cartels and the institutional features of 
selected cartels that have been detected in South Africa. In doing so, the study focused on how 
selected cartels managed themselves internally and how they managed to limit the external 
threats they faced. In answering this question, the author also examined the extent to which the 
cartel management structures were consistent with theoretical expectations and the findings 
from empirical studies. In addition, the study provides insights on some of the unresolved 
theoretical and empirical questions relating to collusion. The characteristics of cartels include 
the duration of firms’ participation in collusion during the years covered by the current 
competition regime, the mix and forms of collusive practices employed by cartels, the extent 
of firms’ involvement in collusion, and the extent of cartel overcharges. 
The author found that the institutional structures of selected South African cartels were broadly 
consistent with those discussed in the theoretical literature and with the findings of empirical 
studies on cartels. Some of the important aspects of the findings relate to communication, the 
vertical structure of some selected key South African cartels and the role that protectionist trade 
tools might play when used as a strategic, costless tool to limit external threats. Communication 
plays a central role in collusion, but it can be imperfect, being neither formalised nor centralised 
by the cartel. Cartels are likely to use a combination of various forms of communication, and 
monitoring can comprise decentralised, firm-level forms, which nonetheless enhance collusion. 
The theoretical literature does not always incorporate the combined use of various forms of 
communication and monitoring, which may also not always be readily reported in public 
information. For example, settled cases may not always expose other forms of communication 
and monitoring used by cartels, e.g. the use of matching clauses and the use of firm-level sales 
infrastructure and customer relationships. This could explain the difficulties faced in the 




collusion on list prices when discounts are not agreed upon. The sales infrastructure of firms 
can provide a reliable way of detecting cheating, helping a cartel to deal with the uncertainty 
created by imperfect information. 
Key South African cartels had a vertical structure to them, which likely helped them address 
both internal and external threats to collusion, in that some of the major cartel members were 
also suppliers of key inputs to the firms that they colluded with. In a country like South Africa, 
where the next best alternative source of inputs might be imports, trade tariffs also seem to be 
used as a costless tool for mitigating the threats that cartels face from imports. 
1.2.2 Research question 2: what is the pricing behaviour of multi-product firms involved 
in collusion, and what is the extent of harm that they impose on consumers? 
To answer this question, the study used panel-data analyses to examine the pricing behaviour 
of a multi-product cartel, with a view to estimating overcharges made by such a cartel on 
different products and over time. This question is important given the significant number of 
cartels involving multi-product/-market firms and the gaps in the empirical literature on these 
two aspects. The dissertation also contributes to the body of empirical literature on overcharge 
estimation when the dissolution of a cartel takes different forms. 
The author found that cartel overcharges vary by product and over time, even if the collusive 
mechanism might be the same for different products. This finding suggests that harm cannot 
be generalised, and to the extent that penalties are in part influenced by the degree of harm 
imposed by a cartel during its life, there is a need to consider the pricing of different products 
over time by multi-product cartels. The variability of overcharges also means that in follow-on 
damages claims, the right approach would be to consider the harm pertaining to individual 
products bought by customers over time. The findings of this study could enhance cartel 
enforcement policy on penalties and deterrence. Taken together with the first research question, 
the study points to the need for closer scrutiny of multi-product/-market firms involved in 






1.2.3 Research question 3: what have been the key drivers of cartel enforcement in South 
Africa, and how effective has cartel enforcement been when examined through the 
lens of efficiency and deterrence? 
Given the findings on the institutional features of collusion in South Africa and the pricing 
behaviour of multi-product firms involved in collusion, as well as the empirical evidence of 
overcharges from other studies,2 it is important to provide a critical appraisal of the cartel 
enforcement record in order to understand cartel detection and prosecution through the lens of 
deterrence. The availability of resources, leniency and penalties have been the major drivers of 
enforcement activity, but they have not led to greater efficiency in cartel enforcement, as shown 
by the increasing duration of investigations and prosecutions over time. Panel regression results 
support the qualitative analyses of the duration of cases. 
Using the present-value technique, the author examined the impact of the time taken to 
conclude investigations and prosecutions of firms on the present value of the penalties imposed. 
The study found that prolonged investigation and prosecution of cases had the significant effect 
of reducing the real value of the penalties paid. This undermines the efficacy of penalties as a 
deterrence tool. The key policy implication is that the Commission should account for delays 
in finalising cases, even if settled, when determining penalties, in order to preserve the 
deterrence effect of penalties. The author argues that an optimal cartel enforcement policy will 
penalise firms that delay finalising cases, with progressively higher penalties, in order to retain 
and enhance incentives to settle cases earlier, rather than later. In addition, interest can be added 
to the amount of the penalty for the period between the year on which the penalty is calculated 
and the year in which the penalty is paid. 
1.3 Structure of dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents an examination of the characteristics of detected South African cartels, 
focusing on the institutional features of selected key cartels. The pricing behaviour of a multi-
product cartel is examined in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 provides a critical examination of the 
cartel enforcement record over the 20 years from the start of the current competition law regime 
in 1999. Key conclusions and policy recommendations are discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
2 See for example, Mncube (2014); Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts (2014)]; Mondliwa and Das Nair (2019); 





Characteristics of South African cartels, focusing on institutional features of key cartels 
2.1 Introduction 
Collusion has been pervasive, occurring across several sectors of the South African economy. 
Some firms (either at the product level or at the group/holding company level) are involved in 
collusion across markets or sectors. As elaborated in Chapter 4, leniency played an important 
role in the detection and prosecution of cartels in South Africa. Leniency appears to have 
peaked in its ability to help detect cartels in South Africa, with applications having declined to 
pre-2010 levels (see Figure 2.1). This decline is consistent with the experience in other 
jurisdictions. In the European Union, leniency is also trending downwards, with 46 applications 
in 2014, 32 applications in 2015, 24 applications in 2016 and 18 applications in 2017.3 The 
United States shows similar trends which have been attributed to the potential exposure to 
follow-on civil lawsuits.4 
Figure 2.1: Number of leniency applications in South Africa from FY2000 to FY2018 
 














































As leniency applications have declined, and with concerns that leniency detects dying cartels,5 
the success of cartel enforcement in the future will depend on the ability of the competition 
authorities to proactively screen and detect cartels. Proactive detection will require the 
application of screening tools that rely on economic data and structural analyses of the 
markets.6 Several factors are conducive to collusion, including high concentration levels; 
product homogeneity; the presence of high entry barriers; stable demand; firm symmetries; 
lack of excess capacity; high levels of market transparency, supported by information 
exchange; and the size and concentration of buyers. In a concentrated economy like that of 
South Africa, screening cartels solely based on these features might not be of much effect. 
This chapter examined the key features of collusion in South Africa, particularly the 
institutional features of detected cartels.7 The aim is to examine the extent to which the 
institutional features of South African cartels are consistent with the theoretical and empirical 
literature. This study is important for understanding how detected cartels in South Africa 
managed to keep the incentives to collude sufficiently compatible among their members for 
several years, and some of the strategic actions used to restrict external threats to the cartels.  
The features of cartels detected in South African were drawn from a review of 265 prosecution 
decisions taken against firms between April 1999 and March 2018. Next, the study focused on 
20 cartels to examine their institutional features. These cartels were selected based on their 
significance in terms of the potential impact they had on the economy or their institutional 
features, which provided insights into the management of collusion. Most of the cartelised 
products were inputs into other economic activities, while others involved important basic 
consumer products (e.g. bread and maize meal). These cartels were, on average, durable, 
operating for several years during their lifespan within the study period. The cartels included 
the: 
(i) flat steel cartel, 
(ii) long steel cartel, 
(iii) scrap metal cartel, 
(iv) rebar cartel, 
(v) wire cartel, 
 
5 Harrington Jr. and Chang (2015) and Harrington Jr. (2016). 
6 See Harrington (2015) for a discussion on both behavioural and structural screening. 
7 This is not to suggest that factors that are conducive to collusion were not relevant to the success of the cartels. 




(vi) cement cartel, 
(vii) bread cartel, 
(viii) milling cartel, 
(ix) construction cartels, 
(x) soda ash cartel, 
(xi) print media cartel, 
(xii) ocean transport cartel, 
(xiii) industrial waste-removal cartel, 
(xiv) poultry breeding cartel, 
(xv) chemical-to-fertiliser cartel, 
(xvi) fishing cartel, 
(xvii) wooden products cartel, 
(xviii) glass cartel, 
(xix) tyre manufacturers cartel, and 
(xx) electrical cables cartel. 
Collusion in South Africa has mostly been studied at a micro level, either at a sector level – 
e.g. in the construction sector, by Ratshisusu (2014) – or at an individual cartel level, mostly 
as parts of studies estimating cartel overcharges. The World Bank (2016) gives a high-level 
view of collusion in South Africa, focusing on the nature of cartels (e.g. duration, serial 
collusion, number of firms involved and linkages across cartels) and the features of the 
cartelised markets. However, the World Bank report did not examine, in detail, how cartels in 
South Africa organised and managed themselves. Examining the institutional features of cartels 
helps us understand how selected South African cartels organised and managed themselves, 
considering the multi-year duration of most cartels. It also helps determine their consistency 
with the theoretical and empirical literature, and the extent of uniqueness of collusion in South 
Africa. 
Understanding the characteristics of cartels and the institutional features of key cartels helps 
competition authorities in two broad ways. First, it highlights areas of focus when screening 
for cartel conduct. An example of this would be to complement behavioural and structural 
screening by searching for the presence of joint ventures and sub-contracting arrangements 





Second, an understanding of the characteristics and features of cartels assists the competition 
authorities by highlighting the types of evidence they require to develop a coherent case for 
collusive harm. For example, where cartels use compensation schemes, joint ventures, sub-
contracting and toll-manufacturing arrangements, investigations will require gathering 
evidence on payments between competitors, and understanding the nature of the work for 
which compensation is provided or the nature and rationale for the sub-contracting work 
undertaken. For toll-manufacturing arrangements, key questions might include, for example, 
whether there are legitimate business case reasons (e.g. capacity constraints) and why firms 
favour toll-manufacturing over expanding their own capacities (e.g. cost justifications). When 
investigating collusion in markets where there are allegations of abuse of dominance, 
competition authorities should not treat such allegations as being isolated allegations against a 
single dominant firm. Instead, possible abuse of dominance should be incorporated into a 
coherent theory of collusion, in which the alleged abuse may in fact be an entry or expansion 
deterrence strategy or a tool for internal management of the cartel. 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 provides a discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on collusion, focusing on the institutional structures of the cartels; section 
2.3 highlights the key features of collusion in South Africa in light of theoretical and empirical 
literature; section 2.4 provides a discussion of the key institutional features of cartels, using 
case studies of some of the key cartels in South Africa; and key conclusions and policy 
implications are discussed in section 2.5. 
2.2 Review of literature on theory and empirical evidence of collusion 
2.2.1 Brief review of theoretical and empirical literature on the institutional features of 
cartels 
Collusion requires aligning incentives and managing the self-interests of competing cartel 
members (i.e., the incentive to cheat on the collusive scheme), and managing the threat of 
external destabilising factors. These are not always easy to achieve. This section focuses on the 
theoretical and empirical literature that examines the institutional features of cartels, focusing 






2.2.1.1 Internal institutional features of cartels 
In his influential paper, Stigler (1964) concluded that collusion is inherently unstable, as the 
private incentive to cheat on the collusive arrangement will prove powerful enough to outweigh 
the benefits of co-ordination to individual firms. This led Stigler to conclude that cheating will 
be the primary cause of the death of cartels. In any given cartel, the incentive for firms to 
unilaterally defect exists for several reasons. A cartel member facing financial challenges may 
have a different intertemporal discount rate compared with other firms, and this may mean that 
the firm will lack the patience to honour the collusive agreement, leading to cheating [Porter 
(2005) and Levenstein and Suslow (2011)]. Cartel members facing different costs or capacities 
may also resort to cheating [Cave and Salant (1995); Athey and Bagwell (2001); and Athey, 
Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004)]. A maverick firm may also have incentives to cheat [Baker 
(2002)]. Dissatisfaction over the sharing of cartel rents could result in cartel members having 
different valuations of the collusive rents, leading to cheating [Hendricks, Porter and Tan 
(2008)]. 
This literature highlights the internal challenges that cartels face as they try to raise prices above 
competitive levels. However, it does not fully consider the various factors and ways in which 
cartels can, with some success, mitigate the challenges. Equally, the early theoretical literature 
often does not formally address entry as a threat to collusion, meaning that cartel instability 
was regarded to be a function of internal dynamics. Recent advances in the theoretical and 
empirical literature on collusion are useful in understanding how cartels organise themselves 
and manage the threats to their existence. 
Porter (2005) developed a useful taxonomy of factors and institutional structures of cartels, 
which aid collusion. These factors and structures help align disparate interests, address 
cheating, and enable cartels to adapt to changing market conditions. Where cartels face 
disparate interests, they must find a way of accommodating members’ interests. This 
requirement affects the collusive mechanism used by the cartel and how the cartel deals with 
instances of unilateral defection and changes in market conditions. For instance, in cartels 
involving large and small firms, the larger firms may have to make compromises with the 
smaller firms to co-opt them into the collusive scheme, rather than alienate them. This affects 
how the economic rents from collusion are shared between the large and small firms [Porter 
(2005)]. Some cartels use joint ventures and side-payments as mechanisms to address the 




Communication is central to cartels resolving these issues, and as such, the next section reviews 
the literature on communication within cartels. 
2.2.1.1.1 Communication and monitoring 
Communication and information are important to cartels in two ways. First, they help cartels 
reach terms of co-ordination, including the collusive mechanisms and sharing of rents. Second, 
they help monitor the actions of cartel members, making implementation more effective. 
Albæk, Møllgaard and Overgaard (1997) give a useful example of how the availability of 
information can help oligopolies function better and more effectively in raising prices above 
competitive levels. The authors found that the prices of two grades of ready-mixed concrete 
increased by between 15 per cent and 20 per cent within a year of government publishing firm-
specific transaction prices for those products. This shows that beyond facilitating agreement 
on terms of co-ordination, communication is an active part of the collusive equilibrium. 
Communication between cartel members can be direct (e.g. through meetings, telephonic 
conversations, and emails) or indirect (e.g. using signals). The citric acid cartel in the US, for 
example, used structured cartel meetings to agree on prices, share information and resolve 
cartel problems. In the case of indirect communication, one cartel member could use advance 
price announcements to send a signal to other cartel members [e.g. Grether and Plott (1984) 
and Holt and Scheffman (1987)]. These forms of communication are imperfect, and to be 
effective, they must communicate the minimum level of information required to enable cartel 
members to co-ordinate. 
Cartels try to eliminate problems caused by information imperfections by investing in 
monitoring mechanisms that can track the actions of individual members. These monitoring 
mechanisms evolve over time as cartels experience new challenges. Their degree and nature 
vary across cartels depending on each cartel’s circumstances. Effective monitoring helps 
cartels to detect cheating and to separate cheating from demand fluctuations, enabling them to 
avoid unnecessary, costly price wars [see Levenstein and Suslow (2006)]. Cartels can share 
information (e.g. sales volumes) among themselves, as was the case in the Lysine cartel, or 
they can use trade associations or other independent third parties [see for example, Levenstein 
and Suslow (2011)]. In some cartels, the role of organisations such as trade associations extends 




the Sugar Institute acted as an arbiter when there were disputes about cheating [Genesove and 
Mullin (2001)]. 
Monitoring cartel members through information exchange can be complemented by 
information from customers, e.g. through price matching clauses, which can help monitor 
defection by fellow cartel members [Porter (2005)]. The same applies to information that sales 
teams can glean from day-to-day interactions with customers. These forms of monitoring are 
driven by individual firms keen to protect their own share of the collusive rents, and they take 
advantage of attempts by unsuspecting customers to get better prices from suppliers. These 
types of monitoring mechanisms can be more effective in detecting and responding to secret 
price cutting, and help cartels avoid engaging in indiscriminate, costly price wars. Responses 
can be targeted, simply removing the benefit of cheating, thereby reducing the incentives of 
cartel members to cheat. 
Information from the interactions between cartel members and their customers helps with 
monitoring the price side of firm behaviour, complementing monitoring done through sales 
reports exchanged between cartel members. The complementary use of the two helps cartels 
know when a decline in sales for some cartel members is the result of cheating or the result of 
a slump in demand. This helps cartels function better. 
The economic literature identifies different forms of communication and different sources of 
information for cartels. However, it does not fully examine the feasibility of collusion when 
cartels use a combination of communication mechanisms to develop more complete monitoring 
mechanisms. This failure to recognise and account for complementary forms of communication 
and monitoring means that economic theory, in some instances, is unable to fully explain 
collusion when certain aspects of firm behaviour are not readily monitored in a centralised way. 
In this chapter, the author attempts to develop further understanding of collusion, by examining 
communication within South African cartels, with a focus on selected key cartels. In so doing, 
the author assesses the extent to which cartel experiences align with or deviate from the 
literature. 
The next section provides a review of the economic literature on how cartels address cheating, 






Cheating happens in most cartels and, if left unchecked, can result in the collapse of a cartel. 
Cartels look for ways to deal with cheating by their members, and there are several strategic 
actions that firms can adopt to help deal with this problem. Cartel members could, for example, 
use a price war to make cheating unprofitable. Green and Porter (1984) conclude that the threat 
of a costly price war deters cheating. By extending the work of Green and Porter (1984), Abreu, 
Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) identified a set of strategies that maximise the expected profits 
from collusion with imperfect monitoring. They conclude that on-and-off price wars do not 
reflect unstable cartels, as posited by Stigler, but are mechanisms through which cartels manage 
themselves. 
Complex pricing structures make it difficult to detect cheating. Some cartels solve this problem 
by simplifying pricing structures. Examples of simplified pricing structures include 
standardised pricing in the case of the Sugar Institute, which Genesove and Mullin (2001) 
studied, and base-point pricing structures. Cartels use the simplest available mechanisms given 
the circumstances they face – for example, the distribution of market shares, products or 
geographical areas, or customers among members – and leave the pricing decisions to 
individual firms. 
Some cartels use compensation schemes that involve payments or transfers among cartel 
members [Porter (2005) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006, 2011)]. These disincentivise 
cheating, by shifting the illicit gains of defectors to the victims of defection. This reduces the 
incentive to cheat. In turn, this keeps the agreed framework of rent sharing in balance. 
The fact that firms in a cartel typically interact repeatedly creates greater scope for co-operation 
because cheating in the current period can induce aggressive responses from other cartel 
members in future periods. The seminal work of Friedman (1971) complemented by research 
such as by Benoit and Krishna (1985) shows that collusion can be supported by repeated 
interaction over time and across markets, which makes punishment more effective in deterring 
cheating, especially where firms value future profits more than current profits. Repeated 
interaction also produces learning effects in cartels and, where possible, scope for refinements 
to the cartel's organisation, e.g. by enhancing information gathering (monitoring) capabilities. 
This increases the prospects of successful collusion in terms of duration and ability to set prices 




Harrington (1987) studied the possibility of collusion in finitely repeated games under the 
assumption of full rationality and found that there were instances where collusion could be 
achieved. The author also found that such collusion could be extended to a multi-product/-
market setting where future behaviour in one market becomes dependent on behaviour in 
another market, increasing the likelihood of reaching a cartel solution. Multi-product/-market 
collusion could enhance the credibility of punishment being extended to other products by 
raising the cost of defection. 
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) similarly found that multi-market contact could enhance 
collusion and benefit the firms involved, but that the impact of multi-market contact was not 
necessarily socially undesirable. The authors argue that the impact on prices or profits in any 
of the affected markets depends on the nature of the markets and the features of the firms 
involved, and on potential entrants. When there are cost asymmetries between firms, discount 
rates will influence whether prices are lower or higher. If firms are similar, prices may be higher 
in some markets but lower in others. The authors argue that with multi-market contact, 
behaviour in different markets/products becomes interdependent. 
Spagnolo (1999) identifies circumstances in which multi-market contact always facilitates 
collusion – for instance, when strategic interactions between firms are interdependent, meaning 
that a firm’s valuation of profits in one market is influenced by profits achieved in other 
markets. In this situation, punishment is more effective, and collusion is more profitable when 
multi-market contact exists. Matsushima (2001) shows that multi-market contact facilitates 
collusion even under imperfect monitoring, especially if there is interdependence in the supply 
choices of firms in the different markets. At least one study shows that firms that interact in 
multiple markets are more likely to co-operate in pricing behaviour than those that do not [see 
Ciliberto and Williams (2014), who studied collusion in airlines]. The authors, however, argue 
that the impact of multi-market contact on prices is influenced by cross-price elasticities. 
Kovacic, Marshall and Meurer (2018) examined the incidence of serial collusion by multi-
product firms, noting that the evidence reflects business models that embrace collusion. The 
authors argue that such collusion reflects the management of a portfolio of cartels rather than 
individual cartels. The authors conclude that serial collusion creates opportunities for cartels to 
solve the standard cartel problems more effectively, making collusion more profitable, stable, 
and long-lasting. Cartels involved in serial collusion can better share collusive rents across 




set of possible collusive equilibria to enhance the success and profitability of the overall 
portfolio of cartels. Kovacic, Marshall and Meurer (2018) argue that theories based on single-
product collusion do not capture the full dynamics of collusion in a serial setting. This in turn 
leads to limited appreciation of the nature and effectiveness of collusion, limitations in the 
detection of collusion, and enforcement efforts that are not fully effective in deterring collusion. 
Often competition authorities consider cartels at a market/product level, meaning that cartel 
stability and harm are dealt with from the perspective of individual markets/products, as 
opposed to the portfolios of cartels that firms may be involved in. 
The review above shows that cartels have various mechanisms for deterring cheating. These 
include price wars, which can be in the form of a symmetrical shift to non-collusive behaviour 
by all members or asymmetrical targeting of only the cheating member. Simplified pricing 
structures remove the scope for cheating, and compensation schemes eliminate the benefit of 
cheating and restore agreed rent sharing structures. Repeated interaction across 
markets/products introduces flexibility and increases the cost of deviation. Similarly, repeated 
interaction over time also creates the scope for making punishment more effective, especially 
where firms value future profits more than current profits. Collusion in multiple markets means 
that firms have flexibility in sharing collusive rents and in resolving cartel problems. 
Cartels can also take advantage of vertical integration or vertical relationships to enhance their 
prospects of success. The next section reviews the relevant literature in this regard. 
2.2.1.1.3 Vertical integration and vertical arrangements 
Vertical integration can, through enhanced information exchange, ease and increase the level 
of transparency in markets, helping firms reach and sustain collusion. Firms can achieve 
collusion using vertical agreements that enable information sharing among cartel members. 
This is the case with ‘hub and spoke’ cartels, where a supplier or retailer acts as the platform 
(hub) for sharing information between the cartel members (spokes) operating at another level 
of the value chain [Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (2011)].  
Cartel members can also use vertical restraints (e.g. resale price maintenance, exclusive 
territories) to soften competition, by preventing aggressive competition at another level of the 
value chain [Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (2011)]. When suppliers are colluding, these kinds 
of arrangements can reduce both intra- and inter-brand competition at the retail level, helping 




competition between themselves through discounting the prices of the different suppliers. The 
suppliers’ cartel could prevent this by employing restraints that prevent retailers from 
discounting the products of the various suppliers. 
Arrangements that seem vertical in some respects (e.g. toll manufacturing between cartel 
members) can be employed by cartels to reduce competition and enhance rent sharing. For 
example, cartel members may opt for toll manufacturing arrangements over investing in 
expanding their own capacity. In so doing, the cartel members avoid increasing market 
capacity, which could incentivise competition. Some cartels may involve firms exiting one 
level of the value chain and simultaneously entering into a vertical supply agreement with a 
fellow cartel member for the supply of the upstream product that they had previously supplied 
themselves. 
Although the literature identifies the potential use of vertical integration and vertical restraints 
to support collusion, it does not address collusion in situations where vertically integrated firms 
participate in collusion at successive levels of the value chain. This study examined the vertical 
features of collusion in key South African cartels, particularly the extent to which vertical 
integration, vertical agreements, and collusion took place at successive levels of the value 
chain. The latter is not fully explored in the existing literature. 
2.2.1.2 External threats of entry and expansion 
In Levenstein and Suslow (2006), entry is found to be the most common cause of cartel death, 
while it is found to destabilise cartels in the Levenstein and Suslow (2011) study of 
international cartels. Cartels that succeed exercise cartel market power and raise prices above 
competitive levels, but such prices inevitably attract entry, which in turn erodes the supra-
competitive profits. Entry will therefore undermine the collusive schemes. Cartels are more 
likely to survive and be effective in raising prices above competitive levels for a sustained 
period in markets characterised by significant entry barriers than in markets where barriers are 
low [see Dick (1996b); Symeonidis (2003); Levenstein (1995); and Clay and Werner (2002)]. 
Some cartels create barriers to prevent or marginalise entry by new competitors or the 
expansion of firms that are outside the cartel. These barriers include those of (i) exclusionary 
behaviour by the cartel or some of its members – e.g. in the form of predation [see Burns 
(1986); Weiman and Levin (1994); Scott Morton (1997); Podolny and Scott Morton (1999); 




and Walker (2010)]; (ii) information asymmetries between incumbents and new entrants; and 
(iii) regulatory impediments imposed by the state on its own initiative, at the request or with 
the support of firms involved in cartels, e.g. the imposition of import tariffs and other 
restrictions on entry. The theoretical literature shows that strategic entry deterrence is possible 
where there is some form of excess capacity, which makes responses to entry or threats of entry 
more credible [e.g. Dixit (1979)]. 
Genesove and Mullin (2001), Porter (2005) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006, 2011) argue 
that resilient cartels embrace learning effects by adapting the underlying collusive agreement 
or implementing mechanisms that enhance their ability to cope with evolving circumstances, 
e.g. new ways of sharing information and making cartel decisions. Harrington and Chang 
(2009) found that cartels that cope with shocks are likely to last longer than those that do not. 
The response to entry and threats of entry is also an important part of a successful cartel 
operation. 
2.2.1.3 Summary of key learning from literature 
Cartels need to communicate to succeed. The form of communication varies, and different 
cartels use different forms of communication that, in some cases, involve extensive information 
sharing. The literature does not fully examine the impact of the combination of different forms 
of communication and monitoring by cartels, which could explain the success of collusion 
when some monitoring mechanisms are imperfect. 
Price wars help deter cheating in some cartels, but other mechanisms can sustain collusion (e.g. 
compensation schemes, multi-market contact, and vertical integration and restraints). All these 
are recognised in the economic literature. However, there is limited consideration of collusion 
where vertically integrated firms participate in collusion at successive levels of the value chain. 
As section 2.4 shows, this is a feature of some of the key cartels in South Africa. Section 2.4 
confirms the use of compensation schemes and the correlation between multi-market contact, 
vertical integration and restraints, and collusion. 
The institutional features of collusion can help during the screening and investigation of 
suspected cartels, especially in an environment where the primary detection tools such as 
leniency have deteriorated. Some studies [e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2006,2011) and Porter 
(2005)] have considered the factors that help cartels succeed, including institutional features. 




Section 2.3 provides a discussion of the broader dataset used in the study and then proceeds to 
discuss the characteristics of collusion in South Africa. 
2.3 Characteristics of collusion in South Africa 
This section provides a discussion on the characteristics of those cartels that were detected and 
penalised in South African between April 1999 and March 2018. The focus was on the forms 
of collusion used by the cartels, the extent of firm involvement in collusion across sectors, the 
duration of firm involvement in collusion, and evidence of the pricing power of some of the 
detected cartels. The data and its sources used in this chapter are described, before discussing 
the characteristics of the detected cartels. 
2.3.1 Description of data and its sources 
The data used in this study came from the cartel prosecution records reflected in the decisions 
of the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) covering the 
period from April 1999 to March 2018, comprising 265 prosecutions of firms across 8 sectors. 
This data was generated from the investigations and prosecutions of firms by the Commission 
and is reflected in the case decision records that describe the cartelised products, the nature and 
features of the conduct being prosecuted, the firms involved, whether the investigation 
involved leniency, and how the prosecutions were resolved. The data on cartel features 
typically includes the type of conduct (e.g. price fixing, market allocation, cover pricing, 
collusive tendering), when the conducted occurred, other elements of the collusive arrangement 
(e.g. joint ventures, payment schemes and sub-contracting) and in some instances the 
involvement of an industry body (e.g. industry association or third-party provider of 
information). 
Most cases (over 90 per cent) prosecuted between April 1999 and March 2018 were concluded 
by way of settlements, in which the Commission and the firm under investigation or 
prosecution negotiated the terms of settlement, principally the penalty paid by the firm and the 
admissions made on the collusive conduct. In many instances, the firms pledged to help the 
Commission in its investigation and prosecution of other firms involved in the cartel or in 
relation to collusion involving other products or markets that the firm was involved in. 




The information was obtained from the Tribunal’s and the Commission’s websites, annual 
reports, press releases and other publications. Some cartels had been in operation since prior to 
1999, but the study excluded this prior period because it fell outside of the applicability of the 
current Competition Act, which introduced more vigour in cartel enforcement in South Africa. 
The period prior to 1999 also coincided with State regulation of markets, in which some of the 
key cartels were either legalised (e.g. cement) or part of marketing boards (e.g. the grain-
milling cartel). This history was, however, useful for understanding an aspect of the context of 
the illegal cartels under the current competition law regime. 
Given the way in which prosecutions were mostly resolved through settlements, the data 
presented some limitations. First, the data was likely to be incomplete because cases that were 
concluded via settlements and leniency did not always result in full exposition of a cartel’s 
institutional structure, its evolution, and how the cartel managed the challenges it encountered 
during its life. For example, in the publicly available cartel data, there was limited investigation 
and discussion of how the cartels dealt with the threat of, or actual entry or how they might 
have dealt with the presence of a competitive fringe. The data was complemented using other 
data relating to the activities of the firms in other spheres such as policy or regulation-making 
processes, the incidence of complaints against cartel members for exclusionary conduct, and 
the like. Similarly, there was not always full discussion of the institutional structure of cartels, 
to understand how those structures helped collusion, or what challenges the structures in place 
resolved. 
The second limitation relates to the sample, which was biased towards detected and prosecuted 
cartels, and the observed features of these cartels may have differed from the features of durable 
undetected cartels. Nonetheless, the dataset provided some rich information on how cartels in 
South Africa organised themselves and sustained their arrangements. These two broad 
limitations of the data are not unique to this study and are unlikely to invalidate the insights 
drawn, because the available baseline data describes the key features of the collusive 
arrangements in the prosecuted cartels. 
2.3.2 Forms of collusion 
In South Africa, collusion is prohibited along three main dimensions: price fixing; market 
allocation and collusive tendering. Within these three broad dimensions, various types of 




price fixing and the fixing of other trading conditions. This means that even fixing discounts is 
covered and as such prohibited. Market allocation covers the allocation of customers or 
suppliers, geographic territories, specific types of products and services, and market shares. 
Collusive tendering is a broad category that covers various forms of collusion in relation to 
tenders. For example, cover pricing would be covered under collusive tendering. 
From an economics perspective, the form of collusion is not necessarily the most important 
consideration leading up to its prohibition, but the effect that it has on pricing. Firms collude 
to raise prices above competitive levels so that they earn supra-competitive profits. This can be 
achieved in different ways, depending on the circumstances faced by the cartel, including 
agreeing on the price; allocating customers to cartel members, and leaving the pricing to cartel 
members; or agreeing on restricting output to a certain level, which has the effect of raising the 
price; or even agreeing on the level of profit. The available options for collusion are not 
mutually exclusive, and cartels can use them in combination. For example, a cartel that faces a 
variety of customers who buy products using different mechanisms, such as normal day-to-day 
transactional purchases and tenders, is more likely to collude across the three main dimensions. 
For the group of customers who use tenders, the cartel might opt to use cover pricing or 
customer allocation, and for customers who use day-to-day purchase systems, the cartel might 
fix prices, discounts, or both. 
The cartel enforcement record shows that of the firms that were prosecuted between April 1999 
and March 2018, 31 per cent were involved in a cartel that used a combination of different 
forms of collusion. From his review of collusion in the construction sector, Ratshisusu (2014) 
noted that firms used customer (bids) allocation together with agreements on the profits to be 
earned from contracts. The same observations can be made of the fertiliser cartel, which used 
market allocation together with an agreement to keep target margins. In the wire industry, the 
cartel fixed prices, agreed on discount levels for different classes of customers and allocated 
some customers among cartel members. The milling cartel fixed prices and changes in prices 
for different products and classes of customers, and allocated customers among cartel 
members. Similarly, firms involved in the bread cartel fixed prices, increases to the prices of 
some types of bread and discounts or commissions given to agents, and allocated customers. 
The cement cartel employed price fixing coupled with an agreement not to offer special 




Firms that colluded in the scrap metal industry used price fixing (selling and purchase prices 
for scrap metal) and customer allocation as mechanisms for collusion. 
69 per cent of the prosecutions related to cases where the cartels employed only one form of 
collusion. Of this group of prosecutions, 55 per cent were for price fixing alone, 36 per cent 
were for collusive tendering and 9 per cent for market allocation. There was no obvious bias 
towards specific economic activities in the use of each of these forms of collusion. This is likely 
because the form of collusion was driven by the nature of the customer purchases (e.g. the use 
of tenders) and within that, the easier co-ordinating practice, rather than the nature of the 
economic activity. Although price fixing was widely used, it was not frequently used in 
construction and transport (furniture removals for instance), where customers mostly used 
tenders to procure services. 
2.3.3 Extent of firm involvement in collusion across sectors 
Firms collude because it is more profitable to do so than to compete, as suggested in studies of 
cartel overcharges (see section 2.3.5, below, for some examples). Collusion has been a 
pervasive problem in South Africa, demonstrated by the extensive record of prosecutions of 
firms in the country, spanning various sectors, with some companies (either at a product level 
or at a group/holding company level) being involved in collusion across markets or sectors. 
Estimates from the data described in section 2.3.1 show that 42 per cent of firms prosecuted 
between April 1999 and March 2018 colluded more than once or belonged to a group in which 
another firm was prosecuted for collusion. Figure 2.2 shows the extent of firm involvement in 
collusion across sectors, based on the enforcement record of case decisions taken by either the 
Tribunal or the CAC in South Africa from the start of the modern-era South African 
Competition Act in 1999 until March 2018. Firms have been prosecuted for collusion in 
agriculture, communications, construction, health, manufacturing, services, trade, and 




Figure 2.2: Extent of firm participation in collusion across sectors 
 
Source: Own compilation from various case decisions of the Tribunal and CAC 
The number of firms per cartel varies widely, ranging from just two8 to as high as 20 in cartels 
such as the bicycle retailing and rebar cartels. The maize milling cartel comprised 17 firms. 
The large number of firms in some cartels reflects the fact that to be able to raise and sustain 
prices above competitive levels, a cartel must control a significant amount of output. In markets 
with many firms and where firms can expand their output, this can only be achieved by 
incorporating as many firms as possible into the cartel; otherwise, attempts to raise and sustain 
prices above competitive levels for a sustained period would be undermined by those outside 
it. 
In other instances, despite the large number of firms involved in a cartel, most of the output 
was controlled by a few firms. The inclusion of smaller firms in those cartels could reflect 
accommodation strategies by larger firms or industries characterised by few leader firms and 
small follower firms, with limited capacity to aggressively challenge the larger firms. Rather 
than being outside of cartel arrangements and adopting a challenger position, the smaller firms 
may find it better and more profitable to be part of the cartels. This is more likely to be the case 
in those markets characterised by some form of economies of scale and scope where fixed costs 
are significant, and where larger firms have a per-unit cost advantage and, as such, are better 
 
8 Note that due to the per se nature of the prohibition of cartel conduct, firms can be prosecuted even if they do 


































placed to aggressively deal with a smaller firm that adopts a maverick stance. As such, by being 
part of a cartel, the smaller firms are shielded from the negative effects of aggressive 
competition which might push them to exit the market. Markets such as maize milling in South 
Africa had a history of co-operation, and it is possible that all firms just continued with the 
more comfortable tradition of cooperation after 1999, rather than moving to a new tradition 
that embraced a riskier competitive culture. 
2.3.4 Duration of firm involvement in collusion since 1999 
The duration of a cartel and of firms’ involvement in collusion provides a useful indicator of 
the stability of collusion and of the success of collusion, especially where there is evidence that 
the cartels were able to raise and sustain prices significantly above competitive levels for an 
extended period. The World Bank (2016) gives some useful facts about some of the cartels that 
have been detected and prosecuted in South Africa. For instance, in a review of cartels 
prosecuted between 2005 and 2015, the World Bank notes that on average the cartels ran for 
eight years. 
In the database of firm prosecutions between April 1999 and March 2018, this study estimated 
the average duration of involvement of firms in collusion. This was done in two ways: (i) across 
economic activities and (ii) for firms involved in serial collusion or that belonged to a group in 
which another firm was prosecuted for collusion relative to those that were involved in only 
one cartel and were not part of a group in which another firm was prosecuted for collusion. For 
the reasons stated above, duration of involvement was calculated from 1999, even though for 
some cartels, collusion started prior to this. 
For firms involved in collusion that involved bidding for contracts, there can be debate on how 
duration should be determined, that is, whether in terms of the specific contracts or in terms of 
the serial nature of collusion across multiple simultaneous and sequential contracts. In this 
study, the author argues that the duration of involvement should not be determined based on 
the duration of a specific contract over which firms cover-priced or allocated customers. Using 
the duration of a single contract does not yield appreciation of the quid pro quo nature of the 
collusive arrangements in their totality and fails to consider the incentives of firms to provide 
a cover-price on one contract when they benefit from another contract. In such cases, it is highly 
probable that firms gain from the other contracts that they get around the same time or when 




Meurer (2018) on the benefits of involvement in a portfolio of cartels. A review of collusion in 
construction cartels shows that the quid pro quo nature of collusion applied to a series of 
contracts taking place in the same period or in different periods. In the author’s view, duration 
should thus be from the beginning of the first instance of collusion in the series of cartelised 
contracts to the end of the cartel or the firm’s participation in collusion. 
In the study sample, a firm was involved in collusion for an average of 6 years, with the shortest 
duration being less than a year and the longest being 17 years.9 Figure 2.3 shows the average 
duration of firms’ involvement in collusion by economic activity10, as well as the shortest and 
longest durations. Across various economic activities, collusion lasted for several years, which 
is consistent with observations made by the World Bank (2016). 
Figure 2.3: Average duration of firm involvement in collusion from 1999 to 2018 
 
Source: Own compilation from various case decisions of the Tribunal and CAC 
Figure 2.4 compares the average duration of involvement in cartel conduct by firms that 
engaged in serial collusion and those that did not. 
 
9 The average duration of firm involvement in a cartel can differ from the average duration of a cartel because 
some firms join cartels that are already in existence and may exit cartels that are continuing. 
10 Economic activities under each broader economic activity group were varied in nature. For example, 



























Figure 2.4: Average duration of involvement in collusion among serial colluding firms 
and once-off colluding firms 
 
Source: Own compilation from various case decisions of the Tribunal and CAC 
Concerning collusion arising from serial involvement or being part of a group where one of the 
sister firms was involved in collusion, there did not appear to have been major differences in 
the duration – other than by one year longer – of these firms’ involvement in collusion. This 
result was due to some once-off colluding firms being involved in the same cartels as serial 
colluding firms and staying in these cartels for the same duration. 
2.3.5 Evidence that cartels exercise market power afforded by collusion 
A wide range of international and South African empirical studies on cartel overcharges show 
that many cartels were able to exercise collective market power facilitated by collusion, 
charging prices that are significantly above competitive levels.11 The degree to which 
individual cartels succeed in raising prices above the competitive levels varies by cartel and 
product. Connor and Lande (2006) found that average cartel overcharges varied significantly 
across empirical studies, with average overcharges ranging between 31 per cent and 49 per cent 
and the median overcharges ranging between 22 per cent and 25 per cent. Werden (2003) 
estimated average overcharges of 21 per cent, while the OECD (2002) estimated average 
overcharges of 15.75 per cent. Using 12 cartel cases, Posner (2001) found average overcharges 
 
11 It is important to note that the results are sensitive to estimation procedures employed and the quality of the 



























of 49 per cent. Oxera (2009) found median overcharges of 18 per cent and mean overcharges 
of 20 per cent. In a study of overcharges in the German cement cartel, Hüschelrath, Müller and 
Veith (2013) found overcharges ranging from 20.7 per cent to 26.5 per cent, depending on the 
estimation approach. 
There have been several studies on cartel overcharges in South Africa. A few illustrative 
examples show how much cartels in South Africa were able to exercise collective market 
power. Mncube (2014) estimated overcharges ranging between seven per cent and 42 per cent 
for the wheat flour cartel. With the concrete pipes cartel, depending on the geographic region, 
overcharges ranged between 16.5 per cent and 57 per cent [see Khumalo, Mashiane and 
Roberts (2014)]. The reinforcing bar cartel achieved overcharges of 35.7 per cent and 43.2 per 
cent, depending on the counterfactual [Mondliwa and Das Nair (2019)]. In the bitumen market, 
Boshoff (2015) found overcharges ranging between 25 per cent, based on the forecasting and 
dummy variable approaches, and 80 per cent, based on the difference-in-difference approach. 
Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019) found estimated cartel overcharges by the cement cartel, of 
between 19.2 per cent and 19.9 per cent. 
Chapter 3 presents the findings of the study, which explored overcharges by a multi-product 
cartel that operated over multiple collusive phases. As shown in Chapter 3, average overcharges 
varied by product, with smaller overcharges, which are not statistically significant, for some 
products, and larger overcharges, which are statistically significant, for others. Overcharges 
were also found to have varied across collusive phases. 
2.4 Institutional characteristics of key South African cartels 
This section provides a discussion of the institutional features of the key cartels identified in 
section 2.1 above. The cartels were significant in terms of their potential impact on consumers 
and the economy, their institutional features, or their durability. The focus was on those features 
that related to the internal management of cartel arrangements and those that related to the 
management of external threats. The study made inferences and drew conclusions by 
contextualising the institutional features observed in the cartels in terms of economics theory 






2.4.1 Internal management of collusion 
Examining the internal institutional features of the selected cartels shed light on their durability, 
which lasted several years for many of them. The author was interested in two important 
elements of collusion, which are recognised in the theory and in practice. The first of these was 
the alignment of incentives, and the second, dealing with cheating in a way that was effective 
enough to keep incentives aligned for the duration of the cartel. Supra-competitive profits from 
collusion can create powerful motivation for firms to align the incentives to collude and to keep 
them sufficiently compatible to sustain the collusion [Levenstein and Suslow (2006)]. 
Estimates of cartel overcharges by South African cartels suggest that collusion creates the 
scope to raise prices significantly above competitive levels, yielding significant profits that can 
be sustained for several years. 
Communication is important for firms in aligning incentives and monitoring deviations from 
the agreement to collude. This means that cartel members must find a way to communicate on 
an ongoing basis during the cartel’s lifecycle. Against this backdrop, the discussion in the next 
section starts by examining how South African cartels communicated during their periods of 
collusion. This is followed by an appraisal of other structures used by the cartels, such as 
compensation schemes, joint ventures, sub-contracting, and other arrangements, as well as 
multi-market collusion. The examination also looks at how the cartels addressed cheating and 
the vertical features of collusion. 
2.4.1.1 Communication 
Communication between cartel members, whether explicit or implicit, is an essential part of 
collusion. It can be direct or indirect. Communication helps cartel members reach common 
understandings, co-ordinate the actions of cartel members, monitor defections from the 
agreement, and restore the collusive arrangement if cheating occurs. It is necessary to keep the 
collusive incentive structure intact. Evidence from South African cartels is consistent with the 
view that communication is central to successful collusion. The cartel record shows that cartel 
members communicated in one form or another, mostly in an explicit way. 
Communication within the cartels that have been prosecuted in South Africa occurred through 
meetings, bilateral conversations by email and over the telephone, and in some cases, involved 
extensive exchange of information between cartel members. For example, the bread, milling, 




and telephone conversations and information exchange.12 The cartels met on the sidelines of 
industry association meetings, at the offices of fellow cartel members, in public venues, such 
as hotels, and, in some instances, in holiday-type settings, such as fishing trips attended by 
members of the cartels.13 These types of communication took place around the time when the 
collusion started, when there was a need to adjust prices, when the next tender came up or when 
dealing with instances of cheating.14 
Some cartels left the role of co-ordination to specific individuals or firms, especially where the 
number of firms involved was large. For instance, in the wire cartel, one individual co-
ordinated the cartel business of several cartel members.15 The individual had long-standing 
relationships with the smaller cartel members, including involving cross-directorships in some 
of the smaller firms.16 Joint ventures and the vertical nature of some of the cartels appear also 
to have been useful platforms for communication and co-ordination. Both joint ventures and 
the vertical nature of cartels are discussed in the sections that follow. 
Some trade associations and other third parties also enhanced collusion. These institutions 
acted as platforms for more entrenched relationships between firms, as they interacted under 
the auspices of the industry body, which involved the smoother resolution of cartel problems. 
Trade associations are often set up to provide a platform for industry interaction between firms 
and to promote matters of common interest to the firms in the industry. For example, in policy 
settings, trade associations often co-ordinate and help reconcile the positions of members and 
play the role of advocating for certain policies on behalf of industry. This means that effective 
trade associations are those that become experienced and more effective at helping the industry 
find common ground for and achieve outcomes in favour of their collective members. Two 
areas where trade associations played a co-ordinating role that facilitated collusion in South 
Africa included acting as platforms for information sharing and as discussed below, promoting 
trade tariffs on behalf of members. 
In some cartels, trade associations and independent third parties, which include government 
agencies, provided firms with more formalised and centralised mechanisms for information 
 
12 See, for example, Tribunal decisions in case numbers 10&15/CR/Mar10; 23/CR/Mar12; 37/CR/Apr08; 
31/CR/May05; CR092Jan07/SA090Aug16. 
13 See, for example, Tribunal decisions in case numbers 31/CR/May05; 23/CR/Mar12; 10&15/CR/Mar10; 
15/CR/Feb09. 
14 See, for example, Tribunal decision in case numbers 15/CR/Feb09; CR093Jan07/SA004Apr18. 
15 See, for example, Tribunal decision in case number CR093Jan07/SA083Aug19. 




sharing. These information-sharing activities enhanced monitoring by at least enabling each 
firm to track its own market share. The World Bank (2016) reported that 33 per cent of cartel 
cases between 2005 and 2015 involved the participation of a trade association. Prosecution data 
at the level of the firm shows that about 28 per cent of the prosecutions for collusion between 
April 1999 and March 2018 involved a trade association or other third party.17 Cartels in 
milling, bread, steel and cement had extensive information-sharing arrangements, which 
included information relating to production or sales volumes, average production costs and 
average costs of key inputs.18 This information exchange over time allowed firms to develop 
better knowledge of the costs of their rivals and provided a benchmark, or focal point, for key 
costs and changes over time. In the steel cartel, members shared information on capital 
expenditure programmes, which would have provided an indication on any capacity changes. 
The cement cartel even refined its information sharing arrangement to address monitoring 
gaps.19 The impact of these forms of information sharing on enhancing the ability of cartels to 
function more effectively are readily integrated into the theory on collusion and are observed 
in some empirical studies. 
By using customer contracts, firms can use price-matching clauses to detect cheating by other 
cartel members. Unsuspecting customers wishing to obtain a better price from their 
longstanding supplier can approach the supplier with evidence of better offers from competing 
suppliers, giving the supplier an opportunity to match or better the offer. In so doing, the 
customer inadvertently alerts to the supplier of cheating by fellow cartel members. For instance, 
in the wire cartel, some of the customer contracts had price-matching clauses that required 
customers to provide written evidence of better offers. This not only helped detect cheating 
using concrete proof, but also allowed the firm to respond in a targeted way rather than engage 
in an indiscriminate price war. It also helped avoid being fooled by customers trying to bargain 
through bogus claims of better offers. This shows that relationships between the sales teams of 
cartel members and customers can also make it easier to obtain information on the activities of 
cartel members, helping to detect and address cheating in a targeted way. Customer-based 
mechanisms can be highly effective tools for detecting and addressing cheating by cartel 
members, as they allow for a targeted, less costly response to cheating. 
 
17 Trade associations are more prevalent in many markets than suggested by these numbers. 
18 See, for example, Tribunal decisions on case numbers CR092Jan07/SA090Aug16; 23/CR/Mar12; 
10/CR/Mar10 and 15/CR/Mar10. 




Economic theory recognises the importance of communication in collusion: the need to convey 
enough information to help cartel members to reach terms of co-ordination and to monitor 
cheating. However, communication in most cartels is not always complete, meaning that some 
aspects of firms’ behaviour are not monitored perfectly. For example, firms may agree to fix 
list prices without necessarily having the ability to monitor the discounts granted by each firm, 
creating possibilities for cheating to happen through discounting. This suggests that cartels that 
rely on monitoring list prices could experience challenges and face collapse, yet this has not 
been the case with most cartels. 
A review of the bread, cement, milling, and steel cases referred to above showed that cartel 
members exchanged a large amount of information. This information exchange enabled the 
tracking of each firm’s market share and cost information, despite the cost information being 
exchanged less frequently, often annually. Over a long period of time, during which firms 
repeatedly share information and where production processes do not dramatically differ or 
change, it can be expected that, even with imperfect information, firms will build up knowledge 
of the businesses of their rivals and of key indicative production costs. For example, in the 
prosecution of Pioneer Foods for participating in the bread cartel, the Tribunal observed that 
the costs of operating a plant bakery were comparable across different firms and were subject 
to the same fluctuations.20 This meant that Pioneer Foods had a reasonable understanding of 
the production costs of the businesses of its rivals and the margins involved. This can be 
expected to enhance the ability to collude and the effectiveness of collusion. 
Firms can also make use of the basic market intelligence infrastructure, through their sales 
teams, to track the prevailing market conditions, the discounting practices taking place in the 
market and to identity the firms that pursue sales more aggressively by discounting. That is, 
the market intelligence infrastructure can easily be directed towards collusive ends. Cartel 
members consider information imperfections when choosing co-ordinating or monitoring 
practices. For example, cartels such as the wire cartel colluded on both list prices and discounts, 
entailing effectively fixing the net price paid, while in other cartels (e.g. construction), the firms 
fixed the level of profit. Some cartels (e.g. the cement, steel, bread, and milling cartels) invested 
significantly in putting in place extensive monitoring mechanisms, introducing additional 
levels of monitoring where necessary. 
 




It was evident in some of the cartels that communication and monitoring did not always need 
to take place through a centralised or institutionalised structure, such as a trade association, to 
help firms collude effectively. There were instances in some South African cartels where 
cheating was detected by the firms that were victims of cheating, rather than by a centralised 
cartel structure. The detected cheating could then be brought to the attention of the other cartel 
members, or efforts would be taken to address the situation on a bilateral level between the 
perpetrator and the victim (e.g. in the wire cartel). The same can be said of supplier-customer 
contracts that help detect cheating through price-matching clauses. Contracts are unlikely to be 
centralised or shared widely among cartel members. The cases reviewed in this section also 
show that cartels can use a combination of mechanisms to communicate and monitor the 
activities of members. For example, cartels that exchanged information through centralised 
systems (e.g. a trade association) also communicated and monitored the day-to-day behaviour 
of cartel members through various means, which included the use of sales teams, price-
matching clauses, and bilateral communication.21 Economic theory does not always explicitly 
incorporate these complementary elements of communication and monitoring that a cartel 
could use in some combination, depending on its circumstances. This could explain the limited 
extent to which economic theory can explain collusion where some aspects of firm behaviour 
are not readily observable through centralised structures of communication and monitoring. 
Economic theory22 predicts that collusion is exceedingly difficult to sustain in the face of 
uncertainty. This theory places more weight on perceived uncertainties where certain aspects 
of firm behaviour are not readily observed. This is especially the case where the collusive 
mechanism leaves room for rivals to cheat or where the formal monitoring mechanism is 
imperfect, making the detection of cheating challenging. Evidence from South African cartels 
suggest that cartels mitigate the uncertainties using other complementary, non-centralised 
mechanisms such as market and business knowledge built over time; firm-level mechanisms 
such as customer relationships; and basic firm-level market intelligence infrastructure, which 
firms that compete ordinarily possess. 
South African cartels used different forms of communication and monitoring, and in some key 
cartels, different forms of communication and monitoring complemented each other to provide 
the cartels with a more complete structure for sustaining collusion, even in situations where 
 
21 See, for example, Tribunal decision in case number 15/CR/Feb07 and 50/CR/May08. 
22 Levenstein and Suslow (2011) point out that “Economic theory identifies uncertainty as the primary cause of 




some aspects of firm behaviour were not readily observable to the cartel members. For 
example, in a price-fixing cartel monitoring through exchanging sales volumes, sales teams 
through their interactions with customers provided useful information on the discounting 
practices of cartel members. This complements the use of sales volumes as a monitoring tool. 
2.4.1.2 Compensation, or payment schemes; joint ventures; sub-contracting; and 
other arrangements 
South African cartels have adopted different structures for aligning incentives and keeping 
them as such. Compensation or payment mechanisms; joint ventures; and sub-contracting 
arrangements were features of some key cartels. A compensation scheme can be defined as a 
tool used by cartels to disincentivise firms from cheating, by transferring the gains from 
cheating back to the firms that are victims of the cheating [see, for example, Porter (2005), 
Levenstein and Suslow (2011)]. The goal of this is to maintain the agreed apportionment of 
collusive rents, which in turn helps keep the incentives to collude intact. 
In this study, compensation or payment schemes were defined more broadly than the narrow 
transfers to other cartel members by a cartel member who either cheats or finds themselves 
with greater rents, due to demand fluctuations. The author included those situations involving 
payments to fellow cartel members in the form of a share of profits from contracts and payment 
of a loser’s fees to firms that agreed to provide cover-prices in tenders. The use of such schemes 
ensures that collusive rents are shared in the agreed form among cartel members and, in doing 
so, helps to keep the incentives to collude compatible. Examples of the use of such payment 
schemes include those in the construction sector, as highlighted by Ratshisusu (2014). 
Collusion in construction contracts, for example, included an agreement for cartel members to 
provide cover-prices and, on top of that, ensure that the firm that agreed to cover the price gets 
a share of the profit, which in at least one instance was achieved through sub-contracting some 
of the project’s work to the firm that provided a cover-price.23 It appears that in this way, the 
cartel solves several problems. The first problem solved by the cartel is that it avoids price 
competition through cover pricing, enabling the cartel to realise the price it wants to charge. 
The second problem that the cartel solves relates to the need to find a mechanism for sharing 
collusive rents among participants. Third, by sub-contracting the cartelised work and sharing 
profits with the firm that provided cover-prices, the cartel also resolves a trust issue among its 
 




members. The cartelisation of some construction contracts involved paying losers’ fees to the 
firms that provided cover-bids.24 The former CEO of one of the firms testified about a cartel 
scorecard that was used for tracking outstanding payments, which were either invoiced or offset 
against other projects [see Ratshisusu (2014)]. 
While Ratshisusu (2014) saw the use of sub-contracting and payment of losers’ fees as a form 
of collusion, in this dissertation the author argues that these arrangements are better 
characterised as part of the management of the collusive structure – ways of aligning incentives 
and sharing collusive rents. This would be more consistent with the theoretical and empirical 
literature on cartels using payment schemes to keep incentives compatible. Such an approach 
also helps to distinguish between forms of collusion (e.g. price fixing, market allocation and 
collusive tendering) and management structures, which are used to sustain collusion. 
Joint ventures facilitated collusion in several ways. First, they reduced the number of firms 
independently bidding for contracts or independently competing in markets. Joint ventures also 
replaced the independent actions of competing firms with co-ordinated, dependent actions. 
Second, they helped to co-ordinate the interests of various firms that, through joint ventures, 
aligned their interests, especially in the construction sector. Third, joint ventures and cross-
directorships created avenues for communication and information sharing between firms. 
Through joint ventures, communication between firms can be direct and informal, yet more 
effective, given that the interests of the firms are aligned through the joint venture. Fourth, 
collusion through joint ventures can be difficult to detect given that they can serve both a 
legitimate pro-competitive commercial purpose and an illegitimate collusive purpose. The two 
purposes can be difficult for competition authorities to distinguish. Finally, joint ventures 
created easier avenues for generating and sharing collusive rents in a more transparent manner, 
since each joint venture partner would get an agreed proportionate share of the rents. The 
prevalence of joint ventures between competing firms in construction projects suggests that 
joint venture arrangements served as a mechanism for sharing rents in selected contracts, and 
in some instances, cartel members outside the joint venture got a share of the work through 
sub-contracting arrangements. 
 




Collusion in soda ash, poultry breeding, print media, waste removal, steel, ocean transport, 
construction and cement involved joint ventures.25 Notable in the construction sector was the 
routine way in which the major construction firms participated in joint ventures that were used 
for collusion. This suggests that joint ventures provided a simple and effective way of 
reconciling the interests of firms, sharing collusive rents, and accommodating the interests of 
various firms. In the steel-to-wire value chain, an upstream cartel operated with two members 
of the cartel having a joint venture that operated in a downstream cartel. The downstream cartel 
also included the downstream activities of another member of the upstream cartel. The vertical 
nature of collusion is discussed in a section that follows. 
Some collusive arrangements, while not fitting perfectly within the framework of joint ventures 
or sub-contracting arrangements, appear to have had similar effects as mechanisms for aligning 
the incentives of firms and for distributing collusive rents. These included the use of toll-
manufacturing arrangements in collusive conduct between Sasol and Foskor, and the use of 
supply arrangements that involved supplying products to, or through other cartel members, as 
was the case in the fertiliser, poultry breeding and wire cartels. 
The use of joint ventures as part of collusive arrangements calls for greater scrutiny of joint 
ventures by competition authorities. Part of the scrutiny should involve proper characterisation 
of joint ventures to determine whether they are in place for legitimate purposes or for anti-
competitive purposes. In doing this, the competition authorities should focus on characterising 
the nature of the conduct given the economic relationship between the firms, the potential 
effects of the conduct on the competitive process and the likely economic effects on market 
outcomes. This assessment should be undertaken in the context of a critical examination of the 
rationale for the existence of such arrangements as well as any restraints that may be contained 
in such arrangements. Such an approach ensures that the potential impact of joint ventures in 
aiding collusion is grounded in economics theory behind the prohibition of collusion and that 
only those joint venture arrangements that are likely to lead to collusive outcomes are 
characterised as such. The same approach can be applied to the use of other arrangements such 
as toll-manufacturing, sub-contracting and supply arrangements between competitors. It is 
important to note that the conclusions that can be drawn from the application of the suggested 
 
25 See for example, the Tribunal decisions in case numbers CO044Jun13; 017277/CO077Jul13; 23/CR/Mar12; 




framework will depend on the facts of the case. It avoids a blanket approach to arrangements 
between firms which may lead to both Type I and Type II enforcement errors. 
The foregoing discussion is consistent with the hypothesis that the use of compensation or 
payment schemes, joint ventures, sub-contracting, and toll-manufacturing and cross-supply 
arrangements can facilitate collusion. They help align incentives and share collusive rents. The 
mechanics and definition of schemes that involve payment or compensation may vary from 
case to case. In some cases, compensation schemes could simply refer to arrangements where 
a cartel member that cheats or realises greater sales than its agreed share transfers a portion of 
its rents to other cartel members. A review of the cartel record in South Africa suggests that 
the notion of a payment or compensation scheme could be broader to include compensation for 
foregoing a contract and entitlement to a share of profits from the cartelised projects. One 
common feature of these arrangements is that they keep the incentives to collude aligned and 
facilitate sharing collusive rents in an agreed way. This would be consistent with the rationale 
for the use of compensation schemes in Levenstein and Suslow (2006,2011) and Porter (2005). 
2.4.1.3 Multi-market and multi-product26 nature of cartels 
Firms that have multi-market contact interact repeatedly over time and across markets. A 
significant number of cartels involved firms that enjoyed multi-market contact, as well as 
multi-product firms in which multiple products were cartelised. Examples of cartels that 
involved multi-market contact include those in the steel industry, pharmaceutical industry, 
agriculture industry, manufacturing industry and construction industry. This is consistent with 
the theoretical and empirical literature, which shows that collusion is more likely to be possible 
to sustain in the presence of multi-market contact. 
As discussed in section 2.2, multi-market contact creates better opportunities for aligning the 
incentives to collude and for more flexible ways of addressing cartel problems, including the 
distribution of collusive rents, and dealing with cheating. For example, in the fertiliser cartel, 
the collusion resulted in Sasol becoming the sole supplier of limestone ammonium nitrate 
(LAN (28)) to the wholesale market.27 The firms involved in upstream steel cartels colluded in 
 
26 There is notionally a distinction between multi-market collusion and multi-product collusion, in that products 
in a multi-product cartel may or may not be in the same relevant market. If the products are in separate relevant 
markets, this would be characterised as multi-market collusion. If they are in the same relevant market, this would 
just be multi-product collusion. 




the production and supply of inputs to the steel-to-wire value chain as well as to the steel-to-
reinforcing bar value chain. The upstream steel cartel also had market allocation features. The 
largest millers of maize and wheat products were also involved in collusion at the downstream 
level, where they also competed in the production and supply of retail products such as bread 
and mealie meal. A review of collusion in the construction sector best illustrates this because 
collusion across different types of construction activities allowed firms to allocate contracts 
across different activities through reciprocal cover-pricing and over time. 
As stated in section 2.3, 42 per cent of firms prosecuted between April 1999 and March 2018 
engaged in serial collusion or were part of a group in which another firm participated in 
collusion in another market. The World Bank (2016) reports that for cartels prosecuted in South 
Africa between 2005 and 2015, in 63 per cent of the cases, a firm was also in another cartel in 
a different market of the same sector, or in another sector. The World Bank (2016) uses the 
network mapping technique based on firm ownership links to show the links between colluding 
firms in the agriculture and food sectors. Such analysis reflects the extent of multi-market 
contact between firms that may be colluding in the same cartels, and it shows how multi-market 
contact can lead to the export of collusion as a rational business strategy to other markets or 
sectors. 
The South African cartel record is consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature, which 
shows that cartel conduct is possible to sustain where firms have multi-product/-market contact. 
This is particularly so for the cases reviewed in this section, which were mostly characterised 
by multi-product firms that competed across multiple markets. 
2.4.1.4 Cheating 
As discussed in section 2.2, economic theory shows that cheating can be less profitable than 
honouring the collusive agreement. Cheating is not a feature of cartels that is commonly 
reported in South African case decisions, potentially supporting theoretical predictions. 
However, this may be more a result of the way most prosecutions are finalised rather than 
evidence of the absence of cheating. Cases that are concluded through settlement seldom 
explore the detailed nature of a cartel’s problems and how it resolved those problems. However, 
if cheating had posed a significant risk to collusion, one would have expected that the firms 
involved would have raised the disruptive nature of cheating as part of the negotiations or 




The cement and wire cartels are two cases where cheating was a significant problem, that it 
was discussed in some detail in the cases. The discussion of cheating in the cement cartel arose 
because the solution to such cheating was an adaptation to the collusive arrangement and its 
monitoring mechanisms, which coincided with the transition from a legal cartel to an illegal 
cartel. This also coincided with the beginning of the modern era of cartel enforcement in South 
Africa. 
Cheating in the wire cartel was debated following arguments raised by firms that were facing 
prosecution. The firms argued that the price war that had resulted from cheating signalled a 
breakdown of the collusive arrangements, as opposed to being a means of managing the 
collusive arrangement. Cheating in the wire cartel appeared to have been triggered by a slump 
in demand for at least one of the cartel members, who became financially impatient and decided 
to deviate from the collusive arrangement. In both cases, collusion involved multiple products, 
and the price wars involved more than one product. 
Mondliwa and Das Nair (2019) reported that the reinforcing-bar cartel resolved instances of 
cheating by targeting the customers of the firm that deviated from the agreement to collude. 
Such retaliatory mechanisms continued until the firms regrouped to restore the collusive 
agreement. These cases show that price wars were useful tools for keeping or restoring the 
compatibility of the incentives to collude. In the cement, wire and reinforcing-bar cases, 
cheating and the ensuing reprisals did not end the collusion but were succeeded by adapted 
collusion in the case of the cement cartel and a reversion to the same collusive scheme in the 
cases of the wire and steel cartels. The three cartels were ended by the intervention of the 
competition authorities. 
Some of the cartels that engaged in price fixing adopted simplified pricing structures. In 
industries such as the steel and steel-related markets, pricing was based on simple import-parity 
pricing and delivered-price rules, with changes to prices following changes in international 
steel prices. A standard-pricing formula was used by the scrap metal cartel to fix the purchase 
price of scrap metal. Price changes that followed changes in international steel prices not only 
helped to simplify the pricing structure but also helped cartels to avoid detection, since the 
changes followed a historically industry-accepted notional cost of steel, which customers also 
accepted. The cement cartel used base-point pricing rules. In a cartel like the wire cartel, a 
simple framework of agreed list prices less agreed discounts was applied to all cartelised 




steel products. Simplified structures, coupled with information exchange, involving repeated 
interaction across markets and over time, can mitigate the detrimental effect of cheating on a 
cartel. For some cartels, meetings and telephone discussions were sufficient to resolve cheating 
problems. For others, resolving cheating problems required adapting arrangements, including 
investing in greater information sharing. 
Cheating occurs in cartels, but it does not always lead to the death of a cartel [see, for example 
Levenstein and Suslow (2011)]. Cartels find ways of addressing cheating. This can be through 
price wars, or enhanced monitoring capabilities, or compensation schemes. Some of the cartels 
considered in this chapter experienced cheating, but this did not lead to the death of the cartels. 
Cheating was addressed through price wars and enhanced monitoring capabilities. Other 
factors could also have mitigated the temptation to cheat. These included the prevalence of 
multi-market contact, joint ventures, payment schemes and the vertical nature of collusion. 
Cheating has not been widely reported in South African cartel cases, except for a few. In the 
cement and wire cartel cases, it appears that the price wars were symmetrical, involving all the 
cartel members moving to a non-collusive phase, at least with some products. In the rebar case, 
the cartel members targeted the customers of the cheating member. In all the cases, the phases 
of cheating and retaliation did not cause cartel death but re-established the agreement. The 
observation that cheating is not the pre-eminent cause of cartel collapse was also observed in 
studies such as Levenstein and Suslow (2006 and 2011). 
2.4.1.5 Vertical features of some South African cartels 
A feature of some of the key South African cartels was the vertical nature of collusion. Several 
of the major cartels involved cartel members that were vertically integrated and were involved 
in cartels either at both levels of the value chain or where a firm was dominant upstream was 
involved, in some way,28 in collusion at the downstream level. Examples of cartels in which 
the same firms or some of the firms were involved in cartels both downstream and upstream 
included those in the steel and wire industries; cartels in agriculture and the agro-processing 
industry; cartels in maize and wheat milling, which were also involved in bread and maize 
milled products; the wooden products cartel, in which an upstream cartel supplied raw board 
to downstream competitors that they also competed against; and cartels in the chemical-to-
 
28 This could be directly through itself or a wholly-owned subsidiary, or indirectly through, for example, some 




fertiliser value chain. The major construction firms were also vertically integrated, with 
involvement in collusion at various levels of the value chain. The upstream cartel or major 
upstream firms supplied key inputs to the downstream cartel, which the firms were also part 
of. The glass cartel involved a dominant upstream firm that was also involved in or appeared 
to support downstream collusion. This phenomenon raises economics questions, explored 
below. 
Upstream and downstream markets are complementary in nature, and vertically integrated 
firms are, in theory, expected to have the incentive to reduce prices [Bishop and Walker 
(2010)]. This is because a higher price at the upstream level reduces demand for the product 
upstream and reduces demand for the downstream product. With this economic effect, both the 
upstream and downstream businesses benefit, through higher sales volumes and revenue, from 
a lower price being charged at either level of the value chain. A cartel at each level of the value 
chain is expected to raise prices above the competitive level, meaning that the existence of each 
cartel undermines the demand for its own product and the product at another level. Given this 
effect, the incentives to participate in cartels operating at complementary levels of the value 
chain are not obvious. 
The firms that colluded at upstream and downstream levels were significant suppliers of the 
respective products at each level and supplied inputs to other downstream firms. For example, 
firms that operated the upstream wheat milling cartel were the largest suppliers of flour 
products, and the same firms also supplied a significant share of supply of bread products 
(estimated to be between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the domestic bread market).29 They 
also supplied flour to some downstream independent bakeries, which they competed with. A 
similar observation can be made for the upstream steel cartels, which also competed in 
downstream markets, where they were major suppliers of steel input products. Sasol and its 
competitors supplied inputs to their downstream competitor, Nutri-Flo. 
The supply of key inputs to downstream competitors gave upstream firms that also participated 
in downstream cartels influence over the costs of the key inputs of downstream members of 
the cartels. Control over the supply and costs of key inputs potentially helps address incentives 
to cheat by smaller non-vertically integrated rivals and to marginalise those that attempt to 
undermine the cartels. It also means that the smaller cartel members potentially become 
 
29 The remainder of the market was supplied by about 4,000 smaller independent bakeries comprising stand-alone, 




followers of the larger vertically integrated cartel members. In a situation like the bread cartel, 
independent bakeries faced marginalisation in two ways. First, through upstream cartel 
overcharges, which Mncube (2014) estimated to range between seven per cent and 42 per cent 
and, second, through exclusionary behaviour.30 This mitigates the risks that firm asymmetries 
pose to collusion, as smaller firms may find it better to align with the cartel arrangement than 
attempt to be mavericks. The vertically integrated structure of collusion, where the larger firms 
control most of the supply, means that these firms have greater control over value chains and 
distribution networks, rather than merely being content with cartelising only one level of the 
value chain. This enhances the probability of the success of collusion. 
The use of supply and production agreements also appeared in cartel arrangements. Some firms 
in the wire cartel used distributorship arrangements, where one cartel member would exit some 
geographic regions and have their products distributed exclusively by a fellow cartel member 
in those areas. The firms saw exclusive distributorship as a solution to incidents of price 
competition (cheating). Firms in the fertiliser and related-chemicals cartel used toll-
manufacturing and supply agreements. While these arrangements may appear to be vertical in 
nature, they are, in effect, horizontal co-ordination arrangements reinforcing collusion. 
Participation in collusion at two successive levels of the value chain weakens or eliminates 
competition at both levels. This may result in higher prices overall along the value chain, 
making vertically integrated cartels more successful. Operating at two levels means that the 
cartel can capture upstream sales that are lost when independent downstream firms are 
foreclosed. The ability of effective competition at one level to potentially undermine collusion 
and the exercising of market power at another level is weakened, as the same firms control 
production and supply at both levels. In this study, the author concludes that the observed 
vertically integrated cartel structure of some cartels enabled the cartels to exercise market 
power better than would have been the case if the firms had colluded at only one level. 
The vertical features of collusion (firms colluding in cartels operating at successive levels of 
the value chain) are not widely discussed in economic theory and in empirical studies. 
Discussions about the impact of vertical integration and restraints on collusion mostly focus on 
helping firms become more symmetrical, enhancing transparency through information sharing 
and raising entry barriers. These would appear to remain relevant in the case of the cartels 
 




discussed in this section, but they do not necessarily address the incentives of firms to collude 
at successive levels of the value chain. The inference drawn in this study from collusion at 
successive levels of the value chain is that these institutional features enhanced the success of 
firms at colluding. 
2.4.2 Dealing with threats of entry 
Cartels try to charge supra-competitive prices and earn higher margins. If a cartel lasts for 
several years, higher margins are expected to attract entry by firms outside the market. 
Expansion by those outside the collusive arrangement in turn destabilises the cartel. Levenstein 
and Suslow (2006) found entry to be a significant contributor to the death of cartels. Effective 
cartels succeed in restricting the entry and expansion of firms outside the collusive 
arrangements. The World Bank (2016) reports that most cartelised markets in South Africa 
were highly concentrated, with high entry barriers. The focus of this dissertation was on 
examining how South African cartels deployed strategic entry barriers over and above other 
forms of entry barriers that characterised the markets. From the cartel data and developments 
in trade tariffs, the author identified two ways through which cartels could have deployed 
strategic entry barriers. First, they could have done so in the form of exclusionary conduct and, 
second, by advocating for, or supporting protectionist instruments such as trade tariffs. 
2.4.2.1 Exclusionary behaviour 
The evidence from some cartels shows that cartels used a variety of entry and expansion 
deterrence strategies. These strategies can broadly be categorised into predatory behaviour, 
price discrimination and margin-squeeze types of exclusionary conduct. The latter types of 
exclusionary conduct were facilitated by the vertically integrated nature of the leading firms in 
some cartels. Some of these firms also supplied key inputs to their downstream competitors. 
In the bread cartel, one of the larger firms, Pioneer Foods, employed predatory strategies 
against smaller independent bakeries, marginalising them in the process.31 Part of the 
allegations in the bread cartel was that the agreement also included not supplying bread to new 
bread distributors and to one another’s former employees. This conduct appeared to be aimed 
at limiting the disruptive impact of new distributors and former employees on collusion. 
 




Although it was not prosecuted, Arcelor Mittal was accused of engaging in exclusionary 
conduct by one of the smaller maverick downstream competitors. Notably, in its settlement 
with the Commission, Arcelor Mittal agreed to remedies relating to its pricing conduct.32 It 
must be stated that the complainant reserved their right to review the settlement agreement 
between the Commission and Arcelor Mittal.33 Similarly, in the wooden board industry, two 
duopoly cartelists34 in the supply of raw wooden board, who also competed in the downstream 
market, were accused of engaging in exclusionary conduct through margin squeeze-type 
conduct. 
In the fertiliser value chain, Nutri-Flo complained that it was subjected to exclusionary 
behaviour through excessive pricing conduct linked to the pricing of inputs.35 This conduct 
appeared to have been supported by the vertical nature of collusion, where some cartel 
members were suppliers of critical inputs to their own downstream competitors, who in turn, 
were either in the collusive ring or outside of the collusive ring. The vertical nature of collusion 
in this case helped with managing the internal dynamics of the collusive arrangements, as 
discussed above, and with limiting the impact of external threats to the cartels. 
Another feature of entry or expansion deterrence is the use of vertical restraints to deny new 
entrants access to customers or suppliers. The scrap metal cartel used exclusive-supply 
agreements to limit the supply of scrap metal to customers outside the collusive arrangement 
and to restrict the purchase of scrap metal from suppliers outside of the collusive ring. In 
markets that are characterised by economies of scale and scope, this conduct can effectively 
neutralise the threats that entry and expansion can pose to a cartel. 
2.4.2.2 Strategic use of protectionist instruments such as trade tariffs 
In some South African markets (e.g. steel, grain, textiles, etc.), imports present the next best 
alternative for customers, and historically, pricing was import-parity-based. For some cartels, 
the threat of import constraints was limited by import tariffs. A review of the post-1999 era of 
regulation shows that firms in some cartelised markets, either directly or through third parties 
such as trade associations, opposed the removal or reduction of import tariffs and in some 
 
32 See the Tribunal's press release dated 16 November 2016, available at: https://www.comptrib.co.za/case-
detail/7177. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See the Tribunal decision in case number CO030May19. 




instances applied for the increasing of tariffs. In this instance, the behaviour appears to have 
continued even after the cartels had ended, suggesting that firms may have had the incentive to 
limit competition from imports even long after the cartel conduct had ended. 
During the period of collusion, tyre manufacturers through their industry body (SATMC), 
opposed a reduction in tariffs on some tyres.36 The same manufacturers even opposed the 
reduction of tariffs on imported second-hand types, partly because of the rising incidence of 
second-hand tyres and the downward impact on the price of new tyres.37 Similarly, during the 
period of collusion, the Association of Electric Cable Manufacturers of South Africa opposed 
an application for rebates on tariffs on cables and wire products classifiable under the broader 
tariff heading, which could have been read to include imported products that competed with 
their products. The association argued that the rebates would have increased imports and 
“caused injury” to the domestic industry.38 Even in the post-cartel era, some of these firms 
continued to request tariff increases or to oppose the reduction or removal of tariffs, or the 
introduction of rebates on imported competing products. For example, in 2010, around the time 
the electric cables cartel was reported to have ended, the Association of Electronic Cable 
Manufacturers of South Africa also raised concerns that the introduction of import rebates on 
insulated electric cables would, among other considerations, have eroded support provided to 
domestic manufacturers of cables.39 
In 2005, the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa (ITAC) 
undertook a review of the customs tariff regime that applied to wheat, wheat flour and wheat-
related downstream products. The review task team included industry participants and bodies 
such as the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC). The review showed that 
wheaten flour and wheat-related downstream products enjoyed significant tariff support. 
Although the proposal was rejected by ITAC, the industry advocated for the raising of import 
tariffs on wheat and wheat flour products.40 At the time, South Africa was a net importer of 










businesses.41 It is notable, however, that wheat-milling businesses benefited from the rebates 
applicable to wheat, which lowered their costs of wheat. ITAC noted that imports were not 
posing significant competition to the wheat milling industry, which enjoyed tariff protection. 
The wheat milling industry continued to enjoy significant tariff support after the review. 
ITAC undertook a review of tariffs in the steel industry in 2005, observing that the industry, 
which relied on import parity pricing, was protected from international competition through 
the geographic isolation of South Africa and a five per cent tariff that applied to imports, which 
it regarded as superfluous.42 The review sought to find ways of reducing the cost of steel that 
downstream industries faced and considered removing the tariffs on imported primary steel 
products. SAISI, the industry body, opposed removal of the tariffs, arguing instead for the 
maintenance of the tariff. Columbus Stainless and the Southern African Stainless Steel 
Development Association opposed removal of tariffs on stainless steel products, cautioning 
that this could negatively affect the viability of primary producers. 
These observations do not undermine the policy use of tariffs to protect the legitimate interests 
of any nation and the right of firms to fight for issues of interest to the markets they operate in. 
It calls for close examination of the legitimacy of the interests represented in these actions – 
that is, in opposing the reduction or removal of import tariffs or supporting the imposition or 
increase of current tariffs. Tariff support is one way that firms may rely on to dampen 
competition, especially in those markets where domestic entry is less likely to occur. For 
example, in 2014 the South African Wire Association and some members of the erstwhile wire 
cartel supported an application by one of its members to introduce tariffs on imported wire 
products.43 Similarly, in 2015 SAISI on behalf of the upstream steel producers who were part 
of the upstream steel cartel, together with Highveld Steel and Vanadium Limited, applied for 
tariffs on various products.44 
Tariff protection provides a costless mechanism for cartels to manage the external threats posed 
by imports of inputs and final products that compete with the products of cartel members. The 
 
41 Premier Foods commented about the upward cost impact of such moves; the concern appears to have been more 
about the input cost impact on its wheat milling business, and not necessarily the higher prices that consumers 








cartel does not need to engage in any exclusionary conduct, which results in a sacrifice in short-
term profits, yet it could still effectively partially support collusion. 
2.4.3 Summary of key lessons from the characteristics of detected cartels and 
institutional features of key cartels 
Several lessons can be drawn from the review of the characteristics of detected cartels and the 
institutional features of collusion. The features of cartels include the following:  
(i) Cartels employed a mixture of collusive practices, which were probably driven by the 
nature of the transactions with customers and the ease with which the co-ordinating 
mechanism could be used. 
(ii) Collusion happened across all sectors of the economy, but was concentrated in 
manufacturing, trade, transport and construction. The communications and health 
sectors had the lowest cartel detection rates. The number of firms per cartel varied 
widely, from two to as many as 20 firms of differing sizes. The large number of firms 
in some cartels might be because show that for the cartels to be able to control market 
prices, they needed to incorporate as many firms as possible. However, in some sectors, 
this might simply have reflected the continuance of a culture of co-operation that 
predated the current competition law regime. 
(iii) On average, most cartels lasted several years, with average firm participation in a cartel 
between 1999 and 2018 being six years, but this number varied by cartel, firm, and 
sector. The shortest cartel lifespan was less than a year, and the longest lifespan was 17 
years. 
(iv) Evidence from studies of cartel overcharges in South Africa shows that cartels were 
able to exercise market power to significant but varying degrees. 
The institutional features of detected cartels and selected key cartels reveal several lessons, 
which are as follows: 
(i) Communication in detected South African cartels took place using meetings, telephonic 
discussions, emails and, in some cases, involved extensive information-sharing 
structures. Communication was not always centralised and could have been bilateral 
and informal. Cartels can use a combination of different forms of communication, for 
example, meetings, telephone discussions and extensive information-sharing 




conduct of fellow cartel members who try to cheat on collusive arrangements. The 
normal sales team infrastructures and relationships can help cartels monitor and detect 
cheating by fellow cartel members, and this monitoring can happen at a firm level, and 
not necessarily at a centralised, cartel level. As such, cartels do not necessarily need to 
invest in costly, extensive and centralised monitoring systems. 
The theoretical literature addressing collusion under imperfection should be expanded 
to consider how using combined mechanisms of communication and monitoring could 
succeed in closing the gaps left by incomplete information, making collusion more 
successful. For example, firms that collude on parts of a price (e.g. list prices) could 
monitor the uncertainties of discounting practices using their sales team infrastructures 
and customer contracts with matching clauses to complement monitoring through an 
exchange of sales information. Cartels are not restricted to using just one centralised 
mechanism. Similarly, firms that collude repeatedly over time could build sufficient 
knowledge of the businesses and cost structures of their rivals, especially if production 
processes are similar and do not change significantly over time. Further, there is need 
to examine the effectiveness of indirect communication in facilitating collusion. This 
can be done by examining the extent of overcharges in those cases where indirect 
communication is employed compared to those cases where cartel members have more 
direct communication, controlling for other factors that impact on overcharges. 
(ii) Some cartels use compensation/payment schemes, joint ventures, sub-contracting, and 
other arrangements. These are similar to those shown in the literature on other types of 
arrangements [e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2006,2011) and Porter (2005)]. These 
arrangements are useful mechanisms for keeping incentives compatible and distributing 
collusive rents among cartel members. 
(iii) Multi-market or multi-product collusion is a feature of many cartels. This is consistent 
with the theoretical and empirical literature. There is a high likelihood that firms that 
interact in several markets will collude in other markets after these firms have formed 
a cartel in one market. 
(iv) Cheating happens in cartels, but it is not widely reported as a big problem that 
threatened and led to the death of detected cartels in South Africa. In cases where it was 
reported, it did not lead to the death of the cartels. Ensuing price wars led to the re-




(v) Some key detected cartels exhibited vertical features of collusion, where firms collude 
at successive levels of the value chain. Cartels seek to raise prices above competitive 
levels, and this is expected to have the effect of reducing the demand for the cartelised 
products and those of the complementary products at the next level of the value chain. 
This means that firms operating at each level of the value chain are expected not to 
condone or participate in a cartel at the next level of the value chain. The participation 
of the same firms in cartels at multiple, successive levels of the value chain suggests 
that relaxing competition at successive levels in some instances enhances the prospects 
of success or the effectiveness of collusion, with collusive rents being distributed 
between the upstream and downstream levels of the value chain; otherwise, this feature 
would not be present. This feature of collusion is not widely addressed in the economics 
literature. 
(vi) As expected in the economics literature, cartels deal with external threats through 
exclusionary conduct, which may be supported by the vertically integrated nature of 
larger firms involved in collusion that also supply key inputs to their rivals at the next 
level of the value chain. In South Africa, imports offered the next best alternative source 
of supply for inputs, and import tariffs appear to provide a way of mitigating the impact 
of imports on cartel stability. A review of the activity of firms or their trade associations 
in the realm of trade tariffs suggests that cartels potentially saw this as a viable, costless 
tool for mitigating the impact of imports. The strategic use of trade tariffs to limit the 
impact of competition may continue even long after the cartels end. 
2.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
In many ways, South African cartels have been supported by a combination of many of the 
factors that are identified in the theoretical and empirical literature. South African cartels have 
also adopted institutional features that are consistent with the theoretical and empirical 
literature. The South African cartel record confirms that cartels are not and will never be perfect 
organisations. They will face various challenges, whether they be challenges in aligning 
disparate interests, cheating or the threat of entry or expansion by firms outside the cartels. 
This, however, does not make them ineffective or inherently unstable to the extent that they 
would cease to exist. Instead, the record of detected cartels shows that a lot of the cartels lasted 




collective market power afforded by collusion. Cartels find ways of managing the threats that 
confront them. 
Of the various institutional features available to cartels in South Africa, it is worth emphasising 
three that were observable from the key cartels: communication, the vertical nature of 
collusion, and the potential use of trade policy tools by cartels. 
Relating to the first of these, communication in cartels is important and was prevalent across 
all detected cartels. Communication takes various forms, and not every aspect of 
communication needs to be centralised within the cartel structure. It happens at different levels 
within firms and can be complemented by the various mechanisms available to firms in the 
ordinary course of business (e.g. sales teams infrastructure, customer relationships and learning 
effects built over time). Given the prevalence of cartels, the various forms that communication 
can take, and the various mechanisms that cartels can use to complement imperfect 
information, there is the possibility that economics theory presently overstates the uncertainties 
and complexities of collusion and consequently sets very restrictive requirements for successful 
collusion. 
Second among the three emphasised features of the key South African cartels is that they had 
a vertical dimension, which appeared to contribute significantly to their successful collusion in 
two ways. On the one hand, it helped with aligning the internal interests of the cartel members, 
by exposing the smaller cartel members to the discipline of their larger fellow cartel members, 
who by virtue of vertical integration, controlled key inputs while also colluding in upstream 
markets. On the other hand, control over key inputs by vertically integrated upstream cartels 
placed those firms in the upstream market in a better position to deal with the external threats 
of entry or expansion by firms outside the downstream cartels, since the cartels essentially 
controlled the value chains and distribution networks associated with their products. By 
relaxing the competition at successive levels of the value chain, the vertically integrated cartels 
were better placed to succeed and exert themselves. 
Third among the emphasised features of the key South African cartels was the use of trade 
tariffs to dampen the threats posed by imports. For most downstream rivals, the next best 
alternative to getting inputs from vertically integrated cartel members was imports. In this area, 
the input markets were in some instances protected, using import-parity pricing and trade tariffs 




representing the cartel members. Higher prices for imports would have made them an 
unattractive alternative source of supply, forcing downstream rivals outside the collusive 
arrangement to rely on vertically integrated cartel members for supply. This weakened the 
ability of these rivals to threaten the cartels. Similarly, weakening constraints from imports of 
final products in downstream markets weakens the threat to downstream collusion. 
There are several policy implications that emerge from the examination of the institutional 
features of collusion in South Africa: 
(i) In cartel investigations, there is need for the competition authorities to examine the 
nature of communication between the employees of various firms at different levels. 
This communication need not be limited to physical meetings, email, and telephonic 
contact, but could include informal and indirect communication. Such an examination 
should extend to the institutional structure of trade associations and third-party bodies 
that suspected cartelists interact with. These third-party bodies could even include 
government bodies. It is important to note that information exchange does not need to 
be centralised within a cartel structure, or to eliminate all uncertainty to be effective in 
aiding collusion. Some aspects of monitoring can occur at the firm level. This is 
particularly the case where there are long-standing horizontal and vertical relationships 
between firms, where firms have sufficient knowledge of rivals’ businesses, and cartel 
members have long-standing relationships with customers. 
(ii) The second policy implication, given the vertical nature of collusion in some of the 
cartels, is that once there are suspicions of collusion at one level of the value chain, it 
is important for the competition authorities to examine the possibility of collusion at 
other levels, or in other markets where the same firm interacts with its fellow cartel 
members. Mapping cross-shareholding or cross-directorships should be undertaken, 
and where collusion is proven, it should be addressed with remedies. The vertical nature 
of collusion also places vertically integrated cartel members that supply key inputs to 
non-cartel members in a better position to restrict the entry or growth of a competitive 
fringe. This means that allegations of exclusionary conduct in markets suspected of 
collusion or where collusion had previously been proven should be examined, not just 
as standalone abuse conduct, but also as part of a coherent theory of collusion. Upstream 
firms may not individually meet the legal dominance threshold for abuse but could 




The same applies to the use of vertical restraints between firms suspected of collusion, 
and between firms suspected of collusion and their customers. 
(iii) The third policy implication is that cartel investigations or screening for collusion 
should also involve a search for the existence of joint ventures, the incidence of sub-
contracting, cross-payments, cross-supply, and toll-manufacturing arrangements 
between firms suspected of collusion. In so doing, the commercial rationale for such 
arrangements should be carefully examined, especially where there are no capacity 
constraints. Sub-contracting arrangements should be cross-checked against bidding 
behaviour and tracked over several contracts that the firms have or could have 
participated in, rather than just the individual contracts under scrutiny. This should help 
build a more complete picture of the organisation and management of collusion. 
(iv) The fourth policy implication is that multi-product firms that are suspected of colluding 
in one market should be screened for collusion in other markets, and links between 
collusion in various markets should be examined. This is because the management of 
collusion could involve a quid pro quo structure that spans more than one market or 
product and treating collusion in each market separately is likely to lead to a partial 
understanding of the framework of collusion employed by the firms. A partial 
understanding of collusion undermines deterrence. 
(v) The final policy implication is that in markets where imports present the next best 
alternative source of supply for key inputs, other than the firms suspected of cartel 
conduct, investigations of collusion should incorporate an examination of the activities 
of cartel members or their trade bodies in advocating for or supporting the imposition 
of trade tariffs on competing imported products. This could be a useful and costless way 
for cartels to raise entry barriers. Where government is contemplating imposing tariff 
protection for domestic firms, it is necessary to tie such support to clear growth and 
developmental goals that include preserving domestic competition. Failure to do so 
raises the risk of supporting the stability of collusion, by protecting cartel members 
from the destabilising effects of import competition. The willingness and role of 
government in making collusion possible, whether inadvertently or as a result of 
balancing other policy considerations such as supporting domestic industry, requires 
further study. This further study should balance the anticipated policy benefits of the 
initiatives against the costs posed by cartels on consumers, the competitive process and 
the economy. Where possible, the policy initiatives should include mechanisms that 





The pricing dynamics of a multi-product cartel 
3.1 Introduction 
Having identified, in the previous chapter, that a significant number of cartels detected and 
prosecuted in South Africa involved multi-product collusion, in this chapter panel data is used 
to explore the pricing dynamics of a multi-product cartel with known phases of instability, 
though the exact duration and timing of those phases may be less certain. The wire cartel is 
used as a case study with the aim of better understanding the estimation of overcharges on 
different products, in a context where prices for the various products were set within the same 
collusive framework. Cartel overcharges can vary by product for reasons that include 
differences in conditions of demand and supply. This raises questions for competition 
authorities and courts when judging overcharges by a multi-product cartel, which may be a 
consideration in determining penalties or in damages claims. 
Typically, firms that participate in a multi-product cartel face a single investigation for all the 
products that they cartelise and will each pay a single penalty relating to all the cartelised 
products. For instance, concerning the wire cartel, a single case was formulated for all its cartel-
related conduct, arguably because this was perpetrated by the same firms, despite it covering 
multiple products and taking different forms. In many instances, firms that participate in 
multiple cartels pay a single penalty for multiple cases of cartel conduct. The question that 
arises is whether the competition authorities and courts should rely on an average of 
overcharges on different products or treat each product on its own merits and find a pragmatic 
rule for determining the overall penalty. Addressing this question requires developing a deeper 
understanding of the overcharges at the product level, since the time-series properties of 
aggregate data (across all products) may differ significantly from those at the product level. 
The wire cartel offered some useful insights into variations in cartel overcharges over the life 
of the conspiracy, because of changes in demand and supply conditions and in the dynamics of 
the cartel itself over its lifespan. The cartel period represents the typical lifespan of a cartel, 
proceeding through phases of stability, instability, readjustment following a period of 
instability, and eventually breakdown. The cement cartel, which involved multiple products, 
went through similar phases as it adjusted after the end of the legal cartel in 1996 [see Boshoff 




succeeded by a period of re-establishment and, subsequently, a sustained period of collusion. 
Similarly, the wire cartel was characterised by intermittent periods of instability. As argued 
below, this raises questions about the appropriate technique to use in determining overcharges 
from such a cartel. For instance, the use of a before-and-after approach, which fails to account 
for the different phases, may produce biased overcharge estimates. 
The ability of cartels to raise prices above the competitive level varies over the term of the 
conspiracy: collusive prices may fluctuate depending on cartel efficacy. Estimating 
overcharges at different times allowed the author to explore temporal variations in cartel 
overcharges. It also presented an opportunity to account for the presence of phases of instability 
during the life of the conspiracy. The wire cartel provided fertile ground for developing 
practical insights and understanding some of the issues in overcharge estimations. It also helped 
highlight the drawbacks of approaches that assume that a cartel’s pricing power remains the 
same throughout its lifespan. The presence of unstable periods of collusion has practical 
implications for the courts handling damages claims and competition authorities wishing to use 
overcharges to demonstrate their value-add. 
The author used panel data and the during-and-after45 technique, with dummy variables 
capturing the cartel effects. As shown by Boswijk, Bun and Schinkel (2019), misdating the 
beginning and ending of a cartel has serious consequences for estimated overcharges, and this 
will also apply to misdating the beginning and ending of the periods of instability. The stable 
collusive periods were captured using dummy variables for the different cartel phases, taking 
the value of 1 during the phases of collusion and 0 otherwise. The author controlled for known 
periods of instability (which cartel members commonly termed the price war period), using a 
separate dummy variable for those episodes that allowed for the isolation and capture of the 
pure cartel effect. In the study three alternative assumptions about the transition period between 
collusive and non-collusive episodes were made: 
(i) First, it assumed that a transition period between collusion and competition could be 
captured using a separate dummy variable. 
 
45 This is the before-and-after technique, but the study took the period after the conspiracy as being competitive. 
The study acknowledged that there is significant debate about the appropriateness of using the post-period as a 
competitive benchmark, due to the challenges associated with identifying the ending of the cartel and its effects. 
This period was taken because of the availability of data, and different dates were taken as the ending of the 




(ii) The second assumption made in the study was that there was a linear transition period 
between collusive pricing and competitive pricing. A separate indicator variable was 
used for the unstable periods, and different cartel phases were captured using separate 
dummy variables for each phase. 
(iii) A third assumption made was that there was no transition period, so that the cartel 
instantly adjusted from pricing at collusive levels to pricing at competitive levels. 
Again, a separate indicator variable captured the unstable phases and separate dummy 
variables were used to capture the individual phases of collusion. 
Panel-data analyses enabled the study to capture the dynamics of collusion across the multiple 
products involved. Each dummy variable that captured the cartel effect in each phase allowed 
for observation and comparison of the magnitude of overcharges in each phase relative to the 
other phases. This enabled the author to observe temporal variations in overcharges. As 
discussed below, the results for the wire cartel show that overcharges varied significantly by 
products and over time, with some products having demonstrably low and statistically 
insignificant overcharges. In other products, the measured overcharge decreased significantly 
from one collusive phase to the next. Overall, the results reveal that the cartel under study was 
imperfect, and cartel members potentially faced significant competition for some products 
within the collusive framework (e.g. from a competitive fringe). The results also show that the 
cartel optimised its pricing on different products in line with the constraints it faced. 
This chapter, therefore, contributes to the economic literature on overcharge estimation for (i) 
multi-product collusion, (ii) multi-period collusion where the price effects vary across collusive 
phases; and (iii) where transitions between collusion and competition can take different forms. 
The next section reviews the literature related to these three themes. 
3.2 Review of literature on multi-product pricing, collusion, and overcharges 
This section presents a discussion of three dimensions of the economic literature on cartel 
pricing. First, the author selectively reviewed the economic literature on the pricing behaviour 
of multi-product firms, focusing on multi-product firms involved in collusion. When firms 
produce multiple products, they can be expected to implement pricing in a way that optimises 
cost recovery, revenue and profitability across their entire product portfolio, and the same 
considerations may remain relevant in a cartel setting. As noted earlier, this literature is relevant 




products. Second, the author surveyed the economic literature on methodologies for measuring 
overcharges, focusing on those that were relevant to the approach adopted in this chapter. 
Third, given that the post-cartel period was adopted as the counterfactual period, the author 
also reviewed the literature on how to account for the transition from collusion to competition 
following the collapse of a cartel. In this regard, the importance of correctly dating the end of 
collusion was considered. 
The review was focused on the international literature, but it included references to overcharge 
studies based on South African cases. The approaches applied in the South African studies fell 
within the same classes of techniques as those applied in international empirical work. 
3.2.1 Brief review of literature on the pricing behaviour of multi-product firms 
Firms in most markets produce and supply multiple related products that share elements of the 
production process, e.g. production equipment, production space, staff members, among 
others. Further, where a firm produces multiple products, some products are likely to be value-
added product extensions of base products. In such markets, the optimal pricing strategy may 
be to ensure that overall production costs (including common costs) are recouped throughout 
the entire portfolio of products [O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013)]. This necessarily means that 
the firm earns different margins for products facing demand with different price elasticities. 
O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013) suggest that in such circumstances, it might be more insightful 
to analyse the pricing policy of a multi-product firm in its entirety and not in a piecemeal 
fashion, product by product. Although argued in the context of excessive pricing, it appears 
that the same reasoning might be relevant to a setting in which a firm involved in collusion is 
faced with given costs and produces multiple products that face different demand and supply 
conditions. The pricing decisions of the firm are potentially informed by the need to optimise 
the recovery of costs or maximise revenue generation, which in turn enables the firm to 
optimise and generate the highest possible aggregate profit. In that setting, the ability to impose 
overcharges can be expected to vary by product. The presence of a competitive fringe, which 
affects some, but not all products, can also affect the magnitude of cartel overcharges on 
selected products. 
Harrington (1987) examined the feasibility of collusion involving multi-product firms where 
the products were related. The study examined whether the output decision of a firm in one 




over and above the past behaviour of its rivals of the product, or in the market in question. 
Harrington argued that this is plausible where two products share cost or have demand 
dependencies. The study also showed that collusion is possible because of the existence of 
credible punishment extending to another product or market, as well as the possibility that 
collusion in the product of concern may also cease, leading to reversion to competition and 
thereby raising the cost of defection. 
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) studied the relationship between multi-market contact and 
collusion in a repeated game setting, drawing three key conclusions. First, multi-market contact 
can enhance collusion. Second, firms benefit from multi-market contact. Third, the impact of 
multi-market contact is not necessarily socially undesirable. More significant for this chapter, 
the authors found that the impact of multi-market contact on prices or profits in any one of the 
contact markets was significantly influenced by the nature of the markets and the features of 
the firms involved, as well as by potential entrants. The authors argued that when firms face 
cost asymmetries, prices may be higher or lower depending on discount factors, whereas with 
similar firms, prices and profits may be higher in some markets than in others. Multi-market 
contact leads to interdependent behaviour across markets, meaning that when an event occurs 
in one market, correlations can be observed with prices in other markets. 
Extending the work of Bernheim and Whinston, Spagnolo (1999) argued that there exists 
another circumstance in which multi-market contact always facilitates collusion. This occurs 
when strategic interactions between firms are interdependent, with the consequence that a 
firm’s valuation of profits in one market is influenced by profits achieved in other markets. 
Punishment is more effective, and collusion is more profitable when multi-market contact 
exists. Spagnolo concurred with the findings of Bernheim and Whinston’s study, arguing that 
when the circumstances identified by them exist for collusion to arise from multi-market 
contact, the pro-collusive effect is stronger. Matsushima (2001) showed, at a theoretical level, 
that multi-market contact facilitates implicit collusion, even under imperfect monitoring. This 
is especially the case when firms’ supply choices in individual markets depend on 
developments in those markets and developments in other markets. 
Using collusion in airlines, Ciliberto and Williams (2014) empirically studied the relationship 
between multi-market contact and collusion. The authors found that airlines that interacted in 
multiple markets co-operated in setting fares, which was consistent with the findings from the 




hand, the authors found that airlines that did not enjoy multi-market contact did not co-operate 
on fare-setting behaviour. The impact of multi-market contact on prices was significantly 
affected by cross-price elasticities. 
As such, the presence of multi-product or -market contact, especially where products are 
related, makes collusion more likely to involve a wider range of products or markets. This 
factor has been widely flagged in the economic literature as possibly facilitating collusion. 
Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the significance of this factor in South African cartels and 
shows that it has been a feature of collusion. Cartels such as those in the wheat-to-bread and 
steel value chains involved the same firms colluding on several products and markets. This is 
supported by the evidence presented in Chapter 2. The World Bank (2016) found that 48 of the 
collusion cases that had been uncovered involved a firm that had colluded in another market in 
the same sector or in a different one, and for at least 20 of the cartels where there was a leniency 
application, the leniency application came from a firm that had applied for immunity for 
multiple cartels. 
The theoretical literature cited above shows that multi-product cartels recognise inter-
dependencies between products and markets and take that into account when making pricing 
decisions. However, there is limited empirical work examining the way multi-product firms 
involved in collusion approach the pricing of individual cartelised products. This study 
contributes to the empirical literature in this aspect. 
3.2.2 Brief review of literature on multi-period collusion 
Apart from the many cartels operating across multiple products, evidence from an examination 
of the duration of cartels shows that most cartels operated over multiple periods [see, for 
example, Chapter 2, above; World Bank (2016); and Levenstein and Suslow (2006; 2011)]. 
Macroeconomic conditions, conditions of demand and supply, and firm-specific financial 
circumstances fluctuate over the duration of an existing cartel. As these fluctuations occur, firm 
incentives to honour the collusive agreement may shift, leading to deviations from the collusive 
equilibrium. These deviations could lead to a shift to a non-collusive equilibrium. Cartels that 
survive the impact of these fluctuations adapt their conduct to the circumstances, in some 
instances investing in mechanisms to keep incentives intact and making compromises where 
necessary (e.g. accepting a lower overcharge in one period compared with another). Adaptation 




throughout their lifespan. Briefly discussed below is some literature on the relationship 
between fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions, demand and supply conditions, and the 
financial condition of firms and cartel success. 
Green and Porter (1984) predict that a negative shock to demand that is not observed will result 
in a price war, while Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that price wars will arise during 
booms. This suggests that changes in economic and market conditions result in changes in the 
pricing behaviour of firms, including when they are involved in a cartel. Markets experiencing 
moderate growth are more likely to support collusion than those that are either rapidly 
shrinking or rapidly growing [Symeonidis (2003)]. Rapid growth increases the chances of entry 
and raises the level of uncertainty. Jacquemin, Nambu and Dewez (1981) made similar findings 
on the impact of higher demand growth on the duration of a cartel. Any given market can be 
expected to go through various phases, growing moderately or rapidly at some point, or 
experiencing decline as the macroeconomic and demand environment may dictate. Eckbo 
(1976) examined the relationship between demand elasticity and the success of cartels and 
found that cartels’ success in raising prices significantly was possible if demand was inelastic 
and the cartel faced limited threats from substitutes in the short term. 
The ability to raise prices can vary as substitutes or new entrants emerge over time. The threat 
of entry is a significant contributor to cartel death [Levenstein and Suslow (2006;2011)]. The 
ability of a cartel to institute entry deterrence successfully over time will also affect its ability 
to raise prices significantly over the course of its lifespan. If the threat of entry increases in 
time, the ability of the cartel to significantly raise prices over multiple periods can be expected 
to progressively decline. 
Similarly, Levenstein and Suslow (2011) argue that fluctuations in the discount rates of firms 
affect the prospects of cartels’ success. Firms facing financial challenges may become 
impatient, causing them to deviate from the collusive equilibrium. As such, fluctuations in 
discount rates affect the pricing behaviour of firms during the life of the cartel. A firm facing 
financial distress may also not be as concerned about punishment for deviation, given its more 
immediate need for cash compared with waiting for collusive rents, which may not be sufficient 
to keep it afloat. 
Although this section places the emphasis on some literature relating to macroeconomic 




rates on the incentives for firms, and the threat of entry, other challenges facing the cartel could 
also affect the ability of firms to continually exercise cartel market power. These include 
imperfect information, which may enable episodic cheating to go undetected. Furthermore, if 
the threat of cartel detection by the competition authorities increases over time, a cartel may 
progressively adapt its pricing to avoid detection, meaning that it may realise varying 
overcharges over time. Harrington (2004) discussed cartel pricing dynamics when there is a 
risk of detection by a competition authority and finds that cartel prices may be lower if 
sanctions are endogenous and the probability of detection is fixed. In that case, the cartel price 
path decreases over time, after being initially raised. The implication of this is that one can 
expect variations in overcharges over time. 
The theoretical literature predicts varying and even episodic overcharges, but there are limited 
empirical studies, especially involving multi-product cartels. The few studies that exist include 
Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019), and Boswijk, Bun and Schinkel (2019). 
3.2.3 Synopsis of classes of approaches to overcharge estimation 
Firms collude to raise prices above the level that would exist absent the conspiracy, which is 
called the but-for or counterfactual price level [Motta (2004)]. Cartel overcharges attempt to 
estimate the extent to which prices charged by the cartel were higher than the but-for price. The 
biggest challenge in estimating overcharges is determining the but-for price, which is not 
observed. The economic literature identifies three broad classes of techniques that researchers 
can apply to estimate the but-for price and consequently the cartel overcharge. These are 
comparator-based approaches, financial-analysis-based approaches, and market-structure-
based approaches [Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (2011) and Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith 
(2013)]. 
Comparator-based approaches are sub-divided into cross-sectional, time-series (or temporal), 
and difference-in-differences (DiD), which combines cross-sectional and time-series elements. 
The counterfactual in comparator-based approaches is based on comparable, but non-cartelised 
markets or a competitive period in the same market, or both in the case of DiD. Financial-
analysis-based approaches apply financial information such as profitability and costs for firms 
involved in the conspiracy and those of comparable firms and markets not exposed to collusion 
to estimate the counterfactual [Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (2011) and Rubinfeld (1985)]. The 




estimation to estimate the counterfactual price fall into the last class of approaches. Profitability 
is difficult and complex to measure and, as such, there is limited application of financial-
analysis- and market-structure-based approaches [Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith (2013)]. This 
study was primarily concerned with techniques falling within the class of comparator-based 
approaches, briefly discussed below. 
3.2.4 Before-and-after approach and estimating overcharges 
Time-series techniques use information relating to the cartelised product(s), covering the 
period of conspiracy and a period when the cartel did not exist, to determine the level of the 
overcharge. The period without the conspiracy can be a period prior to the conspiracy or the 
period following the end of the cartel. This is often referred to as the before-and-after technique. 
In its simplest form, the before-and-after technique involves simple comparisons of prices 
between the conspiracy and non-conspiracy periods. The challenge with this approach is that 
the entire difference between the cartel price and the but-for price is attributed to the 
overcharge, when it could be partially a result of demand and supply shocks [White, Marshall 
and Kennedy (2006)]. To address this challenge, a more sophisticated multivariate approach is 
preferable [Connor (2008) and Paha (2011)]. 
There are two options for estimating the cartel effect, which should ideally be used as 
complements to ensure the robustness of analysis [Nieberding (2006)]. First, a regression 
model can be estimated for the non-conspiracy period, and the resulting coefficients are used 
to estimate the but-for price during the cartel period (often referred to as the forecasting or 
backcasting approach). For robust results, this approach requires sufficient observations in the 
non-conspiracy period to ensure the reliability of the parameters. Alternatively, the dummy 
variable approach can be applied, taking the value of 1 in the conspiracy period and 0 otherwise, 
with the coefficient of the dummy variable measuring the cartel effect. The use of one scale 
dummy46 may not appropriately capture the cartel effect when the cartel affects prices in 
varying and complex ways [Finkelstein and Levenbach (1983)]. 
In both the forecasting and dummy variable approaches, the start and end dates of the 
conspiracy must be captured as accurately as possible, as misdating has a significant impact on 
the accuracy of overcharge estimates [see, for example, Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019); and 
Boswijk, Bun and Schinkel (2019)]. This requires a close examination of the facts of the case 
 




at hand and making the necessary adjustments to one’s assumptions [ABA (2010)]. When the 
dummy variable is defined at the same frequency as the data in the estimation sample, the 
dummy variable and the forecasting approaches are equivalent [Higgins and Johnson (2003)]. 
This equivalence occurs when a separate dummy variable is included for every 
month/quarter/year during the cartel period. 
Before-and-after techniques are easier to apply than other techniques and have limited data 
requirements. They mostly require time-series data on the cartelised product, under the 
assumption that the behaviour of the firms in the collusive period would have been similar to 
their behaviour in the non-collusive period had the cartel conduct not taken place. Identifying 
the starting and ending of cartel effects on price is a key challenge with the before-and-after 
approach. For instance, where the cartel period is followed by tacit collusion, prices will not 
reflect competition, leading to a downward bias in estimates of cartel overcharges [Harrington 
(2004), Connor (2008) and Boswijk, Bun and Schinkel (2019)]. This is also the case where the 
market involves long-term contracts that are not necessarily terminated or renewed at the time 
the cartel is uncovered or prosecuted. 
The difficulty of accurately identifying the end of collusion and its effects on prices can be 
achieved by allowing for a transition period between collusion and when competition can be 
expected to be reflected in prices [Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith (2013)]. If the end of 
collusion is characterised by a price war, cartel overcharge estimates might be biased upwards 
[de Coninck (2010) and Frank and Schliffke (2013)]. To avoid these challenges, a 
counterfactual period prior to the conspiracy is preferable [Van Dijk and Verboven (2008)]. In 
South Africa, this counterfactual is not available in some markets because of the history of co-
operation and legal cartels [see for example, Boshoff (2015)]. This applies to the wire cartel, 
which had a history of co-operation prior to the 2001 agreement. 
Despite the substantial number of cartels uncovered in South Africa, the body of empirical 
research and the application of quantitative techniques to estimate cartel overcharges is still 
limited. The studies in South Africa include those using spatial techniques to estimate 
overcharges by the bitumen cartel, difference-in-difference techniques applied in the precast 
concrete products cartel and temporal techniques in the wheat flour cartel. 
Boshoff (2015) used spatial econometric techniques to estimate overcharges in the bitumen 




cartel. In this case, before-and-after techniques were not appropriate. Thus, the author relied 
on a panel analysis, using comparator markets to estimate parameters for the long-run 
relationship between price and explanatory variables. He used these parameters to forecast the 
but-for price for South Africa, and then compared this price to the actual price charged by the 
cartel, to derive the overcharge. He also applied the dummy variable technique, by including 
the cartelised market in the panel and including a dummy variable in the specification, to 
capture the cartel effect. The dummy variable approach has the advantage of demonstrating 
how explanatory variables differ in their impact on the cartelised market compared with other 
countries and estimates the difference in price levels across countries. The author also applied 
a DiD analysis, in which he included a cartel period dummy, a dummy for the cartelised market 
(South Africa) and an interaction term, which estimated the overcharge. The DiD analysis 
yielded a much higher overcharge (80 per cent) estimate than did the forecasting and dummy 
variable approaches employed (25 per cent). 
DiD analysis was also applied to estimate overcharges in the precast concrete products cartel 
[Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts (2014)]. In this approach, the authors identified comparator 
products, for which they calculated the ratio of prices between the cartelised product and the 
comparator products during a competitive period. They used these ratios to draw inferences 
about the counterfactual price and consequently the cartel overcharge. This is a simple 
approach which assumed that the cartelised product and the comparator products faced the 
same shocks, such that the ratio was stable. More sophisticated techniques may be necessary 
in circumstances where this assumption is not reasonable. Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts 
(2014) found that overcharges in the concrete pipes cartel ranged between 16.5 per cent and 57 
per cent, depending on the region. 
The wheat flour cartel was uncovered in 2007. To estimate overcharges by this cartel, Mncube 
(2014) used the dummy variable approach in a multivariate regression model, in which the 
period following the end of the cartel was identified as the competitive period. The market was 
regulated prior to the illegal cartel. Mncube (2014) found overcharges ranging between seven 
per cent and 42 per cent. The potential limitations of the before-and-after approach led Mncube 
(2014) to supplement the results with a review of industry profits over time. 
Using the cement cartel, Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019) observed that cartels experience 
different phases when periods of collusion may be intermingled with periods of competition. 




switching model and found that the model reported higher overcharge estimates than those 
reported by conventional models. Estimated overcharges ranged between 19.2 per cent and 
19.9 per cent. The authors argued that a regime-switching model enables better estimates of 
cartel overcharges because it (a) accounts for differences in the data-generating process during 
collusive and non-collusive episodes, (b) permits the dating of such episodes, and (c) allows 
for the possibility of flexible transitions between collusive and non-collusive episodes. 
As noted previously, empirical studies of interrelated multi-product overcharges are limited, 
and there is limited focus, from a portfolio perspective, on the pricing behaviour of multi-
product cartels. Similarly, as noted previously, there is limited empirical literature on the 
temporal variation of cartel overcharges when collusion took place over multiple periods. This 
chapter presents an examination of the temporal variation of overcharges by a multi-product 
cartel that existed over multiple periods, which were interspersed by periods of instability. One 
aspect of the empirical treatment involved assumptions about the nature of the transition 
between collusion and competition. This is a further dimension in which this chapter improves 
on the existing literature on estimating cartel overcharges. To this end, the following subsection 
briefly reviews how the work by Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith (2013) has dealt with 
transitions between competition and collusion. 
3.2.5 Cartel overcharges under different assumptions about the transition from collusion 
to competition 
Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith (2013) applied a multivariate before-and-after technique to 
estimate cartel overcharges from the German cement cartel. In doing so, they recognised that 
even after the breakdown of a cartel, there may not be an instantaneous switch back to 
competition. This may be due to new tacit forms of collusion, medium-to-long-term contracts, 
and general price rigidities, all of which may result in the persistence of collusive prices. The 
authors suggested that econometric approaches must therefore explicitly account for the 
transition from collusion to competition, but without overstating it. Assumptions about the 
form and nature of the transition period will impact on the estimated cartel overcharges. As 
such, it is important to understand how long, and up to which point in time the collusive price 
effects persisted, as well as the functional form of the transition period [Hüschelrath, Müller 




Three options to account for the transition period are identified by Hüschelrath, Müller and 
Veith (2013). The first entails ascribing the full cartel price and consequently overcharge to the 
cartel and transition periods, which is achieved by taking the cartel dummy variable as 1 during 
both periods and 0 otherwise. The second assumes that cartel effects gradually dissipate, 
meaning the cartel dummy variable linearly declines from 1 to 0 during the transition period. 
The third includes an additional indicator variable that accounts for the transition period, by 
having a value of 1 in the transition period and 0 otherwise. Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith 
(2013) found higher overcharges after allowing and controlling for a transition period than they 
found when assuming an instantaneous adjustment from collusion to competition. 
This study followed their example, by looking at transition assumptions in the context of a 
multi-product cartel. This is important because, even in a multi-product setting, assumptions 
about the transition between collusion and competition affects overcharge estimates. Some 
cartels degenerate into a price war characterised by sub-competitive pricing. If the overcharge 
estimation technique is not adjusted to control for the price war phase, the resulting overcharges 
will possibly be overestimated. In those cartels where there may be persistent cartel price 
effects that dissipate gradually before prices reach competitive levels, overcharges will be 
under-estimated. 
3.3 Background to the wire industry and the cartel 
Steel-based products are often intermediate products that are used in several downstream 
markets spanning sectors. Some of the products can be further processed to produce other 
value-added products. Steel is the primary input used in the production of the cartelised 
products. Other inputs include zinc and labour. The products are produced by several related 
producers and some independent producers, but they can also be imported. The four largest 
firms produced and supplied a broad range of these products across the country while others 
supplied a limited range of products, in some instances, in specific geographic areas. The 
members of the cartel operated across the major product lines. Steel products are homogenous, 
with firms competing primarily on price. 
Toward the end of 2009, the Commission referred a case to the Tribunal, alleging that the major 
suppliers of some wire products had colluded by fixing prices among other collusive practices. 
The case ran for a protracted period, spanning over 10 years because of procedural issues. The 




obtained leniency; the other settled with the Commission in 2018; and another, smaller one, 
settled after that. The other members of the cartel are still being prosecuted. As shown in 
Chapter 2, collusion was systemic across the entire industry, and it was characterised by 
mutually re-enforcing arrangements such as joint ventures, cross-shareholdings, cross-
directorships, and quid pro quo arrangements. This study focused on the price-fixing element 
of the cartel, which took the form of list price agreements, supported by agreements on levels 
of discounts for different classes of customers. 
The cartel monitored the behaviour of members, using various mechanisms, which included 
self-reporting mechanisms that exploited customers’ desire to bargain. This included contract 
clauses that required customers to provide evidence of written offers from rivals to their 
supplier and afford the supplier an opportunity to match the offers. In other instances, 
customers who received better offers informed their suppliers of these offers, requesting them 
to match or better the offers, or risk losing business. Despite being elementary, these forms of 
monitoring effectively detected cheating, as firms would use them to address cheating. A firm 
would thus know if it had lost one of its traditional customers, and in some instances, to whom 
that customer had been lost. 
Many cartels experience cheating during their lifespan, and this cartel was no exception. As 
occurs in many cartels, cheating may result in periods of temporary movement to pricing below 
cartel levels. This period can be in the form of an intense price war or tit-for-tat pricing – in 
which the response to cheating is simply to match offers made by rivals (which does not 
necessarily reflect an intense sub-competitive price war) – or some other form of pricing that 
is in the intermediate range between deep price wars and cartel prices, but does not necessarily 
reflect competitive pricing, as prices could still be above competitive levels. 
The conduct lasted for a sustained period spanning potentially more than a decade, predating 
the current competition law regime. The Commission considered the cartel conduct to have 
started in the period from 2001. 
3.4 Data and methodology 
3.4.1 Data 
The study used data on the average pricing of the cartelised products, together with data on the 




the final prices – and an indicator of demand for the respective products. Data on steel and zinc 
prices was obtained from international sources, particularly Index Mundi. Data on the 
economic performance of the steel sector, sectors that contributed to the demand for the 
cartelised products, and appropriate price indices were obtained from Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA) and Quantec. In general, South African steel prices and consequently those related 
to steel-based downstream products followed the international price of steel (see Figure 3.1). 
This was largely because the major domestic producers of primary steel, such as Arcelor Mittal, 
had historically applied an import-parity pricing strategy (see, for instance, Tribunal case 
number 13/CR/Feb04). Steel is a major input in the production of the cartelised products, 
accounting for a significant proportion of production costs.  
Figure 3.1: Domestic PPI for billets and mild steel, and international steel prices over 
time 
 
Source: Index Mundi and StatsSA PPI data 
The wire cartel operated for a sustained period, which was suspected to have started prior to 
the introduction of the current competition law regime. The Commission’s investigation was 
focused on the period after the introduction of the current legal regime. Witness evidence from 
the case suggests that there were three collusive phases, as follows: the first phase took place 
prior to the 2001, ending with a period of competition; the second phase took place between 




















































































































































war occurred between 2005 and 2006); and the third phase took place between 2006 and 2008, 
when the cartel was ended by the Commission’s intervention. For the purposes of examining 
overcharges from multi-period collusion, the study focused on the second and third phases. 
Figure 3.2 shows the cartel gross margin calculated as price over the cost of key direct materials 
(wire rod and zinc). Figure 3.2 shows that during the price war period there is an observable 
decline in the gross margins across several products. 
Figure 3.2: Gross margins by product (price less cost of key direct materials) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on product data 
Taking these events into account, Table 3.1 reports the variables used in the analysis. 
Table 3.1: Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Price (P)  Average price per tonne of the cartelised 
products 
StatsSA 
Steel  Price per tonne of wire rod for individual 
steel-based products 
Index Mundi 





 Gross domestic product for South Africa Statistics South Africa/Quantec 
Cartel phase 
dummy 
 Indicator variable to capture individual cartel 
phases for each product 
Constructed to take the value of 1 in 



































































































































































































Variable Description Source 
Price war 
dummy 
 Indicator variable to capture price war effects 
for each price war phase per product 
Constructed to take the value of 1 during 
price war phase and 0 otherwise 
Transition 
period dummy 
 Indicator variable to capture transition period 
at the end of the cartel, per product 
Constructed to take the value of 1 in 
transition period and 0 otherwise 
Source: Own descriptions based on regression data set 
For the purposes of the analysis, the quarterly data formed a balanced panel of 10 cartelised 
products over 14 years. Although import competition could potentially have undermined the 
cartel, it must be noted that the cartel members produced and supplied the bulk of the domestic 
consumption of the products. There was also no evidence of imports having formed a 
substantive basis of pricing considerations among the firms during the cartel period. Table 3.2 
provides key summary statistics of the data used in the analysis, which includes the per-unit 
price of products, per-unit input costs for steel and zinc, and GDP (in millions of rands). 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Price Overall 6,738.00 3,439.96 1,917.20 19,324.77 N = 590 
 Between  1,673.08 4,250.77 9,081.61 n = 10 
  Within   3,051.19 1,400.05 17,450.71 T = 59 
Steel Overall 4,303.61 2,077.58 1,296.00 10,751.00 N = 590 
 Between  823.28 3,034.00 5,435.37 n = 10 
  Within   1,924.91 1,386.24 9,619.24 T = 59 
Zinc Overall 178.83 326.10 0.00 1,854.86 N = 590 
 Between  269.98 0.00 743.33 n = 10 
  Within   201.57 -232.50 1,290.36 T = 59 
GDP Overall 467,319.80 200,906.70 194,211.20 844,284.30 N = 590 
 Between  0.00 467,319.80 467,319.80 n = 10 
  Within   200,906.70 194,211.20 844,284.30 T = 59 
Source: Own calculations based on regression data 
Figure 3.3 shows the average prices for each product and the average weighted price across all 
products. There was significant variation between the average weighted price and the products’ 
prices, as well as across the prices of the individual products. The average weighted price 




Figure 3.3: Index of average prices 
 
Source: Own calculations based on product data 
3.4.2 Econometric approach 
The study used the before-and-after technique to estimate cartel overcharges. The 
counterfactual period was taken as the period following the end of the cartel. This approach 
was appealing because it used data on the cartelised products, and it avoided the difficulties of 
identifying suitable comparators for the cartelised products in South Africa. There was some 
evidence suggesting that the cartel existed prior to 2001, when the price fixing framework was 
established. Between 1998 and 2008, the cartel experienced known periods of instability in the 
form of a non-collusive phase leading up to cartel re-establishment in the third quarter of 2001, 
and a price war that took place between the second quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 
2006. Figure 3.3 shows a downward trend in prices during the price war period. These two 
phases are significant because they necessitated significant meetings aimed at resolving the 
cartel’s challenges. The two meetings (around the third quarter of 2001 and towards the second 
quarter of 2006) give a clear indication of when co-operation began in each phase. Figure 3.2 
shows that following these meetings, prices increased, trending upwards during the two 
collusive phases that occurred between 2001 to 2005, and between 2006 to 2008 (final quarter 
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phases can arise because this might affect estimated overcharges. Evidence from the case, taken 
together with the price evidence presented in Figure 3.3 enable us to date the phases accurately.  
The study tested the individual price series for structural breaks, using a fluctuation test for a 
significant shift in average price changes over time [Crede (2019) discussed various 
approaches]. This was augmented by the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) technique for dating 
structural breaks, which was carried out by regressing each price series on a constant. It can 
identify points when there were significant changes in the data-generating process. Crede 
(2018) used this test to check the robustness of structural break tests, in order to identify and 
date collusive phases in European pasta markets. The procedure was similar also to the price-
change approach used by Hüschelrath and Veith (2013) to screen and date collusion in German 
cement markets. The results of the structural break tests were complemented by the facts 
pertaining to key events concerning the operation of the cartel and changes in key production 
costs. Table 3.3 presents the test results. 
Table 3.3: Results of structural break tests 
Varia
ble 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 






















pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BP 1 2002q1 2001q3 2002q1 2002q1 2002q3 2002q2 2002q1 2002q1 2002q1 2002q1 
BP 2 2006q4 2004q1 2004q1 2006q1 2006q1 2004q2 2004q2 2006q1 2004q2 2004q2 
BP 3   2006q1 2006q1 2008q1 2008q1 2008q1 2007q4 2008q1 2007q4 2007q4 
BP 4   2008q1 2008q1     2011q1 2009q4   2009q4 2009q4 
BP 5   2011q1                 
Statistically significant at: 1 per cent (p<0.01) ***, 5 per cent (p<0.05) **, 10 per cent (p<0.10) * 
The results show that the identified break points (BP) align with the cartel activity and shifts 
in costs. Breaks in late 2001/early 2002 and around 2006 correlate with the establishment of 
the two collusive phases identified above, whereas those breaks around late 2007/early 2008 
and late 2009 and early 2011 correlate with shifts in steel costs. The gradual transition between 
collusion and competition could explain the lack of breaks associated with the end of collusive 
phases. Issues related to the transition between collusion and competition are discussed next. 
The study considered two assumptions about the end of a cartel: first, instantaneous adjustment 
from collusion to competition; and second, a transition/adjustment period lasting four quarters 




were at least suggestions that communication between the firms continued in the quarter 
following the initiation of the investigation by the Commission. Further, allowing for a full 
year of absence of co-ordination allowed for cartel effects to dissipate more fully. Given these 
events, the author argues that there is a need to allow for an adjustment phase and to control 
the effects of these periods on overcharge estimates. Under the assumption of an 
adjustment/transition period, the study adopted two approaches. First, by using a separate 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 during the transition period and 0 otherwise; and second, 
by using a linear transition period from collusion to competition. This is in line with 
suggestions made by Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith (2013) on dealing with transition periods, 
as described earlier. 
The dynamics of multi-product collusion and the resulting overcharges were captured using 
panel-data analyses, which has several advantages over either cross-section or time-series 
analysis [Hsiao, Chan and Ho-Illman (1995)]. First, it facilitates more accurate inferences about 
model parameters, by providing more degrees of freedom and more sample variability, thereby 
improving model efficiency. Second, it provides greater capacity to capture the complexities 
and thus enables better understanding of the dynamics of firm behaviour in multi-product 
collusion. It also enables one to control for the impact of omitted variables. Panel data therefore 
allows one to better understand dynamic relationships, including economic behaviour [Nerlove 
(2002)]. Using inter-individual differences reduces collinearity between current and lagged 
variables, which in turn, allows for the estimation of unrestricted time-adjustment patterns 
[Pakes and Griliches (1984)]. 
By pooling data, more accurate predictions of individual outcomes are possible [Hsiao, Chan, 
Mountain and Tsui (1989); and Hsiao, Appelbe and Dineen (1993)]. Panel analysis also 
provides the micro-foundations for analysing aggregate data. The time-series properties of 
aggregate data may differ from those of micro-level data [Granger (1990), Pesaran (2003)]. 
Where such differences are significant, aggregate estimates and resulting policy evaluations 
may be misleading [Hsiao, Shen and Fujiki (2005)]. This makes panel analysis suitable for 
understanding the dynamics of multi-product cartels, as opposed to generalising over different 
products by studying the dynamics of the cartel at an aggregate level. Finally, panel-data 
analyses can simplify computational and statistical inference in the analysis of non-stationary 
time-series data when cross-sectional observations are independent [Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran 




Panel data allows for transformations that induce different and deducible changes in estimators, 
thereby resolving under-identification problems that would otherwise exist [Biøn (1992), 
Griliches and Hausman (1986), Wansbeek and Koning (1989)]. 
The relationship between price and its key drivers47 can be explained by model 1, which can 
be estimated under three assumptions about the nature of the transition from collusion to 
competition. The three assumptions are (1) instantaneous adjustment, (2) a separate dummy 
variable capturing the transition phase, and (3) linear transition. In model 1, as follows, the 
current price does not depend in part on its previous values: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗=3
𝑗=1 + 𝜎𝑖𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑝𝑤𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the log price at time t for product i, and Demandit is the log for an indicator of 
demand, taken as GDP in this case, to avoid endogeneity problems associated with 
simultaneous determination of price and demand. Endogeneity can result in parameter 
estimates that are inconsistent, and potentially carrying the wrong sign. Using GDP is 
appropriate because some of the products were sold across multiple sectors. Further, given that 
the model that is finally applied (model 2 below) is in first differences with lagged dependent 
and explanatory variables, challenges of endogeneity between price and demand are mitigated. 
Steelit is log steel cost; Zincit is log zinc cost; Djt is an indicator of the cartel during different 
cartel phases j=1 (prior to 2001, represented by D1), 2 (between 2001 and 2005) and 3 (2006 
to 2008); trDt is an indicator variable for the transition, and pwDit is an indicator dummy 
variable capturing the unstable (price war) periods; and ɛit are assumed serially uncorrelated 
error terms. The study was primarily concerned with cartel phases 2 (2001 to 2005) and 3 (2006 
to 2008) and used a dummy variable D1 to control for the period prior to the 2001 instability.
48 
Under the assumption of instantaneous adjustment from collusion to competition, the transition 
dummy variable falls away. The cartel effect was measured by (efactor – 1), where the factor 
equals the coefficient of the dummy variable. 
Model 1, above, does not account for more complex pricing dynamics where the current price 
depends on the previous price(s). Nieberding (2006) suggests capturing this pricing dynamic 
by including a lagged dependent variable as part of the explanatory variables. However, the 
 
47 Evidence from the case suggests that prices were mostly driven by changes in steel prices, and this coincided 
with a lot of the cartel communication and price changes. 
48 There was not sufficient detailed information about the beginning of the instability during this period, so the 




current and past prices are still significantly correlated. Non-stationarity in time-series data 
poses the risk of spurious findings, especially for finite samples. Panel unit-root tests indicated 
that at least some of the panels contained unit roots, that is, they were non-stationary (see 
Appendix A). This suggests that there was a risk of observing spurious results. The author 
therefore tested for cointegration, using the Westerlund (2008) panel tests. There was evidence 
of cointegration (see Appendix A), meaning that the OLS estimates were highly consistent. 
The presence of cointegration allowed for the inclusion of an error correction term, which 
helped systematically address non-stationarity, complex short-run pricing dynamics and serial 
correlation, by using a dynamic OLS model (see model 2, below). Information criteria 
indicated an optimal lag length of one. 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖=10
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖=10
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗=3
𝑗=1 + 𝜎𝑖𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑝𝑤𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2) 
In the above model, X is a vector of the demand and supply variables reflected in model (1), 
and the dummy variables were as described above. Modelling different assumptions about the 
form of the transition from collusion to competition allowed us to demonstrate the impact of 
the assumptions on estimated overcharges. Based on model 2, above, the long-run effect of 
collusion on the equilibrium price was given by the ratio of the coefficient of the cartel dummy 
variable to that of the lagged price variable (
𝛿𝑖
𝛾𝑖⁄ ) [see Nieberding (2009)]. Because 
overcharges could be expected to have varied by product, the study allowed for the 
heterogeneity of both the slope and constant coefficients across the various products [see 
Pesaran and Smith (1995)]. This enabled direct examination and observation of differences in 
overcharges by product. The temporal variations in cartel overcharges were captured using 
dummy variables for each of cartel phases 2 and 3, as defined above. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Regression results 
The results below demonstrate that overcharges varied significantly by products and over time. 
For some products, the overcharges were demonstrably low and not statistically significant, 
while for others, the measured overcharge decreased significantly in phase 3 compared with 
the prior collusive phase (phase 2). This shows that the cartel’s ability to exercise collective 
market power was imperfect, with room for competition on some products within the collusive 




conditions. It also supports the view that this multi-product cartel optimised its pricing on 
different products in line with the constraints discussed in the literature review. 
3.5.1.1 Estimation results for model 2 
Given the presence of non-stationarity and cointegration, the author used model 2 under three 
alternative transition assumptions. The results are presented in Table 3.4, below. 
Table 3.4: Estimated results for model 2 under alternative transition assumptions 
Model 2 under different assumptions about the transition period 
Pesaran & Smith (1995) Mean Group estimator     
All coefficients represent averages across groups (group variable: productid)   
Coefficient averages computed as unweighted means     
Mean Group type estimation   Number of obs = 57049 
Group variable: productid   Number of groups = 10 
      Obs per group: min = 57 
      Obs per group: min = 57  
    max = 57 
ΔPrice Model 2 with separate 
transition dummy 
Model 2 under linear 
transition 
Model 2 under 
instantaneous 
adjustment 
  Wald chi2(9) = 3505.34 Wald chi2(9) = 2922.38 Wald chi2(9) = 831.71  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
ΔPricet-1 -0.0735 -0.0752 -0.1029* 
  (0.0717) (0.0604) (0.0609) 
Pricet-1 -0.6277 *** -0.6162 *** -0.5754 *** 
  (0.0991) (0.0901) (0.0920) 
GDPt-1 0.1758 ** 0.2034 *** 0.1074 * 
  (0.0723) (0.0722) (0.0564) 
Steelt-1 0.5662 *** 0.5051 *** 0.5578 *** 
  (0.0541) (0.0478) (0.0492) 
ΔGDPt-1 0.4206 *** 0.4983 *** 0.4224 *** 
  (0.1166) (0.1342) (0.1207) 
ΔSteelt-1 0.5391 *** 0.5349 *** 0.5287 *** 
  (0.0371) (0.0376) (0.0397) 
ΔSteelt-1 0.0811 0.1241 ** 0.0548 
  (0.0604) (0.0531) (0.0460) 
ΔZinct-1 -0.0247 * -0.0242 * -0.0311 * 
  (0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0190) 
D1 0.0761 ** 0.0619 0.0624 
  (0.0366) (0.0404) (0.0419) 
Cartel phase 2 0.1828 *** 0.1624 *** 0.1725 *** 
  (0.0229) (0.0220) (0.0246) 
Cartel phase 3 0.1153 *** 0.1051 *** 0.1024 *** 
  (0.0321) (0.0347) (0.0285) 
Transition 0.0444 *   
 




  (0.0237)   
Price war 0.1030 *** 0.0871 *** 0.0982 *** 
  (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0219) 
Constant -1.5342 ** -1.5173 ** -1.1034 ** 
  (0.6403) (0.6357) (0.5293) 
Statistically significant at: 1 per cent (p<0.01) ***, 5 per cent (p<0.05) **, 10 per cent (p<0.10) * 
The results confirm the expectation that price depended on its previous values, the cost of steel, 
the cost of zinc, and demand. The results also confirm that, in general, collusion had a 
statistically significant appreciable upward effect on prices, particularly in the second and third 
cartel phases that were examined. This applied across all transition assumptions. 
The average coefficient of the price war variable, across all products, was positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that while the price war might have led to a reduction in 
prices, it was not severe enough to result in sub-competitive pricing and was characterised by 
pricing above competitive levels though below the agreed cartel price path. This result is driven 
by the fact that in seven of the 10 products, the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, while in the remaining three products the coefficient is positive, but smaller and 
not statistically significant. This suggests that in the three products, the price war resulted in 
significantly lower prices. This is consistent with the price war not having affected all products 
to the same extent. Given the shorter duration of the price war compared to the overall duration 
of collusion and the indication that prices during the price war period were not sub-competitive, 
it is unlikely that consumers who received the benefit of the price war were fully compensated 
for the supra-competitive prices imposed by the cartel during its collusive phases. 
The coefficient of the price war dummy variable is closer to the coefficient of the cartel dummy 
variable in the third phase of the cartel, possibly because collusion in the third phase did not 
adjust to the previous cartel price path because of intervention by the Commission and 
economic conditions which were characterised by steep cost increases. 
Collusion in the third phase was less effective than in the second phase. Table 3.5, below, 
reflects the product-specific and cartel-phase-specific coefficients of the cartel dummy 







Table 3.5: Product- and phase-specific cartel-effect coefficients 
Product Model 2 with separate 
transition dummy 
Model 2 under linear 
transition 
Model 2 under 
instantaneous adjustment 
Product 1       
cartel phase 2 0.2092 ** 0.1822 ** 0.2149 ** 
cartel phase 3 0.1935 *** 0.1783 *** 0.1858 *** 
Product 2       
cartel phase 2 0.0779 0.0625 0.0443 
cartel phase 3 0.0089 0.0174 -0.0015 
Product 3       
cartel phase 2 0.2124 *** 0.1754 ** 0.2161 *** 
cartel phase 3 0.0972 * 0.0830 * 0.1046 ** 
Product 4       
cartel phase 2 0.0795 0.0981 0.0801 
cartel phase 3 -0.0625 -0.0757 -0.0643 
Product 5       
cartel phase 2 0.2505 *** 0.2190 ** 0.2502 *** 
cartel phase 3 0.1822 ** 0.1260 * 0.1812 *** 
Product 6       
cartel phase 2 0.0934 ** 0.0809 * 0.1067 ** 
cartel phase 3 0.0009 -0.0103 0.0240 
Product 7       
cartel phase 2 0.2511 *** 0.2251 *** 0.2526 *** 
cartel phase 3 0.1651 *** 0.1555 *** 0.1673 *** 
Product 8       
cartel phase 2 0.2090 * 0.1209 0.1167 
cartel phase 3 0.1410 ** 0.0856 0.0780 
Product 9       
cartel phase 2 0.2617 ** 0.2752 *** 0.2424 ** 
cartel phase 3 0.1743 ** 0.1910 ** 0.1647 ** 
Product 10       
cartel phase 2 0.1833 ** 0.1849 ** 0.2012 ** 
cartel phase 3 0.2528 *** 0.3004 *** 0.1840 *** 














Model 2 with 
separate transition 
dummy 
Model 2 under 
linear transition 




across all products 
  
2 20.06%*** 17.64%*** 18.83%*** 
3 12.22%*** 11.09%*** 10.78%*** 
1 
  
2 23.27%** 19.99%** 23.98%** 
3 21.35%*** 19.52%*** 20.42%*** 
2 
  
2 8.10% 6.45% 4.53% 
3 0.81% 1.75% -0.15% 
3 
  
2 23.66%*** 19.17%** 24.12%*** 
3 10.21%* 8.66%* 11.03%** 
4 
  
2 8.28% 10.31% 8.34% 
3 -6.06% -7.29% -6.23% 
5 
  
2 28.46%*** 24.49%** 28.42%*** 
3 19.99%** 13.43%* 19.87%*** 
6 
  
2 9.79%** 8.43%* 11.27%** 
3 0.09% -1.02% 2.43% 
7 
  
2 28.54%*** 25.24%*** 28.74%*** 
3 17.95%*** 16.82%*** 18.21%*** 
8 
  
2 23.24%* 12.85% 12.37% 
3 15.14%** 8.94% 8.11% 
9 
  
2 29.91%** 31.68%*** 27.43%** 
3 19.04%** 21.05%** 17.90%** 
10 
  
2 20.11%** 20.30%** 22.28%** 
3 28.76%*** 35.04%*** 20.21%*** 
Source: Own calculations, based on regression analyses 
In the short-run, collusion had a significant upward impact on price changes across different 
transition assumptions (Table 3.6, above). Products 2 and 4 do not appear to have been affected 
by collusion in a statistically significantly way compared with the other products. The long-run 
effect of collusion on the equilibrium price is given by the ratio of the coefficient of the cartel 
dummy variable to the coefficient of the lagged-price variable. From the results above, the 
unweighted average cartel effects on price across all products, as well as per product under 








Model 2 with 
separate transition 
dummy 
Model 2 under 
linear transition 




across all products 
2 29.12% *** 26.36% *** 29.98% *** 
3 18.36% *** 17.06% *** 17.79% *** 
1  2 17.10% ** 14.65% ** 18.66% ** 
  3 15.81% *** 14.33% *** 16.13% *** 
2  2 8.23% 7.91% 5.49% 
  3 0.85% 2.20% -0.19% 
3  2 108.26% *** 60.01% ** 96.27% *** 
  3 49.58% * 28.42% * 46.61% ** 
4  2 17.07% 22.25% 17.24% 
  3 -13.43% -17.16% -13.84% 
5  2 34.24% *** 32.77% ** 34.32% *** 
  3 24.92% ** 18.85% * 24.86% *** 
6  2 12.07% ** 10.98% * 13.46% ** 
  3 -8.32% -1.40% 3.03% 
7  2 69.45% *** 52.26% *** 68.24% *** 
  3 45.66% *** 36.10% *** 45.20% *** 
8  2 32.85% * 22.08% 22.37% 
  3 22.16% ** 15.64% 14.96% 
9  2 88.91% ** 93.49% *** 98.38% ** 
  3 59.21% ** 64.89% ** 66.86% ** 
10  2 28.29% ** 25.75% ** 45.15% ** 
  3 39.02% *** 41.85% *** 41.31% *** 
Source: Own calculations, based on regression analyses 
There was greater consistency in the statistical significance of the long-run effect of collusion 
on prices across all the assumptions about the nature of the transition from collusion to 
competition. Product 8 was the exception, where only the model with a separate transition 
dummy showed that the overcharges were statistically significant. In general, collusion had a 
positive effect on pricing across all products in collusive phases 2 and 3, except for products 4 
and 6 in phase 3, where the coefficient was negative. 
The assumptions of instantaneous adjustment and of a separate transition dummy variable 
estimated higher overcharges than that for linear transition. In the case of instantaneous 
adjustment, an overestimation of the cartel overcharge was possible where the end of the cartel 
was characterised by sub-competitive pricing, which might have occurred if firms had entered 
a price war or with price cutting behaviour that was below competitive levels. This was possible 
given that the end of the cartel was characterised by a leniency application by one of the firms 




gradual decrease in the cartel overcharge towards the competitive price may have been more 
properly captured by a linear transition. 
The effect of a separate transition dummy is to preclude the transition period from affecting 
the overcharge estimate. To the extent that the timing and drop in pricing between the 
competitive and collusive price are not accurately timed, this could have a significant impact 
on the estimated results. A statistically significant and separate transition dummy variable gives 
useful information about the impact of the end of the cartel on pricing behaviour. In this case, 
the transition dummy was statistically significant at the 10 per cent level of significance but 
showed a much smaller price coefficient compared with the phase 2 and 3 coefficients. This 
suggests that during this transition phase, prices had adjusted downwards compared with those 
during the collusive phases. The weaker statistical significance of the transition dummy 
variable, at 10 per cent, suggests that the pricing in this period had moved closer to the margins 
of competitive pricing. 
The variation in the results reflects the significant impact that assumptions on the nature of the 
shift from collusive pricing to competitive pricing had on the results of the analyses of 
overcharges. The substantial variation in the overcharge estimated for product 3 across the 
assumptions for linear transition, on the one hand, and the instantaneous adjustment and for a 
separate transition dummy variable were a direct result of the relative sizes of the cartel 
coefficient and the coefficient of the lagged-price variable. The results show that significant 
consideration must be given to the assumptions made about the end of collusion and how this 
would affect the observed overcharges. This is particularly important if penalties are linked to 
the extent of the overcharges. Having different scenarios modelled allows the competition 
authorities to identify a range of overcharges that could have been realised by the cartel and to 
exercise judgement with the different ranges in mind. The determination of penalties and harm 
from collusion is often a matter of judgement, and the more information is available to 
competition authorities, the better the judgement exercised, and the better the prospects of 
achieving deterrence. 
3.5.1.2 Heterogeneity of overcharges from multi-period collusion 
This section presents a discussion on the variation in overcharges across two collusive phases 
– phase 2, which encompassed the period between 2001 and 2005, and phase 3, which 




cartel appeared to have been more effective in phase 2 than in phase 3. Phase 2 involved higher 
overcharges than phase 3, as shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, above. There are three potential 
reasons for this. The first is that phase 3 was characterised by attempts to re-establish the 
collusive arrangement following a period of significant instability in 2005, and it is arguable 
that by the time the cartel had ended, it had not yet managed to achieve the same level of 
efficacy as in the second phase. 
The second reason for higher overcharges in phase 2 is that phase 3 coincided with sharp 
increases in input costs (steel prices) during 2007 – 08, in the presence of demand reduction 
due to the global economic recession. As such, the cartel may not have been able to pass on the 
full cost increases and fully exert its pricing power. The changes in demand conditions could 
also have resulted in a shift to a new collusive equilibrium compared with the one in phase 2. 
Changes in demand and supply conditions over time affect the behaviour of cartels and their 
ability to impose overcharges. The findings confirm that cartels are dynamic, and not static, in 
their response to changes in market conditions. 
Finally, phase 3 coincided with increased focus on cartel enforcement by the competition 
authorities, and at the time, there was a focus on collusion in the steel sector. Evidence 
presented at the trial shows that during phase 3, some cartel members were concerned about 
the possibility of the cartel being detected by the competition authorities. An observation is 
that across all assumptions about the transition from collusion to competition and within the 
assumptions, there was greater variability of overcharges in phase 2 than in phase 3, despite 
the latter being characterised by greater input-cost volatility (see Table 3.8, below). This is 
consistent with observations on the variability of overcharges by product, discussed below. It 
might also have reflected attempts by the cartel to smooth out the impact of the volatility of 
input cost changes on prices, to avoid creating opportunities for cheating by members. 















Phase 2 33.3% 25.6% 32.7% 30.0% 
Phase 3 23.8% 22.4% 24.0% 22.7% 





3.5.1.3 Heterogeneity of overcharges from multi-product collusion 
By allowing for heterogeneity across all specifications, the author could determine and show 
whether cartel overcharges varied by product, and if so, to what extent. Tables 3.6 and 3.7, 
above, show that there was significant heterogeneity in overcharges on different products. 
There were two broad clusters of overcharges, that is, products with relatively low and 
statistically insignificant overcharges (products 2, 4, 6 and 850) and those with high and 
statistically significant overcharges (the rest of the products). The products falling into the 
lower and statistically insignificant overcharge cluster involved smoother and more stable 
overcharges compared with the other cluster. The variance in the estimated overcharges for the 
products with lower and statistically insignificant overcharges across phases 2 and 3 was 2.0 
per cent compared with 7.3 per cent for those that had high and statistically significant 
overcharges. This could have been because where a cartel imposes higher overcharges, the 
incentive to cheat exists and more likely leads to greater variability in the overcharges. On the 
other hand, cheating for products with lower overcharges is more likely to immediately result 
in reversion to competitive pricing and punishment, which is sub-optimal for the cartel. 
The cluster of products with lower or statistically insignificant overcharges comprised products 
that were considered base products, with a greater number of firms supplying them, including 
those outside the collusive arrangement. Steel-based products are homogenous, though there 
could be some differences between those products produced from scrap metal and those 
produced from steel billets. It is thus easier to have the cartel arrangement undercut both 
internally and externally on these products. Some manufacturers of these products applied for 
tariff protection, arguing that imports from lower-priced sources, such as those in Eastern Asia, 
including China, were threatening the viability of the domestic market. The products that were 
subject to tariff protection applications were P4, P5 and P6. The most recent tariff applications 
took place after the end of the conspiracy, between 2014 and 2017.51 
The products involving greater overcharges were those that were value-added products, which 
reflected a further processing of the base products. These products also had fewer domestic 
manufacturers: primarily, the major producers involved in the conspiracy were the main 
sources of supply. This is consistent with the expectation that in a multi-product setting, firms 
 






are likely to set the prices of different products in line with the conditions of demand and supply 
pertaining to each product, to optimise the recovery of costs, for revenue and for profit 
maximisation. This is also consistent with pricing under cartel conduct, where firms still have 
an interest in optimising cost recovery and maximising cartel profits, given production costs, 
demand, and supply conditions. 
The presence of a competitive fringe had a downward effect on prices, particularly for those 
products relative to the rest of the products. This does not necessarily mean pricing at 
competitive levels, but that the competitive fringe limits the ability of the cartel to fully exercise 
its collective market power. The results also support the view that in a multi-product setting, 
firms are more likely to collude across all products, including those for which collusion may 
not yield significant or higher levels of overcharges. Consistent with the observations in 
Chapter 2, once a multi-product firm colludes on one product, there is a possibility that it will 
be engaged in collusion on the other products, particularly if the same firms are involved in the 
production and supply of the other products. This has implications for cartel detection and 
deterrence. 
Table 3.9, below, shows that there was significant heterogeneity in overcharges on different 
products during the 2005 – 06 price war period. Four of these products reflect that during the 
price war, the cartel did not have a statistically significant upward effect on prices. Three of 
the four products were those that reflected low, statistically insignificant overcharges during 
collusive phases 2 and 3. The fourth product had statistically significant overcharges during 
collusive phases 2 and 3 but had reduced and statistically insignificant overcharges during the 
price war. This suggests that the price war induced competition for this product, leading to a 
reduction in the size and statistical significance of the overcharge as firms shifted to a period 
of non-collusive pricing. 
The cartel appeared to have been able to sustain prices significantly above the competitive level 
for some products, suggesting that while there may have been a price war, its effects did not 
include or affect all products to the same extent. In other words, the price war appears to have 
applied to some products, and not all products. This was expected because a price war across 
all products would unnecessarily undermine the overall profitability of the collusive 
framework, when the cheating problem could be addressed through other less costly means 




from the case, which showed that for some products, the cartel continued to apply the collusive 
framework during the price war period. 
Table 3.9: Short-term effects of price war on estimated overcharges on different 
products 
Product Model 2 with 
separate 
transition dummy 
Model 2 under 
linear transition 
Model 2 under 
instantaneous 
adjustment 
Unweighted average across all products 10.85% *** 9.10% *** 10.32% *** 
1 10.93  7.85% 12.38% 
2 1.66% 0.48% -1.15% 
3 13.29% ** 9.97% * 13.50% ** 
4 1.65% 3.48% 1.71% 
5 19.33% ** 16.79% ** 19.29% ** 
6 7.54% * 6.80% 9.17% ** 
7 19.84% *** 16.33% ** 19.91% *** 
8 7.69% 1.55% 1.48% 
9 14.63% * 15.62% * 13.22% 
10 13.64% * 13.73% * 16.01% ** 
Source: Own calculations, based on regression analyses 
3.6 Conclusion 
The scope and number of cartels that have been uncovered in South Africa has increased 
significantly over the last 15 years. A sizeable number of the cartels have involved firms that 
produced and sold multiple products. Some of the cartels have included collusion across 
multiple products, across markets and using the same framework of collusion with different 
mechanisms, depending on how customers procured products. With more cartels being 
uncovered, the scope and quantum of penalties also increased significantly. 
The Competition Act requires the Tribunal to consider factors such as the gravity and extent of 
the contravention, the loss or damage suffered because of the contravention, and the level of 
profit derived from the contravention when determining administrative penalties for collusion. 
While there may be debate about how these factors ought to be evaluated and applied, there is 
no doubt that firms will seek to argue that their conduct was not as harmful as alleged and did 
not yield significant profit. If there is sufficient information, evidence of overcharges becomes 
highly relevant for consideration. 
It is important that all the relevant factors be considered when estimating cartel overcharges. 




and facts of the market(s) in question, key events during the life of the cartel and the scope of 
the conduct. The necessary adjustments and controls must then be applied in the selected 
methodology. It is also important to understand the general pricing behaviour of firms involved 
in the cartel and how this applies in the context of the collusive arrangements under scrutiny. 
Economic theory suggests that in a multi-product setting, firms may price their products to 
optimise the recovery of production and distribution costs, and to maximise profits, given the 
demand and supply conditions for each product. Where there is multi-product cartel conduct, 
it is likely that the effects of the conspiracy will vary by product. It is more appropriate for 
competition authorities, firms, and their advisors to apply methodologies that can more fully 
capture the dynamics of pricing in a multi-product environment and to appreciate how those 
dynamics apply where collusion involves multiple products where the production processes are 
related. 
Appropriate methods in such circumstances include panel-data analyses, allowing for 
heterogeneity over products and time. This also means that some methodologies and 
assumptions are necessarily not applicable once all the facts and dynamics are considered. 
Examples of approaches that require caution include simple time-series analyses for individual 
products, but even more so those techniques that rely on simple comparisons of average prices 
or profits across spatial benchmarks or over time. 
This chapter comprised an examination of overcharges by a multi-product cartel where there 
were episodes of instability in the cartel’s life. In doing so, the chapter also provided an 
examination of the effect of assumptions about the transition period from collusion to 
competition on estimated overcharges, after correcting for known periods of significant 
instability in the life of the collusive conduct. By applying heterogeneous panel-data analyses, 
the study captured the cartel effect using indicator dummy variables. The unstable periods were 
captured by a separate dummy variable, which effectively controlled for the effects of these 
phases on estimated overcharges. The study found that estimated overcharges on some products 
were statistically significant and varied, depending on the assumptions made about the form 
and nature of the transition from collusion to competition. Notably, overcharges varied over 





The presence of multi-product/-market contact among firms makes collusion on several 
products more likely, even though the level of overcharges on some of the products may be 
much smaller. Base products tend to have lower, and more stable overcharges compared with 
value-added products. 
Across all phases and within phases, the standard deviation of overcharges was greater for 
products with higher overcharges than for those with lower overcharges. Some of the base 
products had also been subject to applications for tariff protection against imports, particularly 
those from East Asia. This is an important insight for the competition authorities when dealing 
with multi-product cartels, especially given that the Competition Act requires consideration of 
the harm and profit derived from the infringement. This is even more relevant in an era of 
follow-on damages claims and innovative remedies. 
The author found that overcharges varied over time and confirms that the cartel achieved a 
higher percentage of overcharges in its second phase than in its third phase, which was 
characterised by significant input-cost escalations and volatility, as well as an increased cartel 
enforcement focus on the steel sector. The cartel ended with the intervention of the competition 
authorities. The period between the second and third phases was characterised by a period of 
significant instability, which culminated in a price war. The beginning of the third phase was 
consequently characterised by efforts to re-establish adherence with the collusive arrangement. 
Further, the third phase was also characterised by significant escalations and volatility in the 
price of steel and the beginning of a significant slowdown in economic activity, which stemmed 
from the global economic recession. The third phase involved lower percentage overcharges 
than the second phase, which was more stable in terms of the collusive arrangement, input costs 
and economic growth. The third phase also exhibited smaller overcharge variability compared 
with the second phase, a finding that is consistent with findings at a product level that indicate 
greater variability where there are higher overcharges. 
Cartel enforcement in cases where parties present claims of evidence of the overcharges 
achieved by multi-product cartels should include a closer examination of the methodologies 
applied in estimating the overcharges, considering the factual circumstances of the case at hand. 
For instance, attempts should be made at ensuring that any significant events in the life of the 
cartel – such as unstable periods and the form and nature of the transition from collusion to 
competition – are controlled for. This is as important as the accepted need to control for all 




risk of biased estimates if an inappropriate methodology is used and all relevant factors are not 
controlled for. Deterrence could be undermined if overcharges are understated. 
More often, application of competition law involves significant amounts of value judgement. 
To ensure that judgement is applied prudently to achieve optimal deterrence in a multi-product 
cartel setting, it is useful to understand the effects of the cartel on the pricing of individual 
products and the resulting overcharges. This is more useful than merely accepting aggregate 
average overcharges across the cartelised products. Products with significant overcharges may 
be underrepresented in average overcharges. This is important because the time-series 
properties of aggregate data are not always akin to those of micro-units (individual products in 
this case). The question of how to determine appropriate overcharges and penalties in multi-
product cartels is still not fully tested, at least not in South Africa. 
Given that overcharges vary by product, the question is whether there is any merit in 
considering the factors stipulated in the Competition Act for determining penalties on a per-
product basis, before examining the aggregate impact of the conduct. The standard practice has 
been to consider multi-product collusion as a single-cartel infringement, and it is still to be seen 
whether this is effective in achieving deterrence. This study proposes that overcharges should 
be considered and understood with respect to individual products before the competition 
authorities reach a conclusion on the best approach to use for determining the final penalties to 
impose on the conspirators. Whatever the approach, the penalties must be sufficiently high to 
deter firms from engaging in collusion again and to deter those firms that may be contemplating 
starting a multi-product cartel. 
Against the background of the prevalence and features of cartels discussed in Chapter 2 and 
the significant size of overcharges estimated in empirical studies of overcharges – including 
those by a multi-product cartel such as the one studied in this chapter – in Chapter 4 the author 






APPENDIX A: PANEL UNIT-ROOT AND COINTEGRATION TESTS 
Table 3.10: Probability values for unit-root tests on price, steel, zinc, other variable 
costs, labour and GDP 
Price    
       
Unit-root test Null hypothesis Statistic p-value 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots 1.56 0.9407 
Hadri LM (2000) All panels are stationary 104.64 0.0000*** 
        
Steel       
        
Unit-root test Null hypothesis Statistic p-value 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots 2.45 0.9928 
Hadri LM (2000) All panels are stationary 109.09 0.0000*** 
        
Zinc       
        
Unit-root test Null hypothesis Statistic p-value 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots     
Hadri LM (2000) All panels are stationary 57.68 0.0000*** 
        
Other variable costs (ovc)       
        
Unit-root test Null hypothesis Statistic p-value 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots -12.72 0.0000*** 
Hadri LM (2000) All panels are stationary 64.74 0.0000*** 
        
Labour       
        
Unit root test Null hypothesis Statistic p-value 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots 0.85 0.8014 
Hadri LM (2000) All panels are stationary 89.41 0.0000*** 
        
GDP       
        
Unit-root test Null hypothesis Statistic p-value 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) All panels contain unit roots 12.98 1.0000 
Hadri LM (2000) All panels are stationary 118.04 0.0000*** 
Statistically significant at: 1 per cent (p<0.01) ***, 5 per cent (p<0.05) **, 10 per cent (p<0.10) * 
The results above indicate that at least some panels contain unit roots. The study therefore 
tested for panel cointegration using Westerlund’s (2008) panel cointegration tests. 




cointegrated and whether the panel was cointegrated. To address any potential correlation 
between cross-sectional units, the study applied bootstrapping, which gave robust critical 
values. The author found that at least some of the cross-sectional units were cointegrated and 
that the panel was also cointegrated (see Table 3.11). 
Table 3.11: Cointegration tests 
xtwest lnprice lnsteel lnzinc lnovc lnlab lngdp, lags (0 2) bootstrap (1) constant 
Bootstrapping critical values under H0. 
Results for H0: no cointegration         
With 10 series and 5 covariates         
Average AIC selected lead length: 0 
        
Statistic  Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value 
Gt  -3.588 -3.126 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Ga -19.583 -1.768 0.039** 0.000*** 
Pt -10.615 -2.878 0.002*** 0.000*** 
Pa -20.637 -3.538 0.000*** 0.000*** 






A critical examination of South Africa’s 20-year cartel enforcement record 
4.1 Introduction 
Collusion has existed in South Africa for decades, taking either legal (especially in the pre-
1994 era of regulation) or illegal forms. Cartels are viewed as inherently problematic 
arrangements that are harmful to consumers and the economy, and as such should be penalised 
with significant sanctions to deter firms from colluding. Some recent studies by academics and 
the competition authorities support this by pointing to the existence of significant overcharges 
by South African cartels (see Chapters 2 and 3 for indicative evidence). Consequently, there 
have been intensified efforts to deter the formation and continued existence of cartels, and 
where they form and are detected, to penalise them in a manner that ensures deterrence of the 
firms involved as well as those that may be considering forming similar arrangements. 
Admittedly, some cartels go undetected, and the size of that universe is not known. In South 
Africa, penalty provisions have even been revised upwards for repeat offenses to try and deter 
serial collusion. 
South Africa has been one of the most active jurisdictions in fighting cartels, which has been 
enabled by several institutional arrangements. First, a leniency policy was introduced in 2004, 
which was later revised, in 2008. Second, the competition authorities instituted a settlement 
procedure, entailing that firms that co-operate and assist the Commission in prosecuting other 
cartel members – saving the resources of the regulator – face lower penalties. Third, since the 
establishment of the competition regime in its current form, greater resources – primarily 
through increased funding – have been committed to fighting anti-competitive conduct (using 
either internal capacity or external resources). Fourth, a prioritisation framework aimed at 
optimising the Commission’s use of its limited resources for greater impact was implemented 
in 2006. 
Although the South African competition authorities have reported on the successes of their 
initiatives to enhance cartel detection and prosecution, there has been no systematic study of 
the efficacy of the cartel enforcement record in its totality. Such a study examines the nature 
of the relationship between available resources, enforcement policies and tools, on the one 




interaction between leniency and settlements, on the one hand, and the duration of 
investigations and prosecutions relative to penalties, on the other hand, are also limited. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive and critical examination of the cartel enforcement 
record, by looking at three areas from the perspective of deterrence. The first area examined in 
the study concerns the drivers of cartel enforcement in South Africa. The second area entailed 
examining the duration of investigation and prosecution of firms for cartel conduct. This also 
involved analysis of the relationship between the duration of investigations and the key drivers 
of cartel enforcement activity. Finally, for the purposes of understanding the potential impact 
of delays on deterrence, the analyses in the third area applied time-value of money principles, 
which are routinely used in the field of finance, to examine the impact of delays on the effective 
penalties paid by firms. Collectively, these three areas highlight significant gaps in cartel 
enforcement in its current form, and they have implications for deterrence. The three areas also 
highlight gaps in the economic literature on cartel enforcement. The study therefore contributes 
to the economic literature on cartel enforcement, policy development and efficiency 
improvements in cartel enforcement processes. 
4.2 Review of literature on collusion and cartel enforcement 
The literature review begins with section 4.2.1, which appraises the literature on the framework 
underlying most modern cartel enforcement regimes. The underlying framework informs not 
just the approach followed by competition authorities, but also the tools that they employ in 
cartel enforcement. The review shows that most cartel enforcement regimes operate within a 
deterrence-based framework, where the primary goal of the competition authorities is to deter 
firms from engaging in collusion. The review also addressed economic literature regarding the 
tools and other factors that form part of a deterrence-based framework of cartel enforcement. 
The study focused on the penalties, leniency and settlement procedures which are 
commonplace, as well as the established features of cartel enforcement across many countries. 
Further to this, the literature review also provides a discussion on the empirical literature on 
the drivers of cartel enforcement and the effectiveness of cartel enforcement from a deterrence 
perspective. This includes an examination of the duration of investigations and prosecutions of 
firms for collusion. In turn, this entails the potential use of present-value techniques to examine 




paid by firms, and the subsequent impact of this on deterrence. The literature review concludes 
by identifying some gaps in the literature, which the study attempted to fill. 
4.2.1 Theoretical underpinnings of most cartel enforcement regimes 
The existence of collusion and the harm associated with its conduct has led to the introduction 
of antitrust laws in most countries and an expansion of the tools available to competition 
authorities to enhance the detection, prosecution, and deterrence of cartels. This literature 
review covered (i) the framework governing most competition law regimes, as well as the 
central role played by the probability of detection and penalties (subsection 4.2.1.1); (ii) the 
role of leniency in cartel enforcement (subsection 4.2.1.2); and the role of settlements, 
including their interlinkages with penalties and leniency, and their impact on deterrence. 
4.2.1.1 Deterrence-based cartel enforcement framework, probability of detection 
and penalties 
Most competition law regimes are founded on the notion that antitrust laws must deter firms 
from engaging in anti-competitive conduct. This includes those that engage in collusion and 
are detected and punished, as well as those that may be contemplating engaging in collusion. 
The economic basis of cartel enforcement derives from a substantial literature, initiated by 
Becker (1968). Becker developed an economics-based framework of deterrence to prevent only 
inefficient violations, that is, those that result in net harm to society. Becker’s framework 
therefore allows for violations, even if these result in the transfer of a surplus from consumers 
to firms, provided that the net effect on total welfare is neutral or positive. The framework does 
not look to prohibit all violations, but instead it allows for internalisation of the costs and 
benefits associated with the violation. In this framework, Becker examined the costs of illegal 
conduct to society, in the form of costs of criminal damage (harm to society), costs to detect 
and prosecute criminals, and the social costs of punishment. He concluded that an optimal 
enforcement framework minimises these social costs. 
Harm to society partly depends on the number of offences, while detection and prosecution 
depend on the amount of public resources dedicated to the detection and prosecution of crime, 
which in turn is influenced by the activities of the authority. The incentive to commit an offence 
(the supply of offences) is influenced by the possibility of detection and successful prosecution 




appetite of the offender is offset by a large enough probability of detection and prosecution as 
well as a fine that is sufficiently high. Becker argued that the optimal levels of the probability 
of detection and successful prosecution (p) and the resulting sanction (F) can be set relative to 
the level of net harm from the offence, the cost of raising p to a deterring level, and the effect 
that changes in the level of p and F will have on the supply of offences. Although there are 
other deterrence tools available to competition authorities, the most prevalent instrument is 
financial penalties. This is because they are not resource intensive, they punish criminals 
thereby simplifying the determination of both p and F. 
Relying on the benefits and costs to society as the basis for finding the optimal level of 
enforcement is challenging. Such benefits and costs are difficult to quantify in most cases. For 
example, some of the social costs relate to the long-term damage caused by anti-competitive 
conduct on the functioning of markets, and as such, cannot be accurately estimated within the 
Becker framework. Becker’s framework may therefore entail practical difficulties and may 
introduce enforcement inefficiencies, as much time and significant resources will be needed to 
quantify the costs and benefits of violations in each antitrust case. It also increases the risks of 
enforcement errors, as it may be difficult to distinguish between efficient and inefficient 
violations. The internalisation approach may also have the unintended effect of encouraging 
violations since firms can always claim efficiencies. 
Using a deterrence-based framework for antitrust, Motta (2008) concluded that the deterrence 
effects of penalties depend on p and F. He found that optimal sanctions eliminate the illicit 
gains that offenders derive from the conduct, reducing the incentive to engage in illegal 
conduct. The level of the penalty must eliminate the gain obtained by offenders to reduce the 
incentive to engage in illegal conduct. Absolute deterrence, where p equals 1, is too costly to 
achieve, and optimal enforcement can be achieved by finding an appropriate balance between 
the level of enforcement activities and the level of sanctions [Kaplow (1989) and Bebchuk and 
Kaplow (1992)]. Motta (2008) suggested that if p is small, the level of sanction, F, should be 
set at a sufficiently high level and vice versa. 
The primary question for competition authorities is therefore how to ensure that p and F are set 
optimally, i.e., to optimally deter firms from engaging in anti-competitive conduct, including 
collusion. As discussed below, optimal cartel enforcement depends, in large part, on three 
interrelated policies: leniency and settlement (both affecting p) and sanction (penalty), 




Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) gave some insights on how competition authorities can achieve 
deterrence when enforcement activities are costly. They recognised that not every violator faces 
the same probability of detection. If the law enforcement agency can work out p for each 
violator, then the sanctions can be set optimally. However, where some violations are more 
difficult to detect than others, the authors suggested that the difficult-to-detect violators should 
face maximal sanctions, while violators that are detected more easily should face lower 
sanctions. In another scenario, Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) considered a situation when the 
difficulty of detection cannot be observed, even after the violator has been apprehended. In 
such cases, the authors proposed that a single sanction should be applied. 
In cartel enforcement, the competition authority rarely ever knows how easy or difficult it will 
be to detect collusion, and some cartels are more difficult to detect than others. As a result, the 
observations made by Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) are of direct relevance to what competition 
authorities consider when determining penalties for cartel violations. For example, the 
competition authorities in South Africa routinely consider the extent of co-operation by a 
defendant in supplying evidence on the infringement, and whether the defendant is a repeat 
offender. As shown further on, monetary penalties differ across firms within and across cartels, 
largely because penalties are determined based on the revenue of the respective firms. There is 
rarely a singular monetary penalty imposed on firms for collusion, even within the same cartel, 
and this applies to both easy-to-detect and hard-to-detect cartels. Through penalties imposed 
on firms for collusion, competition authorities seek to deter penalised firms from repeating the 
offences, and to deter those that are contemplating collusion or that may consider it. 
Block, Nold and Sidak (1981) examined the impact of antitrust enforcement on deterrence and 
showed that enforcement activities and credible threats of penalties affect cartel pricing by 
lowering it below the level that the cartel would have set in the absence of a competition 
authority. This price is still found to be above competitive levels, meaning that enforcement 
activities reduce the size of the cartel overcharge. This finding suggests that at a given level of 
p, penalties do not necessarily eradicate collusion but reduce the size of the optimal mark-up 
achieved by cartels, unless the interaction between the two reduces the cartel mark-up to 
negligible levels. In such circumstances, the firms will have no incentive to collude. The 
challenge with this finding is that most competition authorities have statutory caps on the 
amount of penalties that they can impose on firms and that not all cartels are detected. Given 




instruments in a manner that optimises p. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn by 
Becker (1968) and Motta (2008). The probability of detection at any level of cartel mark-up is 
influenced by the capacity of the competition authority to initiate cases, which in turn is 
affected by its budget. Block, Nold and Sidak (1981) showed that an increase in the United 
States Department of Justice’s capacity and filing of complaints, reduced cartel mark-ups in 
the bread industry. Increased capacity of competition authorities through funding can be 
expected to contribute to deterrence. Bork (1978) recommended the need to increase cartel 
enforcement activity by adding resources, suggesting that he considered cartel enforcement to 
be suboptimal. 
While accepting that deterrence depends on p and F, Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) argued that 
there are feedback effects between the crime rate and these two variables. They pointed out 
that p and F also depend on the crime rate and that these effects are not considered in most 
models. This proposal has some appeal in policymaking circles where there are debates that 
the level of penalties should be raised because the crime rate is high. Bar-Gill and Harel 
accepted the findings that a higher investment in enforcement raises p and lowers the crime 
rate but argued that this will in future have the feedback effect of reducing the size of future 
penalties. When future penalties are reduced, this will induce an increase in the crime rate. The 
policy implications of their analyses and findings are that the optimal level of investment in 
law enforcement depends on the effect of the crime rate on p and F. Where this effect reinforces 
the reduction in crime that results from investing in law enforcement and having higher 
sanctions, the level of investment is higher. However, if this effect reduces the direct deterrence 
effects of investing in law enforcement and having higher sanctions, then one can expect the 
optimal level of investment in law enforcement to be lower. At an analytical level, it is 
important to test for the existence of this bi-directional feedback effect, and where it exists, to 
test its strength and to apply methods that account for such effects, to avoid bias in estimates. 
Landes (1983) proposed a theory for determining the optimal penalty for competition law 
infringements. He suggested that the optimal penalty should be equal to the net harm resulting 
from the conduct and that this penalty should be adjusted upwards if p is less than one. The 
optimal fine is, however, not designed to penalise efficient violations that produce net cost 
savings. Cartel conduct is prohibited outright regardless of whether the arrangement produces 
cost savings or not. These efficiency gains are applicable only in mitigation of the size of the 




on the other hand, adopted a view that suggested the existence of under-enforcement, by 
advocating for higher sanctions against cartel conduct. This is an ongoing dialogue in antitrust 
circles with some policymakers believing that firms that engage in cartels should face greater 
penalties than is currently provided for in most statutes. It is true that sufficiently deterrent 
penalties should be capable of extracting the illicit gains earned by firms from collusion [see 
Motta (2008)]. 
4.2.1.2 Leniency, cartel detection and deterrence 
The challenge for competition authorities is that, by their nature, most cartels are not readily 
observable to competition authorities and consumers alike. This means that competition 
authorities must find ways of detecting collusion. Leniency programmes have been 
instrumental in the detection of cartels. Section 3 presents some historical statistics on the 
extent to which leniency has played a role in the detection of cartels in South Africa. Motta 
(2008) found that leniency has played a critical role in the detection and prosecution of cartels 
in the EU. Despite this finding, Motta (2008) noted that leniency had not saved resources, as 
there was no clear reduction in the time taken to investigate and penalise firms for cartel 
conduct. 
According to Wils (2008) the presence of a settlement procedure contributes to the prosecution 
of cartels once they have been uncovered. Within this context, leniency is expected to reduce 
the time spent investigating and prosecuting cases, freeing up resources, which can then be 
used to detect the existence of other cartels. Hence, if enough resources are provided to the 
competition authority to complement the effect of leniency, the level of p can be raised. 
Harrington and Chang (2015) examined the circumstances under which leniency programmes 
could result in fewer cartels. The authors found that the effects of leniency on deterrence were 
ambiguous, depending on the impact that reliance on leniency for cartel enforcement has on 
the ability of the competition authorities to undertake non-leniency-based cartel enforcement. 
It also depends on the competition authority’s budget. Leniency is found to deter collusion 
when non-leniency enforcement does not decline. Further, Harrington and Chang (2015) found 
that over-reliance on leniency in the presence of limited resources could undermine deterrence 
if resources shift from the detection of cartels by competition authorities to the assessment and 
processing of leniency applications. One of the key findings was that the instance of cartels 




applications consumed a similar amount of time as non-leniency enforcement. This might also 
shift resources from prosecuting active cartels to ones that are winding down. As such, 
deterrence is better achieved when leniency is combined with penalties that are sufficiently 
severe. Resource constraints can crowd out non-leniency enforcement, leading to under-
deterrence especially of stable cartels. This means that the competition authorities should be 
well funded in order to complement leniency and not to substitute leniency with non-leniency 
enforcement. The problem is that the competition authorities can engage in strategic behaviour 
that also undermines cartel deterrence even when provided with all these tools. For instance, 
the competition authorities could chase after quick wins and divert resources to processing 
leniency applications while neglecting non-leniency enforcement. In so doing, the competition 
authorities may gain public and political acclaim for fighting cartels despite the negative impact 
on deterrence. 
4.2.1.3 Settlements, time value of penalties and deterrence 
Leniency is often used together with a settlement procedure in which the competition authority 
and a firm that has violated competition laws resolve the case by entering into a settlement 
agreement. Settlement procedures and their use vary across different jurisdictions. In South 
Africa, settlement agreements have included acknowledgement by the offending firm that its 
conduct has contravened the law, agreement on the future conduct of the firm and the amount 
of the penalty to be paid by the firm, if any. The penalty is particularly an outcome of 
negotiation between the Commission and the firm involved. In addition, the Commission can 
resolve cases using the settlement procedure at any point during the investigation, including 
long after it has referred cases to the Tribunal for prosecution. This has implications for the 
way investigations are conducted by the Commission, and the incentives and behaviour of 
firms under investigation when resolving cases of collusion. It also has implications for 
deterrence. 
Settlements, like leniency, can result in benefits in terms of cartel enforcement – in the form of 
cost savings for both the competition authorities and the offending firms – and free up the 
resources of the competition authorities, which can be diverted to other prospective cases, 
thereby enhancing detection. However, whether a case against a firm is settled depends on 
several factors including the prospects of the competition authority and offending firm having 
converging interests in resolving case early, as well as how the surplus derived from resolving 




and Motta (2010)]. In other words, firms expect a fair share of the settlement surplus through 
reduced penalties and/or less intrusive and less burdensome remedies. Edwards and Padilla 
(2010) found that firms have incentives to settle with the competition authorities when the sum 
of litigation costs and the resulting penalty are greater, and there is a high probability of 
successful prosecution. The incentives of the competition authorities are influenced by the 
likelihood of successful prosecution and the significance of litigation costs compared with the 
reduction in penalties if a case is resolved by settlement. 
The longer the time to settlement, the more likely it will be that cost savings and other benefits 
of settlement to the competition authorities and hence the State will not be realised. Optimal 
deterrence based on settlements requires competition authorities to determine the optimal time 
horizon for resolving cases and when to afford firms a share of the settlement surplus through 
lower penalties [Franzoni (1999)]. Deterrence is undermined if the resolution of cases is 
prolonged and firms still obtain such a share. This is important given the potential for 
divergence in the incentives among firms and the competition authorities. Firms have an 
incentive to pay a lower real penalty when their involvement in collusion is detected, which 
they can achieve by delaying the penalty and still resolving the case through a settlement 
procedure. Holding p constant, a reduction in the penalty faced by a firm through a settlement 
procedure means that the required level of profit from an infringement required to offset the 
penalty is also lower, making it more likely that firms will commit violations in future [Ascione 
and Motta (2010)]. This undermines deterrence. As Franzoni (1999) observed, this means that 
penalties may be suboptimal for deterrence when cases are resolved using a settlement 
procedure. To avoid this, a reduction in penalties because of a settlement procedure should be 
offset by an increase in p because of increased enforcement (e.g. resources diverted to detect 
other cartels). 
Given the simultaneous use of settlements and leniency, there is potential that significantly 
reduced penalties from settlements could undermine the incentives for firms to apply for 
leniency. Ascione and Motta (2010) suggested that this could in turn reduce the chances of 
detecting cartels through leniency. As such, there is a need for careful design of a settlement 
procedure, including the extent of fine adjustments available to firms when they resolve cases 
via settlements. 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) extended the debates on optimal sanctions to include the 




some being more immediate (e.g. within a year of the investigation starting), while others come 
after several years of investigation. They noted that time delays reduce the deterring effect of 
penalties, by lowering the present value of the penalty, unless the penalty is adjusted upwards. 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) argued thus that the optimal penalty should be adjusted to account 
for the timing of prosecution decisions. Additional literature on optimal penalties argued for 
penalties to be based on cartel overcharges [e.g. Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015, 
2017)]. The propositions in this literature affect the size of penalties faced by firms, but do not 
directly address the impact of delays on the time value of penalties. Basing penalties on 
overcharges may create legal uncertainty and introduce implementation challenges and costs. 
Of relevance to the present study is the fact that it potentially prolongs the duration of cartel 
cases unless competition authorities and firms readily find common ground on key aspects of 
estimating the overcharge. Estimating overcharges is controversial and is likely to be disputed 
by firms because of the impact of overcharges on civil claims that firms might face after the 
decision of the competition authorities. If the penalties that are imposed on firms are not 
adjusted upwards for the potential delays that may arise from the overcharge-based approach 
to penalties, deterrence will be undermined further. 
Edwards and Padilla (2010) argued that a populistic competition authority that places too much 
importance on the impact of its decisions on short-term welfare or is risk averse, or both will 
prefer to settle cases rather than litigate against firms, especially if the outcome of litigation is 
uncertain. This is likely to result in firms paying lower penalties, both nominal and real. 
Based on the above review of the theoretical literature, cartel enforcement includes three 
important policy tools, that is, penalties, leniency, and settlements. The duration of cases from 
inception to a final prosecution decision is an important aspect of an optimal cartel enforcement 
framework because it affects the time-value of penalties. Prolonged durations of settlements 
result in firms paying lower real penalties, undermining deterrence. 
The next section summarises the empirical literature, which covers the drivers of cartel 







4.2.2 Review of literature on drivers of cartel enforcement and the effectiveness of cartel 
enforcement from a deterrence perspective 
As the literature discussed in Chapter 2 shows, expanded cartel enforcement has contributed to 
the death of cartels [e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2011)]. The availability of increased resources 
for cartel enforcement and a wider range of policy tools for cartel detection and prosecution 
have contributed to the collapse of some cartels. Some recent studies have examined the 
attributes of cartel enforcement over time, and how the changing use of enforcement tools by 
competition authorities affects cartel detection and punishment. These studies include Ghosal 
and Sokol (2018), who quantified the effects of various policy regimes on cartel prosecution 
and the financial penalties per firm and individual, and jail time in the United States. They also 
include an examination of the impact that political administration has on these variables. 
Ghosal and Sokol (2018) identified three key policy shifts in the United States cartel 
enforcement history, that is, the increase in the level of fines, incarceration of cartel participants 
and leniency. All these shifts were aimed at raising both p and F. The authors found that the 
introduction of a new leniency programme from 1978 to 1992 and from 1993 to 2003, the 
introduction of the Antitrust Amendment Act and the ACPERA period from 2004 to 2013 did 
not significantly influence the number of cartels prosecuted by the DoJ. 
Similar conclusions were drawn on the number of individuals jailed per cartel and the numbers 
of individuals and firms fined per cartel. However, these policy changes significantly 
influenced the penalties per cartel and the number of jail days. Political party effects were 
significant, with a negative coefficient for the total number of cartels prosecuted during 
Republican administrations. Political effects were not significant for any other factors. The 
total number of cartels and the number of individuals jailed per cartel showed persistence, while 
case load, economic growth and funding did not have a significant impact. The results for the 
effect of funding on the number of cartels were unexpected given predictions from the 
deterrence-based framework of antitrust enforcement. Ghosal and Sokol (2018) reasoned that 
the United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division had discretion in the allocation 
and utilisation of its resources across its work functions, making it difficult to formulate clear 
predictions. This finding is, however, consistent with studies by Ghosal (2011) and Ghosal and 
Sokol (2016). 





(i) The success of leniency could have resulted in fewer cartels or increased compliance. 
(ii) Cartels have become smarter and more effective at avoiding detection and may be 
colluding tacitly via price signalling and using technology. 
(iii) There has been a shift in the United States Department of Justice’s focus from domestic 
to international cartels, and the shutdown of some field offices, together with 
insufficient State enforcement. The study did not include private enforcement, and the 
decline could simply reflect the substitution of private enforcement with public 
enforcement by the United States Department of Justice. Ghosal and Sokol (2018) noted 
that private enforcement and cartel enforcement at the level of States had not picked up 
local bid-rigging cartels, meaning that collusion had gone undetected. It is not possible 
to conclude that the observed decline was the result of effective enforcement, because 
the universe of cartels was not known. 
Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015) provided an empirical assessment of the European 
Commission’s settlement procedure, using a data set of 84 cartels penalised between 2000 and 
2014. They found that the settlement procedure had led to a reduction in the time taken (of 
more than 12 months) between the issuance of a Statement of Objections and the time when a 
decision is made. This aligns with the expectation that tools such as a settlement procedure lead 
to resource savings and quicker decisions. However, the settlement procedure and the use of 
leniency do not appear to have shortened the period between the start of the investigation and 
the issuance of a Statement of Objections. Despite this, Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015) 
found that the settlement procedure had shortened the length of the overall period from the start 
of the investigation to the decision, meaning that resources can be redirected towards detecting 
the existence of other cartels. This could enhance deterrence. 
Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015) recognised that the decision of a firm to settle involves 
more complex consideration of several factors such as the discount for settling; saving litigation 
costs; limiting reputational damage; the prospect of influencing the assessment of the case; and 
the risk of follow-on damages after admission of liability among others. It is perhaps for this 
reason that firms might wait for the European Commission to issue a Statement of Objections 
first and evaluate the strength of the case against them before engaging in more definitive 
settlement negotiations. 
According to Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015), if deterrence and the quality of decisions 




can be maintained if the reduction in penalties is offset by gains in the detection rate from 
increased cartel enforcement activities. The study identified the potential adverse impacts on 
the quality of decisions, development of jurisprudence, and the impact on checks and balances, 
which are reinforced by appeals processes. 
In summary, evidence from the empirical studies cited above provides findings that are 
consistent with theoretical expectations. For instance, revisions to United States leniency 
policy have been associated with an increased number of prosecutions per cartel, and 
amendments to legislation have been associated with greater penalties per cartel. The use of a 
settlement procedure in the European Union has resulted in resource savings, by reducing the 
overall duration of cases. However, this has only reduced the time from the Statement of 
Objections to a decision and has not appeared to affect the period from inception of 
investigation to the issuance of the Statement of Objectives. This suggests strategic behaviour 
by firms, delaying settlement until prosecution is more certain: prosecution becomes evident 
at the issuance of a Statement of Objectives. The next section summarises gaps in the literature 
reviewed. 
4.2.3 Summary of gaps identified in literature 
This study sought to address the following gaps that have been identified in the literature. First, 
the literature addresses only parts of the cartel enforcement record, rather than holistically 
examining the drivers of cartel enforcement and the effectiveness of enforcement from a 
deterrence perspective. For example, Ghosal and Sokol (2011, 2016, 2018) studied the drivers 
of cartel enforcement in the United States without extending their studies to evaluate the 
efficiency of cartel enforcement from a deterrence perspective. This study has addressed this 
gap by examining the drivers of cartel enforcement in South Africa; the duration of cartel cases 
from investigation to a final prosecution decision; and the use of present-value techniques to 
study the impact of duration on penalties with regard to deterrence. This is important in South 
Africa, where the Commission, which is well recognised for cartel enforcement, has placed 
much emphasis on collusion as a key enforcement priority. 
The study provides, first, a critical assessment of the South African cartel enforcement record, 
and thus could contribute to policy changes. Second, and relatedly, to the author’s knowledge, 
no empirical studies have examined the duration of cartel cases from investigation to the final 




enforcement activity in South Africa; this study examined these aspects of cartel enforcement 
in South Africa. The theoretical literature predicts that leniency and settlement procedures will 
reduce the amount of time to decide on cases, meaning that penalties are imposed sooner, and 
the resources saved could be diverted to detecting other cartels. This is expected to enhance the 
deterrence effects of penalties and raise the probability of detection of cartels. However, 
contrary to theoretical expectations, Ascione and Motta (2010) observe that leniency and 
settlements have not resulted in shorter durations of cases, from the start of investigations to 
the conclusion of cases. This finding is contrary to the more recent results of Hüschelrath and 
Laitenberger (2015), who found that settlements have shortened the duration of cases, allowing 
resources to be directed towards detecting other cartels in the EU. 
Third, the unresolved aspects in the literature relate to the incentives to firms to delay the 
finalisation of cases, and the impact of time delays on the effects of penalties on deterrence. 
On a theoretical level, literature such as that of Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) recognised that 
firms may benefit from prolonged cases. As such, firms may have the incentive to delay 
prosecution as much as possible. However, this literature does not show empirically how the 
incentives may work in terms of the impact on penalties paid by firms, and on the effects of 
penalties on deterrence. Lower real penalties undermine the effects of penalties on deterrence. 
This might explain the observation that the time taken from the start of an investigation to the 
issuance of a Statement of Objectives by the European Commission has not been reduced [see 
Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015)]. 
In the present study, this gap is addressed through the examination of the impact of case 
duration on the present-value of the penalties paid by firms at the conclusion of prosecution in 
South Africa. Present-value techniques are routinely used in finance to determine the time 
value of money and can also be applied to penalties. It can be accepted that firms know when 
they have participated in a cartel, hence they decide whether to resolve the case with the 
competition authorities soon after being notified that they are under investigation, or whether 
to delay resolving the case as much as possible and pay a time-discounted penalty. They may 
even benefit from a further discount if they can negotiate a lower nominal penalty through 
settlement. The incentives to firms to delay the resolution of cases will lie in the prospect of 
paying lower real penalties, especially where penalties are not adjusted upwards to compensate 





Data limitations could explain the absence of extensive empirical studies of the three areas 
identified above. The next section outlines the data used in this study. 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Description of data and its sources 
The information used is publicly available and was obtained from the Tribunal’s and the 
Commission’s websites, annual reports, press releases and other publications. The information 
covered the period from April 1999 to March 2018. The study excluded information for the 
prior period, as the current Competition Act - which introduced more invigorated cartel 
enforcement – was not applicable to it. This study recognised that some cartels started prior to 
1999, and some of them were legal cartels. The period prior to 1999 also coincided with State 
regulation of markets, where some of the key cartels were either legal (e.g. cement) or part of 
marketing boards. Given the variables and the period covered, the data comprises a balanced 
panel of six sectors (i.e., N=6) each with 19 annual periods (i.e., T=19), giving a total of 114 
observations. As a general principle, having a greater number of observations provides greater 
comfort on the robustness of econometric analysis, particularly if the models involved are 
complex and require a lot of degrees of freedom. In this study, the models being estimated are 
parsimonious, with a limited number of variables thereby reducing the data requirements and 
the number of degrees of freedom required. These models are conceptually insightful in 
examining the relationship between cartel enforcement record (number of prosecutions and 
duration of prosecutions) and factors that drive them. In addition, the study does not solely rely 
on the results of the econometric analysis, but it is complemented with qualitative descriptive 
analysis. The econometric analysis provides results which are consistent with the findings of 
the qualitative descriptive analysis of the enforcement record data. This mitigates potential 
concerns about the robustness of the results of the econometric analysis. 
The data relates to the completed prosecutions of firms for which there was a final ruling, by 
either the Tribunal or the CAC, as well as non-prosecution specific information relating to the 
funding of the Commission. The information on prosecution decisions includes the identity of 
the firms, the relevant sector or products, detail on the features of the cartel, how the case was 
resolved (i.e. whether settled or litigated), whether the investigation involved leniency, the date 
the Commission initiated the investigation, the date the Tribunal or CAC issued its judgement, 




it is common for the Commission to combine multiple investigations against a firm and resolve 
them in a single settlement, and in this regard, there are instances where firms paid a single 
lumpsum penalty for multiple infringements. Also, these investigations were in some instances 
initiated at different points in time. In these cases, it was impossible to determine the amount 
of the penalty applicable to each infringement. 
Information on cartel features typically includes the type of conduct (e.g. price fixing, market 
allocation, cover pricing, collusive tendering), when the conduct occurred, other elements of 
the collusive arrangement (e.g. compensation schemes) and the involvement of an industry 
body (e.g. industry association or third-party provider of information). The case initiation date 
and the Tribunal’s ruling date give us a measure of the duration of the investigation from 
detection to prosecution. The data also comprises the number of firms that were prosecuted for 
collusion in each year. It is important to note that the process of prosecution can span more 
than a year, and this element is captured in the duration variable. Information on the 
Commission’s funding, number of employees, case load and number of leniency applications 
was obtained from its published Annual Reports and relates to the Commission’s financial year, 
not calendar year. 
4.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
This section starts with a brief description of the evolution of cartel enforcement since 1999 
and an analysis of the evolution of the key cartel enforcement variables of interest in the study, 
that is, the penalties, leniency, funding and number of employees’ aspects pertaining to the 
Commission. This is followed by a summary of the descriptive statistics comprising the key 
cartel enforcement variables studied. 
Cartel enforcement in South Africa took its current form with the implementation of the 
Competition Act in 1998. The current competition authorities were set up under this Act. There 
was limited cartel enforcement in the early years, with the first penalties being imposed in 
2003. The early cases were mostly against trade/professional associations acting on behalf of 
their members by setting prices or fees and against branded motor vehicle dealers (e.g. Subaru 
dealers, VW dealers). These cases were followed by cases involving collusion by airlines. The 
period after this saw more widespread cartel enforcement activity across various sectors, 





4.3.2.1 Evolution of penalties 
The Competition Act empowers South African competition authorities to impose penalties of 
up to 10 per cent of revenue on firms that engage in cartel conduct. Between 1999 and 2018, 
the Commission collected just over R7 billion in penalties for cartel conduct. The total value 
of penalties received per year is influenced by the number of firms prosecuted as well as the 
level of penalties imposed per firm during the period. All else being equal, in periods where 
fewer firms are prosecuted, the total value of penalties imposed will be lower. The penalties in 
the earlier cases were low (see Figure 4.1). This taken together with low enforcement activity 
suggests that both p and F were low, and by implication there was under-deterrence. Some of 
the cartels that were uncovered during the first seven years were public cartels. 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of penalties for cartel conduct from FY2000 to FY2018 
 
Source: Publicly available Tribunal records on penalties 
Penalties for cartel conduct in South Africa started increasing from around 2005, with sharper 
increases from 2007. The 2007 period coincided with the detection and penalisation of the 
bread and milling cartels and the scrap metal cartel. Fines against Pioneer Foods for its 
involvement in the bread and wheat milling cartels as well as for engaging in entry deterrence 
strategies contributed significantly to the penalties reaching the R1 billion level in 2010. This 
produced the first of three outliers that are worth noting. The second peak that exceeded the 
2010 level was a result of penalties against construction firms, where four of the firms that 


























































































cases formed part of the Commission’s Construction Sector Fast Track Settlement Programme, 
an initiative developed and used by the Commission to resolve cases related to extensive 
collusion in the construction sector. In 2016, Arcelor Mittal agreed to pay a penalty of R1.5 
billion for engaging in collusion in the steel markets, thereby producing the third peak. This 
was the highest single-firm penalty for collusion ever paid in South Africa. Figure 4.1 shows 
clearly that the general level of penalties has increased over the period but not to the level 
suggested by these three outliers (see three-year moving average trendline52). 
4.3.2.2 Evolution of the use of leniency 
The Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement activities stepped up with the introduction of its 
corporate leniency policy in 2004, its revision of this in 2008, the prioritisation of sectors for 
more targeted enforcement, and increased public awareness following the detection of the 
bread cartel. The revisions to the leniency policy in 2008 gave firms more certainty, by making 
instigators of cartel conduct eligible for immunity, providing for the acceptance of oral 
evidence. Also introduced with the revisions was a marker procedure that allowed firms to 
submit, in the form of a marker application, a place holder for leniency while they gather 
evidence on their potential involvement in collusion. The marker application could then be 
followed by a formal application for leniency. The revisions were followed by a significant 
increase in the number of leniency applications. At the time, a third of the cases that the 
Commission referred to the Tribunal for prosecution involved leniency applications 
[Competition Commission (2009)].53 Figure 4.2 presents the number of leniency applications 
received by the Commission over time. 
 
52 Moving averages smooth out the peaks and valleys (noise of random outliers) in the data, making it more 
interpretable. Moving averages also make it easier to observe the underlying general trends in data. 




Figure 4.2: Number of leniency applications from FY2000 to FY2018 
 
Source: Commission’s Annual Reports 
Figure 4.2 shows that there were three notable financial years when leniency applications 
increased significantly. The first of these was following revisions to the Commission’s CLP 
and because of the construction cases referred to previously (FY2010). The second entailed the 
highest number of recorded leniency applications, primarily driven by cases in the construction 
sector following the initiation of the Commission’s Construction Sector Fast Track Settlement 
Programme (FY2012). The third, in FY2015, was driven by applications in the automotive 
industry. It is important to note that these peaks in leniency applications related to cases where 
there was significant widespread, industry-wide collusion in the affected sectors. The 
Commission has stated that the key drivers of leniency applications include dawn raids in 
related markets, and initiation of investigations in markets where firms eventually apply for 
leniency [Competition Commission (2009)].54 
The leniency policy was supported by a settlement procedure, that was expected to fast track 
the conclusion of investigations and prosecutions. The settlements procedure offers firms 
reduced penalties for the early resolution of cases, co-operation, and assistance with the 
prosecution of firms that opt for litigation. Over 90 per cent of the finalised cartel prosecutions 
during the period April 1999 to March 2018 were resolved under the settlement procedure. 
 
54 Competition Commission, 2009, 10-Year Review, Unleashing Rivalry, p.49. 






































4.3.2.3 Evolution of the Commission’s funding and number of employees 
Under its prioritisation framework, the Commission adopted a proactive approach to initiating 
cartel investigations, focusing its resources and efforts on identified sectors. In 2012, the 
Commission set up a dedicated Cartels Division whose responsibility is to investigate 
allegations of cartel conduct. The evolution of the number of the Commission’s employees is 
reflected in Figure 4.3.55 These capacity additions in part reflect the increase in funding of the 
Commission between the 2000 and 2018 financial years which follows similar trends to the 
number of employees of the Commission (see Figure 4.3). The recent fiscal challenges facing 
the country are, however, putting pressure on the funding of the Commission, which increased 
by 8.9 per cent between the financial years 2018 and 2019, compared with previous increase 
of 21.8 per cent between the financial years 2017 and 2018. 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of Commission’s staff complement and funding56 from FY2000 to 
FY2018 
 
Source: Commission’s Annual Reports 
In more recent years, the proactive approach to cartel investigations has been complemented 
by intensified use of tools such as dawn raids. Between 2010 and 2018, the Commission 
 
55 These numbers include administrative and support employees. 
56 The Commission’s funding includes grants from government, fees paid by firms for merger approval processes, 









































conducted a total of 20 dawn raids, compared with four in the period between 1999 and 2009. 
At face value, the data shows that the combination of different enforcement tools (leniency, 
settlements, and proactive enforcement) and increased capacity from increased funding has 
raised the probability of detection and successful prosecution. It is also notable that cartel 
enforcement, like other branches of law enforcement, involves a significant number of learning 
effects, which have sharpened and enhanced the ability of the Commission to detect cartels 
from data, from research into markets and during routine merger review investigations. Taken 
together with higher penalties, these enforcement activities can be expected to have contributed 
to greater deterrence, at least compared with earlier years. The Commission has also applied 
sector-wide settlement procedures where widespread collusion was uncovered. An example of 
this is the Construction Sector Fast Track Settlement Programme. This can be expected to have 
resulted in efficiency gains in the finalisation of cases. 
4.3.2.4 Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for some of the key enforcement variables used in the 
analysis. 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics on some key enforcement variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Number of firms prosecuted per calendar year 15 14 
Fines per calendar year57 R352.1 million R478.1 million 
Fines per firm58 R23,7 million R104.2 million 
Number of prosecutions involving leniency per year59 7 9.5 
Caseload per financial year of the Commission 568 156 
Duration of investigation and prosecution 52.2 months (4.3yrs) 27.3 
Duration of investigation and prosecution (pre-2008) 21 months (1.8yrs) 11.4 
Duration of investigation and prosecution (post-2008) 54.2 months (4.5yrs) 26.9 
Funding per financial year of the Commission R142.3 million R97.5 million 
Ratio of fines to Commission’s funding 1.79 2.16 
Source: Own calculations based on cartel prosecution data and the Commission’s Annual Reports 
 
57 Average fines per firm were affected, upwards, by the three outliers identified in Figure 1. 
58 Fines per firm were biased downwards by the low penalties in the initial years of cartel enforcement. 
59 Summary statistics for some of the variables did not provide much information given the evolution of the 
variables over time. For example, the average number of prosecutions involving leniency per year (leniency varied 




The average fine per firm that is prosecuted is R23.7 million, but this varies significantly from 
one firm to another and from one cartel to another. Penalties depend on many factors including 
the revenue of the firm, the extent of co-operation provided by the firm, and other firm-specific 
factors that the Commission and the Tribunal may consider. There are two identifiable periods 
in relation to penalties: the period prior to 2007, when penalties were low compared with the 
period after this, and 2007 onward, when the general level of penalties imposed on firms for 
collusion increased. 
The average duration of investigation and prosecution of cartels for the period under study was 
52.2 months (4.3 years) with variations depending on the cases. Some prosecutions before the 
Tribunal were short, while others lasted a significant period. The Commission, as reflected in 
the economic literature and comparable with other jurisdictions, expected that leniency and 
settlements would shorten the duration of investigations and prosecutions [Competition 
Commission (2009), p.48]. The data on the duration of investigations and the prosecution of 
cartels does not confirm this. 
The data for the period before the successful revisions of the leniency policy in 2008 show that 
the average duration of investigations and prosecution of firms was 21 months (1.8 years) 
compared with 54.2 months (4.5 years) post 2008. This suggests that leniency and settlements 
have not yielded the expected result of reducing the time to finalise investigations and 
prosecute firms. This could be due to several factors: first, cartels in the post-2008 period were 
more sophisticated compared with those in the earlier period, which were mostly non-secret 
cartels; second, the involvement of firms in widespread collusion (e.g. the construction and 
automotive sectors); and third, earlier prosecutions involved much less litigation before the 
Tribunal than did those in the post-2008 period. However, given that most of the prosecutions 
were resolved through settlements, this argument is less compelling. Settlement cases were 
typically resolved quickly before the Tribunal, thereby reducing the amount of time spent 
before the courts. Fourth, the Commission’s increasing case load and number of prosecutions 





Figure 4.4: The Commission’s average case load60 from FY2000 to FY2018 
 
Source: Commission’s Annual Reports 
Figure 4.5: Number of firms prosecuted per year for cartel conduct from FY2000 to 
FY2018 
 
Source: Publicly available Commission and Tribunal records on prosecutions 
The case load and number of prosecutions explanation has limitations because the Commission, 
with increased funding and number of employees, set up a standalone Cartels Division in 2011, 
 

































































































































































and the success of the leniency policy following the revisions in 2008 would have eased this 
challenge, unless the rate of increase in available resources, e.g. funding (Figure 4.3), had been 
outstripped by increases in demand for resources.61 The increase in the number of firms 
prosecuted may have reflected a clearance of the backlog of existing cases or simply have been 
that cartels involved an increasingly higher number of firms (e.g. grain milling cartels, 
construction cartels, automotive parts cartels). The long duration may also be the result of 
internal inefficiencies within the Commission or an increased complexity of cases in the face 
of a reluctance by firms to supply information until they were certain that the Commission had 
a strong case to prosecute, and that the probability of successful prosecution was high. 
Observations on the duration of investigations and the prosecution of firms for cartel conduct 
do not diminish the importance of leniency in detecting cartels. 
The cartel enforcement record summarised above shows that the South African cartel 
enforcement policy is founded on the principle of deterrence, and significant amounts of effort 
and resources have been spent trying to raise p and F to ensure deterrence. The empirical 
framework used in this study is discussed in the next section. 
4.4 Methodology 
The methodology consisted of three parts, consistent with the three research themes and 
described in the three subsections below. The first subsection outlines the approach used to 
study the relationships between the prosecution of firms, penalties, leniency and funding. The 
second subsection outlines the approach used to examine the duration of investigations and the 
prosecution of firms, given the penalties, funding, presence of leniency and a settlement 
procedure. The final subsection provides a discussion of present-value techniques, which 
provided a useful way to assess the impact of the duration of prosecution – from initiation of 










4.4.1 Econometric methodology for examining factors driving firm prosecutions 
The econometric assessment examined the impact of institutional and exogenous factors on the 
evolution of cartel enforcement in South Africa, particularly the prosecution of firms. 
Institutional factors are those factors that are within the control of the Commission, such as its 
internal organisation and strategies for fighting cartels. These factors include the Commission’s 
strategic policies and tools to aid detection of collusion and prosecution of offending firms (e.g. 
the introduction and revision of the leniency policy and the strategic use of a settlement 
procedure). On the other hand, exogenous factors are those that can be characterised as being 
outside the control of the Commission (e.g. its funding, which is determined by the 
government).62 Exogenous factors have been examined in other studies [see, for example, 
Ghosal and Sokol (2018)]. 
Other studies [e.g. Ghosal and Sokol (2018)] included GDP as an explanatory variable in the 
model, although its impact and statistical significance is not obvious. In all their model 
specifications, Ghosal and Sokol found that GDP was not statistically significant, and that 
result is consistent with earlier studies by Ghosal (2011) and Ghosal and Sokol (2016). This 
suggests that the prior empirical work does not support the inclusion of GDP. In this study, the 
inclusion of GDP in equation 1, generated similar results. The GDP variable may also interfere 
with the funding variable in that the performance of a country’s economy may affect the level 
of funding available to competition authorities. Further discussion of the GDP variable is 
presented in the results section. 
While case load may be expected to affect the amount of resources available to fight cartels, 
this is affected by the level of funding available to the competition authority. The case load 
variable may therefore be related to the funding variable. One may also see a rise in the case 
load without necessarily seeing any impact on cartel enforcement if the case load is related to 
other areas of enforcement (e.g. merger review and monopolisation cases). The funding 
variable can capture the potential impact of case load on cartel enforcement in that even if the 
case load increases, cartel enforcement may not suffer if funding is made available. Case load 
may matter where the competition authority’s capacity is restricted by a shortage of funding 
such that it is unable to recruit more investigators or to redeploy its resources with the given 
 
62 It is accepted that the Commission submits an annual budget, although the available funding is determined by 
government at large. Income from fees for merger control and other services offered by the Commission cannot 




amount of funding. Figure 4.6, which shows the evolution of the Commission’s case load and 
funding, shows that this is unlikely to be the case given that funding increases significantly 
relative to the increase in its case load, though in the latter years the Commission has also 
undertaken more resource-intensive market inquiries. 
Figure 4.6: Evolution of the Commission’s funding and case load from FY2000 to 
FY2018 
 
Source: Commission’s Annual Reports 
The inclusion of case load in Ghosal and Sokol (2018) did not find the variable to be significant 
across all specifications - except one - relating to the total number of days spent in jail per cartel 
(statistically significant only at 10 per cent). In the present study, the inclusion of case load 
together with funding produced results that were not statistically significant for both variables 
(see Table 4.12 in the Appendix for full results). Table 4.12 also presents the results for the 
random effects and fixed effects regressions, including case load, and the results were not 
statistically significant. These observations suggest that exclusion of the variable may be 
justified. 
Within the context of a deterrence-based framework for cartel enforcement, the study was 
concerned with the variables that affect cartel detection, prosecution, and penalisation. These 
elements are important for determining the level of p and F. These variables are the amount of 
resources available to the Commission (captured by funding) and the policy tools available to 














































































































































as the available remedies (penalties). An empirical sector-panel data model was specified to 
analyse the factors that influenced the number of firms prosecuted for collusion. This model 
was based on the panel-data model specification below. 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  ∝0𝑖+  𝛽𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (4.1), 
Where: 
firms refer to the natural logarithm of the number of firms prosecuted for cartel conduct 
in a sector per year. 
penalties refer to the natural logarithm of the amounts of fines imposed on firms in a 
sector per year after successful prosecution. The relationship between penalties and the 
number of firms prosecuted for collusion can be ambiguous, in that penalties are expected 
to result in deterrence, meaning that over time, as more penalties are imposed, they are 
expected to reduce the incentive and propensity for firms to engage in collusion. 
However, the universe of cartels is unknown, and the more penalties are imposed on firms 
for collusion, the more firms may confess to their involvement in collusion, leading to 
greater prosecutions of firms. 
funding refers to the natural logarithm of the size of financial resources available to the 
Commission per year for its use. A positive relationship between funding and the number 
of firms prosecuted for cartel conduct can be expected since the greater the resources 
available to the Commission, the greater the ability to detect, investigate and prosecute 
firms. This is the case if the resources are used efficiently and effectively. 
leniency refers to the natural logarithm of the number of cartel prosecutions involving 
leniency per sector per year. Leniency was expected to enhance the detection of cartels, 
and as such, increased the number of firms prosecuted for collusion. As a result, a positive 
relationship can be expected between leniency and the number of firms prosecuted for 
involvement in cartel conduct. 
It was not possible to determine the amount of funding the Commission allocated to each sector 
in the period of study, even in the presence of a prioritisation framework: the publicly available 
annual report of the Commission did not have this breakdown. The Commission investigates 
all complaints across all sectors and will allocate resources to all sectors. In doing so the 




resources given its responsibilities, goals, and strategic priorities. For example, if it prioritises 
cartel enforcement, it could decide to dedicate more resources (funding and manpower) 
towards that enforcement. This, of course, has implications for the Commission’s ability to 
pursue other enforcement priorities such as advocacy, merger reviews, pursuance of restrictive 
business practices, abuse of dominance, market inquiries, and general market research and 
monitoring. For estimation purposes, the author assumed that an increase in the Commission’s 
funding would enhance its ability to investigate and prosecute more firms across all sectors 
where collusion had been detected. 
4.4.2 Approach to examining duration of investigation and prosecution of firms 
The examination of the duration of investigation and the prosecution of firms was twofold. 
First, a simple qualitative examination was made of the time taken from initiation of a case to 
the decision of the Tribunal and/or CAC. Trends in the duration of cases were subsequently 
examined in the study given the use of leniency, settlements, penalties, and the funding of the 
Commission. Theory predicts that leniency and a settlement procedure, taken together with an 
increase in available resources, should reduce the amount of time taken to investigate and 
prosecute firms for collusion. 
A second aspect of the examination of the duration of investigations and prosecutions of firms 
entailed the use of panel-data analyses, with duration as the dependent variable and penalties, 
funding, leniency, and number of firms as explanatory variables (see equation 4.2, below). 
Leniency and increased capacity through increased funding were expected to have a negative 
relationship with duration. The relationship between duration and penalties can be ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the imposition of higher penalties over time can be expected to encourage 
firms to come forward and apply for leniency and/or settle cases earlier with the competition 
authority. These firms would also provide valuable evidence on the cartel(s), which could be 
used to prosecute other firms. This could be expected to reduce the duration of investigating 
and prosecuting firms. However, if firms have incentives to engage in strategic behaviour, 
which delays investigations and penalties, and there is no upward adjustment of penalties for 
delays, a positive relationship between penalties and duration can be observed. The model also 
included the number of firms prosecuted for collusion, as investigating and prosecuting more 
firms can be expected to increase a competition authority’s workload and potentially increase 





𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  ∝0𝑖+  𝛽𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑖𝑡 (4.2), 
where: 
duration refers to the natural logarithm of the average length of time taken to investigate 
and prosecute firms for collusion per year per sector.  
firms, penalties, funding, and leniency are as defined above. 
trend: because the duration variable is trend stationary, the model included a trend variable. 
The results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses are compared for consistency.  
4.4.3 Approach to assessing the impact of delays on penalties 
To assess the impact of delays on penalties, the author employed the present-value technique, 
which is rooted in the finance concept that money received today is worth more than the same 
amount received at a point in the future. The same applies to the impact of penalties on a firm’s 
decision to collude in the presence of the risk of a penalty. A R100,000 penalty paid earlier has 
a greater deterrent-effect on firms than a R100,000 penalty paid five years after the cartel was 
first detected. The value today of a R100,000 penalty paid in 5 years’ time, at a discount rate 
of 10 per cent is approximately R60,65763, assuming daily compounding. This is a massive 
discount on the penalty, which results purely from delaying payment of the R100,000 penalty 
by five years. 
In the field of finance, the value of money is preserved by ensuring that interest is either charged 
or earned over time. In cartel enforcement, a similar concept is rarely applied. Competition 
authorities rarely include interest to preserve the deterrence effect of penalties when firms delay 
the finalising of cases, especially where cases are eventually settled. A firm’s decision on 
whether to co-operate with the competition authority and when to negotiate with the 
competition authority is based on the value it derives from either early or delayed resolution. 
This decision is therefore affected by policymakers choosing not to account for interest. 
A penalty paid by a firm when a case is resolved through settlement is an outcome of 
negotiation between the Commission and the firm. Firms have every incentive to negotiate 
 
63 The discount rate and the frequency of compounding have a significant impact on the present value of an amount 




paying no penalty at all or paying the lowest possible penalty they can pay, even after accepting 
that they broke the law. A cartel member derives greater utility from delaying payment of the 
penalty that it expects or is prepared to pay because this effectively amounts to paying a lower 
penalty than if the penalty was paid earlier [see for example, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013)]. 
This is the case especially if firms face the prospect of significant penalties, unless there are 
other considerations that offset the benefit of delay. An example of this would be the firm 
suffering other forms of harm from having a prolonged investigation or prosecution, such as 
continued public regulatory scrutiny and reputational harm. If these further costs to the firm – 
taken together with the penalty that it ultimately pays if the firm is successfully prosecuted – 
are greater than the benefit of delay, then the firm has a greater incentive to expedite finalisation 
of the case by co-operating, concluding settlement agreements with the Commission and 
paying the penalty. 
The cartel case data in South Africa shows that the duration of investigations and the 
prosecution of firms involved in cartels has been rising over time, meaning that firms are 
increasingly taking longer to finalise settlement agreements with the Commission. Similarly, 
the data shows that most cartel prosecutions are concluded through settlement between firms 
and the Commission. Wils (2008) argued that for the purposes of ensuring optimal deterrence, 
settlements should not result in a situation where enforcement losses from settling cases with 
firms (e.g. lower penalties) outweigh the expected enforcement gains derived from quicker 
resolution of cases (e.g. lower costs, shorter investigations and opportunities to redirect 
resources to detect other cartels). The South African enforcement record suggests that there 
may be too much reliance on settlement and leniency, and this may affect deterrence, as noted 
by Edwards and Padilla (2010). Delays in the finalisation of cases mean that the expected 
benefits of having a leniency procedure complemented by a settlement procedure are not 
realised. 
The present-value of a lump-sum amount (penalty) paid by a firm in the future can be calculated 









PVpenalty is the present-value of the penalty for a firm that is successfully investigated and 
prosecuted for collusion. 
F is the penalty paid by the firm after successful investigation and prosecution. 
r is the discount rate, represented by the average yield rates on five- to 10-year government 
bonds during the respective period between the start of the investigation and finalisation of 
prosecution of the firm. The author uses five- to 10-year discount rates because a significant 
number of investigations and prosecutions lasted for over three years, and most were settled 
within a period of four to 10 years. Government bonds entail a lower risk compared with 
other types of investments.  
n is the number of times the discount (interest) rate is compounded per year. 
T is the number of years between the start of the investigation and penalisation. 
Commencement of an investigation increases the likelihood of cartel detection and 
punishment of firms, and under the current framework, firms can settle cases with the 
Commission at any stage between the start of the investigation and the finalisation of 
prosecution. 
4.5 Empirical results 
The empirical results are presented in the same order as the discussion in the methodology 
section, starting with the econometric results for the relationship between the prosecution of 
firms, on the one hand, and penalties, leniency and funding, on the other. This is followed by 
an examination of the duration of investigation and prosecution of firms and, lastly, an 
examination of the impact of duration of investigation and prosecution on the present value of 
penalties, and its potential impact on deterrence. 
4.5.1 Results of econometric analysis of factors driving firm prosecutions 
4.5.1.1 Unit-root tests 
Before presenting the results of the panel-regression analysis, the data was tested for the 
presence of unit-roots to ensure that the results were not spurious. The presence and impact of 
persistence shocks affects the validity of regression results, and unit-root tests help to detect 




T-ratios do not follow a t-distribution in the presence of a unit-root, meaning that hypotheses 
about the regression parameters cannot be validly tested. Therefore, author tested the following 
variables for unit roots: the number of firms prosecuted per year per sector; the amount of 
penalties imposed on successfully investigated and prosecuted firms per year per sector; the 
funding of the Commission; and institutional factors, which included the number of 
prosecutions that involved leniency. As mentioned previously, the data comprised a balanced 
panel of six sectors (i.e., N=6), 19 annual periods (i.e., T=19) and four variables. 
Several unit-root tests are available for panel data, each with particular assumptions, strengths, 
and limitations. The Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) unit-root test assumes a common auto-regressive 
parameter for all panels, but it does not allow for the possibility that some sectors have unit-
roots. It also requires that the ratio of the number of panels (N) to the number of time periods 
(T) tends towards zero as T grows. To mitigate the effects of cross-sectional correlation, cross-
sectional means were subtracted. The unit-root test developed by Harris and Tzavalis (1999) 
can be applied to panel data sets with a small T – by allowing for small sample adjustments to 
T – and assumes, unlike the Levin-Lin-Chu test, that there is a homogenous variance. The test 
can be applied with balanced panel data. 
In the Breitung (2000) test, the data is adjusted prior to fitting a regression, meaning that it is 
not necessary to undertake bias adjustments. This is contrary to the Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root 
test. The Breitung test has much higher power than the Levin-Lin-Chu test when autoregressive 
parameters approach one and when panel-specific effects are included. The Breitung test also 
has good power in small datasets. However, the power of the test falls when T is fixed and N 
increases. This was not a problem, though, with the dataset used in the study. The test was also 
robust to cross-sectional correlation. The Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test relaxes the strict 
assumptions of the Levin-Lin-Chu test that all panels have a unit-root, by allowing for only 
some panels to have a unit root. The disadvantage of this test is that its power reduces 
significantly if a substantial number of the panels have unit roots. In panel-data analysis, one 
can also use the Fisher-type [Choi (2001)] unit-root test, which combines the p-values from 
unit-root tests on individual panels to obtain an overall test statistic. This enabled the author to 
determine whether the panel series had a unit root. 
This study relied on all the unit-root tests described above, which allowed the examination to 
take advantage of the strengths of the different tests. In turn, this gave greater confidence in the 




the null hypothesis that all or some of the panels have a unit root. The tests showed that the 
variables contained in our six panels of interest were stationary, since in all instances, the null 
hypothesis that the panels have unit roots was rejected. Notably, the funding variable was trend 
stationary. The existence of a trend in this variable is also clear in Figure 4.3, above. Table 4.2, 
below, presents the results of our unit-root tests. Given these results, the study proceeded to 




Table 4.2: Panel unit-root test results 
Test Variable Statistic p-value 
Number of panels = 6 
Number of periods = 19 
HO: panels contain unit-root 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu Firms -2.5165 0.0059*** 
Harris-Tzavalis Firms -4.3651 0.0000*** 
Breitung Firms -4.9729 0.0000*** 
Im-Pesaran-Shin Firms -3.6219 0.0001*** 
Fisher-type Firms 
P = 52.9378 
Z = -5.0193 
L* = -5.9513 





Levin-Lin-Chu Penalties -2.2891 0.0110** 
Harris-Tzavalis Penalties -4.6083 0.0000*** 
Breitung Penalties -3.4765 0.0003*** 
Im-Pesaran-Shin Penalties -3.3755 0.0004*** 
Fisher-type Penalties 
P = 67.8491 
Z = -5.1623 
L* = -7.5362 





Levin-Lin-Chu Funding -10.0220 0.0000*** 
Harris-Tzavalis Funding -3.1108 0.0009*** 
Breitung Funding -1.6717 0.0473** 
Im-Pesaran-Shin Funding -4.2524 0.0000*** 
Fisher-type Funding 
P = 40.9460 
Z = -4.5042 
L* = -4.6335 





Levin-Lin-Chu Leniency -2.2797 0.0113** 
Harris-Tzavalis Leniency -2.6724 0.0038*** 
Breitung Leniency -3.3768 0.0004*** 
Im-Pesaran-Shin Leniency -2.3383 0.0097*** 
Fisher-type Leniency 
P = 36.4573 
Z = -3.0806 
L* = -3.7164 









4.5.1.2 Panel regression analyses 
In the panel regression analysis, the author started by testing whether the appropriate model 
was the fixed-effects model or the random-effects model. This was decided based on the 
Hausman panel-specification test, which has the null hypothesis (Ho) that the random-effects 
model was appropriate and an alternative hypothesis (H1) that the fixed-effects model was 
appropriate. Table 4.3, below, shows the results of the test. 
Table 4.3: Hausman model specification test results 
Variables Coefficients (b - B) 
Difference 







Penalties 0.0727181 0.0744654 -0.0017473 0.0020461 
Funding 0.0695592 0.0678405 0.0017187 0.0146004 
Leniency 0.3859787 0.3661721 0.0198066 0.0262031 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
χ2 (3) = (b-B)' [(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) = 0.89 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8281 
The test statistics show that the null hypothesis – that the random-effects model was the more 
appropriate model to use – could not be rejected. Nonetheless, the results for both the random-
effects and fixed-effects models are presented. Panel regressions were estimated at an 
aggregate level using the bootstrapping technique, which has the advantage of allowing us to 
control and check the stability of the regression results. Bootstrapping also produced 
asymptotically more accurate results than the standard intervals produced using sample 
variance and assumptions of normality. The results of the random-effects and fixed-effects 







Table 4.4: Results of random-effects panel regression analysis of the impact of penalties, 
funding, and leniency on the number of firms prosecuted for collusion in South Africa 
xtreg: number of firms prosecuted = f (penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to detect 
collusion) 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observations = 114 
Group variable: sector Number of groups = 6 
  
R-sq: within = 0.8860 Obs per group: min = 19 
          between = 0.9616 average = 19.0 
          overall = 0.8949 max = 19 
  
 Wald Chi2(3) = 451.27 
corr (u_i, x) = 0 (assumed) Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 





Z P > |z| Normal-based 
[95per cent conf. interval] 
Penalties 0.0744654 0.0078369 9.50*** 0.000 0.0591055 0.0898253 
Funding 0.0678405 0.0362308 1.87* 0.061 -0.003171 0.1388516 
Leniency 0.3661721 0.0978371 3.74*** 0.000 0.174415 0.5579292 
Constant -1.228993 0.6552114 -1.88* 0.061 -2.513183 0.0551982 
sigma_u 0.03438046 
sigma_e 0.30381385 
Rho 0.01264393 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Statistically significant at: 1 per cent (p<0.01) ***, 5 per cent (p<0.05) **, 10 per cent (p<0.10) * 
Given that equation 4.1 was specified in log-log form, the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are elasticities measuring the per cent change in the dependent variable when the 
respective explanatory variable changed by 1 per cent. The results of the random effects 
regression estimated above can therefore be interpreted as follows: a 1 per cent increase in 
penalties increased the number of firms prosecuted for collusion by 0.07 per cent; a 1 per cent 
increase in funding for the Commission increased the number of firms prosecuted by 0.07 per 
cent; and a 1 per cent increase in leniency applications increased the number of firms 
prosecuted for collusion by 0.37 per cent. Stated differently, a 10 per cent increase in the 
number of leniency applications led to an increase in the number of firms prosecuted for 
collusion by 3.7per cent. The impact of leniency on the detection of those penalised cartels was 
likely higher. The penalties and leniency variables were statistically significant at the 1 per cent 




This may have been a result of the limitations of the funding variable, as discussed in the 
methodology section. 
The impact of penalties on the number of prosecutions shows that penalties increased the 
likelihood that more firms would be prosecuted, but the effect was much smaller. A 10 per cent 
increase in the level of penalties resulted in an increase of only 0.7 per cent in the number of 
firms prosecuted for collusion. Given that most cases were resolved through leniency and 
settlements, penalties can be seen to have incentivised firms to come forward, but the level of 
penalties may not have been severe enough to have a large impact on the number of 
prosecutions. Of these variables, leniency was the main driver of prosecutions, which is 
consistent with the qualitative analysis, which showed that over 90 per cent of cases involved 
leniency. 
Table 4.5: Results of fixed-effects panel regression analysis of the impact of penalties, 
funding, and leniency on the number of firms prosecuted for collusion in South Africa 
xtreg: number of firms prosecuted = f (penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to detect 
collusion) 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of observations = 114 
Group variable: sector Number of groups = 6 
  
R-sq: within = 0.8861 Obs per group: min = 19 
          between = 0.9589 average = 19.0 
          overall = 0.8947 max = 19 
 Wald Chi2(3) = 736.38 
corr (u_i, xb) = 0.0093 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 





Z P > |z| Normal-based 
[95per cent conf. interval] 
Penalties 0.0727181 0.0097466 7.46*** 0.000 0.0536152 0.091821 
Funding 0.0695592 0.0385580 1.80* 0.071 -0.006013 0.1451315 
Leniency 0.3859787 0.0969151 3.98*** 0.000 0.1960287 0.5759288 
Constant -1.257367 0.6935727 -1.81* 0.070 -2.616745 0.1020103 
sigma_u 0.07029178 
sigma_e 0.30381385 
Rho 0.05080977 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 




The interpretation of the fixed effects model results is the same as that of the random effects 
model in that the coefficients are elasticities and can be interpreted in the same way. The results 
for the fixed-effects estimation were consistent with those for the random effects estimation 
and showed that all these variables have a positive relationship with the number of firms 
prosecuted for collusion. Penalties and leniency were statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level of significance, while funding was statistically significant at the 10 per cent level of 
significance. These results are consistent with the results of the descriptive analysis presented 
in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, read together with Figure 4.5. It is widely accepted that leniency 
has been an important tool for cartel enforcement in terms of detection and prosecution in South 
Africa. A significant number of cartel prosecutions were finalised by way of a settlement 
procedure and in many instances involved leniency. The results on leniency are significant 
given the positive impact it has on cartel enforcement. It will likely remain key to future cartel 
enforcement by the Commission given the importance of expanding the scale of cartel 
enforcement in order to enhance deterrence. 
The Commission has received increasing levels of funding on a year-to-year basis, which has 
enhanced its capacity to investigate and prosecute cartel conduct. The availability of resources 
has enabled the Commission to set up a standalone Cartels Division, whose resources are 
devoted to, and focus is solely on detecting and investigating cartel conduct. In general, despite 
the limitations of the funding variable, the results support the hypothesis that increasing the 
level of funding for the Commission, as well as enhancing the leniency policy would contribute 
to increased cartel detection, investigation, and prosecution. This, however, gives limited 
insight into how effectively the increased funding over time and the leniency policy have been 
deployed to ensure administrative efficiency and effective deterrence. This author attempted to 
answer these questions, as shown in the sections that follow. 
Per the methodology discussion, above, the inclusion of GDP in both the random-effects and 
fixed-effects regressions produced results in which penalties and leniency remained 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of significance, but GDP and funding were not 
statistically significant. The coefficient was -0.028 suggesting that a 1 per cent increase in GDP 
would have reduced the number of firms prosecuted for collusion by 0.028 per cent. 
To address potential concerns about endogeneity between the number of firms prosecuted and 
leniency applications, for example, the Blundell and Bond (1998) systems generalised method 




of the systems GMM estimation are presented in Table 4.9 in the Appendix. The results confirm 
that leniency and penalties are positively related to the number of firms prosecuted and generate 
coefficients that are of similar magnitude and level of statistical significance. The coefficient 
for leniency is 0.3612 under the systems GMM estimation while it is 0.3662 and 0.3860 under 
the standard random-effects and fixed-effects estimations, respectively. These results confirm 
the importance of leniency as a key driver of cartel detection and prosecution. Similarly, the 
coefficient for penalties is 0.0762 under the systems GMM estimation while it is 0.0745 and 
0.0727 under the standard random-effects and fixed-effects estimations. The difference 
between the systems GMM estimation results and the results of the random-effects and fixed 
effects estimations in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 is that the coefficient for funding, though having the 
same sign, differs significantly and is not statistically significant. 
4.5.2 Examination of duration of investigation and prosecution of firms 
One of the expected contributions of leniency and increased capacity to detect and prosecute 
cartels is that they would have enabled the Commission to deal expeditiously with cartel 
investigations, reducing the duration of time from initiation of investigation to penalisation. 
This is indeed what economics theory envisages, and it is one of the key motivations for 
leniency policies in competition law enforcement. That is, leniency is expected to adduce 
evidence, which is then used to prosecute other cartel members, thereby speedily freeing up 
resources, which can then be directed toward detecting those cartels that the competition 
authority had not yet uncovered. Leniency can be enhanced by the presence of a settlements 
procedure that allows the Commission to resolve cases with firms and to agree on, amongst 
other things, the amount of penalties to be paid. 
The question that then arises is whether the positive relationship observed between leniency 
and prosecution has resulted in all the envisaged benefits that economic theory anticipates or 
whether firms have exploited it to reduce the effective penalties, without necessarily resulting 
in investigative and prosecutorial efficiency. In the discussion below, the study revealed that 
leniency has not necessarily led to a reduction in the duration of investigations and the speedy 
prosecution of firms. This is reflected in Figure 4.7, below, which shows that the average 
duration of investigations and prosecutions has been increasing. 
There are several potential reasons for the increasing duration of cases. First, cartel cases have 




complex arrangements to resolve (e.g. the construction sector collusion). Second, there is 
inefficiency on the part of the Commission in resolving cases, even where leniency exists. For 
instance, some of the cases resolved by the Commission in 2018 were from the 2006/07 to 
2007/08 period. Among these cases, the investigations and prosecutions of some firms were 
left idle for years. Examples of these are firms that were involved in the grain milling cartel, 
where some prosecutions were finalised in 2007/08, others in 2010/11 and others in 2019. With 
information from leniency as well as the conclusion of other prosecutions through settlements, 
there are limited reasons for the delays in prosecutions. 
Third, once a firm involved in collusion knows that its conduct is under investigation, the 
likelihood of successful prosecution and sanction increases, assuming that the competition 
authority is competent and effective at investigating and prosecuting cartels. The firm thus has 
every incentive to minimise the real value of the sanction64 it faces, subject to the constraints 
of investigative and prosecutorial efficiency and the effectiveness of the competition 
authorities.65 The firm can minimise the sanction in one or a combination of ways. First, the 
firm could apply for leniency, and if successful, it would face a zero penalty. Second, if not 
successful in obtaining leniency (e.g. because it was not first to the door of the competition 
authority), the firm could settle with the competition authority and pay a lower penalty, because 
of a settlement discount. 
Finally, the firm could engage in strategic behaviour that would delay the payment of a penalty 
for as long as possible, knowing that over time the real value of the sanction will be eroded by 
inflation. This would effectively equate to a nominal penalty, which would not deter them from 
ongoing or future anti-competitive behaviour. Similarly, firms could delay the payment of 
penalties while they deplete the productive assets and revenues on which the penalties are 
based. This can be achieved through frivolous litigation and forum shopping, where firms 
approach other courts outside of the normal competition law structures (e.g. the High Court) 
where they can manage to extract more time. This has the consequence of delaying the penalty 
 
64 Consider a firm’s objective penalty minimisation function given by: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑡  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆 
where Pt = penalty paid at time t; E = evidence against the firm; S=investigative and prosecutorial efficiency of 
competition authority (skill). 
65 Efficiency in this case refers to the ability to process investigations and prosecutions in the least amount of time, 
using the least possible amount of resources. Effectiveness refers to the ability to produce the desired successful 
prosecution of firms for cartel conduct. It is accepted that in some instances, the duration of investigation and 




such that when it is paid, the revenue base is much smaller, resulting in a lower penalty. 
Examples include cases in the wire and steel industries, where firms tried to impair reported 
revenues and even liquidated the legal entities involved in the collusion. Such strategic 
behaviour can be eliminated or minimised by the Commission taking a proactive approach to 
the imposition of penalties and reducing delays in the prosecution of firms where collusion is 
readily found via leniency. Inefficiency on the part of the Commission worsens this situation. 
Figure 4.7: Average duration of investigations and prosecutions of firms for collusion 
 
Source: Publicly available Commission and Tribunal records on prosecutions  
Table 4.6, below, presents the results of the random-effects estimation of the impact of the 
number of firms investigated and prosecuted for collusion, as well as the penalties imposed, 
funding levels for the Commission, and the use of leniency for the duration of investigations 
and prosecutions of firms for collusion. The random-effects estimation results show that only 
the funding variable carried the expected sign, but like the other core enforcement variables 
included in the model, it was not statistically significant. The penalties variable carried a 
positive sign, and this could be explained by the factors discussed above and the findings of 
the present-value analysis in the next section. Leniency, which has been key to cartel 
enforcement, was not associated with reduced durations of cases. The quantitative analysis in 










































































































investigation to final prosecution decision, taken together with the evolution of funding, 
penalties, and the use of leniency. 
Table 4.6: Results of random-effects panel regression analysis of the impact of the 
number of firms, penalties, funding, and leniency on the durations of investigation and 
prosecution of firms for collusion in South Africa 
xtreg: duration = f (number of firms, penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to detect 
collusion, trend) 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observations = 114 
Group variable: sector Number of groups = 6 
  
R-sq: within = 0.7476 Obs per group: min = 19 
          between = 0.4342 average = 19.0 
          overall = 0.7251 max = 19 
  
 Wald Chi2(5) = 598.36 
corr (u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 





Z P > |z| Normal-based 
[95per cent conf. interval] 
Firms 0.0070253 0.1682271 0.04 0.967 -0.3226939 0.3367444 
Penalties 0.0282743 0.0194895 1.45 0.147 -0.0099245 0.0664731 
Funding -0.1073202 0.1055823 -1.02 0.309 -0.3142577 0.0996173 
Leniency 0.1549930 0.1568096 0.99 0.323 -0.1523482 0.4623341 
Trend 0.0827377 0.014163 5.84 0.000*** 0.05497880 0.1104966 
Constant 1.6727330 1.860689 0.90 0.369 -1.9741520 5.3196170 
sigma_u 0.16998612 
sigma_e 0.37068915 
rho 0.17374797 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Statistically significant at: 1 per cent (p<0.01) ***; 5 per cent (p<0.05) **; 10 per cent (p<0.10) * 
The results of the fixed-effects specification in Table 4.7, below, show that none of the 
variables are statistically significant. Like the random effects specification, the funding variable 
was negatively related to duration, meaning that more funding can be expected to result in a 
reduction in duration, as the Commission will have more resources to process investigations 
and prosecutions more efficiently. However, efficiency will depend on how effectively the 




Table 4.7: Results of fixed-effects panel-regression analysis of the impact of the number 
of firms, penalties, funding, and leniency on the duration of investigation and prosecution 
of firms for collusion in South Africa 
xtreg: duration = f (number of firms, penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to detect 
collusion, trend) 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
Fixed-effects GLS regression Number of observations = 114 
Group variable: sector Number of groups = 6 
  
R-sq: within = 0.7476 Obs per group: min = 19 
          between = 0.4291 average = 19.0 
          overall = 0.7248 max = 19 
  
 Wald Chi2(5) = 388.08 
corr (u_i, Xb) = 0.0068 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 





Z P > |z| Normal-based 
[95per cent conf. interval] 
Firms -0.0013743 0.1481734 -0.01 0.993 -0.2917889 0.2890402 
Penalties 0.0294205 0.0200596 1.47 0.142 -0.0098955 0.0687366 
Funding -0.1060076 0.1108758 -0.96 0.339 -0.3233202 0.111305 
Leniency 0.1504143 0.1514597 0.99 0.321 -0.1464413 0.4472699 
Trend 0.0826878 0.0166238 4.97 0.000*** 0.0501057 0.1152699 
Constant 1.648674 1.951028 0.85 0.398 -2.17527 5.472619 
sigma_u 0.16132253 
sigma_e 0.37068915 
rho 0.15923697 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Statistically significant at: 1 per cent (p<0.01) ***; 5 per cent (p<0.05) **; 10 per cent (p<0.10) * 
As in the case of drivers of prosecutions of firms for collusion above, the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) dynamic panel data model was used to address potential endogeneity issues between 
the duration of investigations and leniency, as well as between the duration of investigations 
and number of firms prosecuted. Table 4.10 in the Appendix shows the results of this systems 
GMM estimation. The results show that leniency has been associated with a smaller positive 
relationship with the duration of investigations, which is not statistically significant. The size 
of the coefficient under the systems GMM specification is smaller than that under the standard 
random-effects and fixed-effects specifications despite having the same sign and not being 




to a reduction in the duration of investigations. Funding on the other hand, appears to contribute 
to a reduction in the duration of investigations. Under the systems GMM specification, funding 
has a larger statistically significant negative relationship with the duration of investigations 
compared to the random-effects and fixed effects specification results which are not 
statistically significant. Caution should be exercised when interpreting the coefficient for 
funding regardless of its statistical significance given the limitations associated with the 
variable as explained above. 
The results of the study show that while leniency and settlements have played a major role in 
cartel detection and prosecution in South Africa, they do not appear to have raised efficiency66 
levels in investigation, prosecution, and penalisation of firms for collusion. It is also important 
to note that the Commission’s manpower has increased significantly compared with the earlier 
years, with a standalone unit for investigating cartels. It appears the Commission’s resources 
are tied up in cartel investigations despite the availability of leniency and settlement procedures 
as enforcement tools available to the Commission. The observations on the duration of cartel 
cases are akin to those in the study by Ascione and Motta (2010). In Europe, for cases involving 
leniency, Ascione and Motta (2010) reported duration of investigations ranging from 13 
months to 58 months. The authors conclude that the resources of the EC are tied up in cartel 
cases, even when leniency yields key evidence with cases rarely lasting less than three years. 
For those cases that did not involve leniency, the authors reported the duration of investigations 
as ranging from 14 months to 62 months. This suggests that one of the central benefits of having 
leniency and settlement procedures (time and resource saving) have not been realised, despite 
the two instruments being central to cartel enforcement in South Africa. 
The timely prosecution of firms for collusion is as important as the prompt detection of 
collusion because delays in prosecution undermine the effectiveness of penalties in enhancing 
 
66 In this study, efficiency is measured as the duration of cases from detection to prosecution and penalisation, all 
else given. There may well be legitimate circumstances/factors that drive up duration, e.g. a dispute on a legal 
principle, which entails a case being litigated in various courts. It is accepted that these are legitimate elements of 
law enforcement since competition authorities are themselves subject to the law. In such circumstances, the 
existence of an infringement and the resulting penalty are determined by the courts and not by settlement between 
the competition authority and the firm. There are instances where the competition authority and the firm agree to 
suspend the determination of certain elements of prosecution (e.g. sanction) pending the determination of legal 
questions by the courts. Where this has occurred, the study examined the efficacy of such agreements from a 
deterrence perspective. For example, there appears to be limited rational reason for the Commission to enter an 
agreement to suspend the determination of a penalty when the dispute is about whether the conduct amounts to 
that of a cartel. The Commission could prosecute both with its motivation for a penalty, and the court could 




deterrence. Firms may even delay cases and then settle them later to enjoy a discount for 
settlement. This has implications for the efficacy of a deterrence-based framework. It is worth 
pointing out that in South Africa, even the longest running cases are mostly resolved through 
settlement, meaning that firms effectively get rewarded for delays in finalising cases, instead 
of being penalised. At this point there is no strong public evidence from final settlement 
agreements that the Commission strongly advocates for increased penalties for firms that delay 
the settlement of cases. 
This may also have the perverse effect of encouraging stable cartels to continue colluding, 
knowing that if detected, sanction will be delayed and could be reduced by entering into a 
settlement agreement with the Commission at a later stage. Firms that would also ordinarily 
settle cases early will also learn that early settlement results in higher real penalties compared 
with later settlement, which will have the unintended effect of disincentivising firms from 
settling cases early. These aspects of the cartel enforcement record often get overlooked in the 
pomp and funfair of the nominal penalties collected by the Commission and the media 
statements that reveal the identity, nature and size of the firms penalised for collusion, as well 
as the public anger at the depth and scale of collusion. 
If cartel conduct leads to more permanent or enduring damage to markets long after the 
infringement has ended, delays in penalties taken together with the enduring damage may fail 
to dissuade firms from violating the law in the first place, even if the size of the sanction may 
appear high in nominal terms. The profit from violating the law includes the benefits that firms 
obtain long after the contravention has ended if it takes time before the market can be 
effectively competitive again. Both the medium-to-long-term impact of the effectiveness of 
competition in markets and the likelihood of timely detection and punishment are important 
elements of whether deterrence is achieved. 
The value of delaying finalisation and payment of penalties is therefore important to understand 
through the lens of firms involved in collusion, and the implications that this has for deterrence. 
To do this, the present-value technique was applied in the study, as discussed below. 
4.5.3 Impact of duration of investigation, prosecution, and penalisation on the value of 
penalties paid by firms for collusion and on deterrence 
In applying the present-value technique, the present values of penalties imposed on firms for 




statistics relating to discounts for delays in investigations and prosecutions of firms for 
collusion, and the associated implications for the present value of penalties. The average 
duration of cases for the period under study was 5.5 years, and the average time-related 
discount on penalties was 34 per cent. In other words, the value of penalties paid by firms for 
involvement in collusion on average was 34 per cent lower in present value terms when 
discounted using the average discount rate on five- to 10-year government bonds. The shortest 
case duration (0.8 years) was associated with the lowest discount on the present value of 
penalties (seven per cent) and the longest case duration, lasting 11.7 years, was associated with 
the largest present value discount, of 61 per cent. 
Another way to show the impact of delays on the penalty paid is to consider how the delay 
changes the penalty as a percentage of revenue, as well as how the delays impact the relative 
penalties paid by two or more firms involved in the same cartel. In the study, the example of 
Pioneer Foods – which opted for litigation and delayed payment of the penalty by about three 
years – is used to show the impact of delays on the penalty paid as a percentage of turnover. 
When Pioneer Foods paid the penalty, the penalty was set at R195.7 million which amounted 
to 9.88 per cent of its bread division’s turnover for 2006. The present value of this penalty was 
R151.0 million which amounted to 7.62 per cent of the bread making division’s turnover for 
2006. Tiger Brands paid, within about a year, a penalty that amounted to 5.7 per cent of its 
turnover for bread. The discounted value of the penalty amounted to 5.32 per cent of its 
turnover for bread, reflecting a 0.38 per cent time-related discount on the penalty. This shows 
that by delaying payment of the penalty by about three years, Pioneer Foods managed to shave 
off a time-related 2.26 per cent points of the penalty as a percentage of turnover, while a shorter 
delay by Tiger Brands, for example, would have resulted in a smaller time-related discount of 
0.38 per cent. Both Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods were involved in the bread cartel but 
resolved their cases at different times using different mechanisms. Tiger Brands settled its case 
and Pioneer Foods opted to litigate in a case that took about three years. The present value of 
the penalty paid by Tiger Brands within a year resulted in a present value discount of seven per 
cent while the three-year delay by Pioneer Foods resulted in a present value discount of 23 per 
cent on the penalty paid. Again, this shows that delays diminish the real quantum and 




Table 4.8: Summary statistics on delays in finalisation of cases and the impact it has on 
the present value of penalties paid 
Variable Value 
Shortest case duration for penalised firms 0.8 years 
Average case duration for penalised firms  5.5 years  
Longest case duration for penalised firms  11.7 years  
Average penalty paid R45.6 million 
Average present value R32.6 million 
Average penalty discount R12.9 million 
Lowest percentage penalty discount for shortest case duration 7 per cent 
Average percentage penalty discount across prosecutions 34 per cent 
Highest percentage penalty discount for longest case duration 61 per cent 
Source: Own calculations based on cartel prosecution data and SARB interest rates 
Table 4.11 in the Appendix presents the results of the analysis. As a general observation, and 
consistent with observations in the finance field, the present value of penalties paid in the future 
declines with time. This means that firms that settle cases and pay penalties earlier effectively 
pay higher penalties compared with those that delay penalties. Stated differently, firms that 
delay paying penalties receive a greater time-related discount on the present value of the 
penalties they eventually pay. Firms that can better negotiate lower penalties with the 
Commission can also have lower discounted penalties if they pay the penalty earlier. The 
results in Table 4.11 (reported in the Appendix) show few instances67 where the discounts for 
penalties paid after shorter periods are greater than those paid after longer periods. This 
provides reassurance that the observations on the value of delays to firms holds in general. 
Given the observations from the cartel enforcement record and by applying time-value-of-
money techniques, and interfacing this with the notion of deterrence, which is central to 
competition law enforcement, the key question is why does the Commission rely on settlements 
and leniency in the manner that it does? The question is highly relevant given that settlement 
and leniency do not appear to have contributed significantly to procedural economy. There 
could be several reasons for the Commission relying on settlements despite the foregoing. First, 
settlements are easier than full litigation, especially where the outcome for the Commission is 
uncertain on the quantum of the penalties. Where firms are prepared to settle at any point in 
time, the Commission would rather negotiate as high a penalty as possible, rather than insisting 
 




on litigating. In the end, the outcome depends on who – between the Commission or the firm 
– is a more skilled and better negotiator. 
The second reason for the Commission’s use of settlement and leniency under these 
circumstances may be concerned about prosecutions being prolonged further, as shown by the 
record, forcing it to settle, rather than to continue litigating. In other words, litigation fatigue 
could result in the Commission opting to close the file through settlement, rather than to 
continue the prosecution through litigation. While this may be appealing, it has the potential to 
undermine deterrence if it results in under-deterring penalties and may reduce procedural 
efficiencies when cases are not resolved quickly. For example, there have been cases where a 
firm accepts that it violated the law but fails to reach agreement with the Commission on the 
penalty to be paid, leading to prolonged litigation that is ultimately resolved by settlement with 
a penalty that is lower than what the Commission initially demanded. 
The third reason for the Commission’s approach may be because several cases have either been 
overturned or have reduced penalties for firms when they go on appeal. As a result, the 
Commission might see it as being better to settle a case and avoid the risk of either having 
cases overturned or penalties being reduced on appeal. In other words, the Commission may 
well have adopted a more risk-averse approach. There are many legitimate reasons for cases to 
be overturned or penalties to be reduced. The suggestion here is not that the appeals have no 
merit, but that the impact of appeal-related reductions in penalties and the overturning of 
decisions might negatively impact the Commission’s appetite to litigate cases, especially where 
this can be avoided. 
Finally, settlement brings results, which the Commission can show to both policymakers and 
the public, and because no work has until now been undertaken to ascertain and show whether 
deterrence is undermined, there is room for rent-seeking behaviour by the Commission, by 
chasing after settlement in a way that effectively disregards the medium- to long-term impact 
on deterrence. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In a deterrence-based framework of cartel enforcement, competition regulators are concerned 
with two elements: first, their ability to detect cartels, p; and second, their ability to penalise 
them. Given that it is impossible to have absolute deterrence, where p = 1, competition 




leniency policies, settlement procedures, increasing their capacity to investigate and prosecute 
cartels (both head count and skills set), and advocacy, which raises awareness of the cartel 
problem. These tools complement one another, but also involve trade-offs that need to be 
carefully considered if deterrence is to be achieved. 
In this study, the relationship between penalties, leniency and the Commission’s funding, on 
the one hand, and the number of firms prosecuted for involvement in collusion, on the other 
was examined. The focus was on the 20 years since the introduction of the current competition 
law regime. The results show that under an OLS-panel specification, the level of penalties, 
leniency and the funding of the Commission have a positive, statistically significant effect on 
the number of firms prosecuted. These results suggest that providing the Commission with 
more funding, coupled with the Commission implementing policies that enhance cartel 
detection and punishment will reduce the incidence of collusion. The caution here is, of course, 
that the cartel universe is unknown, and this might have implications for the generality of the 
results. 
Leniency and settlement procedures are expected to enhance cartel enforcement efficiency by 
placing cartel members in asymmetric positions, leading to whistleblowing and thereby aiding 
cartel detection. These procedures therefore reduce the amount of time and resources spent on 
investigating and prosecuting cartels. The analysis of the duration of cartel investigations and 
the prosecution of firms for collusion showed that over time, the duration of investigation and 
prosecutions have increased significantly compared with the period prior to the introduction of 
the leniency policy, in 2004, and its revisions, in 2008. This is contrary to expectations, given 
that most cases in the period of study were resolved by settlement, and a significant proportion 
involved leniency. Several reasons can be offered for this. First, the number of cartel cases has 
increased significantly, and cartel cases have become more complex. For example, cartel 
investigations often involve industry-wide collusion, requiring complex arrangements to 
resolve (e.g. the construction-sector collusion). Relatedly, leniency applicants may not be 
yielding water-tight hard evidence that enables the Commission to readily prosecute other 
cartel firms, implying that the Commission spends more time and resources searching for more 
evidence. 
The second reason for the increased duration of prosecutions subsequent to the introduction of 
a leniency policy is that the Commission has not been effective in resolving cartel cases 




the Commission in 2018 are from the 2006/07 to 2007/08 period. In these cases, the 
investigations and prosecutions of some firms remained idle for years without any publicly 
observable policy action (e.g. litigation in courts) or stated reasons in public documents 
released by the Commission. For example, the grain milling cartel case was resolved over a 
long period, with some prosecutions finalised in 2007/08, others in 2010/11 and others only in 
2019. With information from leniency, as well as the conclusion of other prosecutions through 
settlements, there seem to be limited reasons for the delays in prosecutions. 
The third reason for the increased duration of prosecutions is the strategic behaviour by firms 
aimed at paying time-discounted penalties. Firms know that the real value of the monetary 
sanction is eroded over time by factors such as inflation, and where firms set aside a smaller 
amount towards the penalty, a significant proportion of the penalty ultimately paid can be 
generated from interest earned from financial markets. This effectively represents nominal 
penalties, especially because the Commission does not adjust penalties for the time that elapses 
between cartel detection and settlement. If penalties are not adjusted to reflect these delays, it 
undermines the deterrence effect of penalties in a manner that may even offset the positive 
impact of leniency and settlements. The negative impact on deterrence is worsened by the 
ineffectiveness of the Commission at resolving cases timeously. 
Firms delay by waiting for investigations to start and get to an advanced stage before either 
applying for leniency or engaging in settlement negotiations, and still receive a settlement 
discount.68 Similarly, as observed in some cases, firms could delay paying penalties while they 
deplete the productive assets and revenues on which the penalties are based. This can be 
achieved through frivolous litigation and forum shopping, where firms approach other courts 
outside of the normal competition law structures (e.g. the High Court) where they can extract 
more time. This has the consequence of delaying the penalty, such that when it is paid, the 
revenue base is much smaller, resulting in a lower penalty. Examples of this include cases in 
the wire and steel industries, where firms tried to impair reported revenues and even liquidated 
the legal entities involved in collusion. Such strategic behaviour can be eliminated or 
minimised by the Commission taking a proactive approach to imposing penalties, and by 
reducing delays in prosecutions where collusion is detected via leniency. 
 




While leniency and settlements have played a major role in detecting cartels and closing 
investigations, they have not increased efficiencies in prosecuting and penalising firms. The 
results of this study show that the duration of investigations and sanctions has been increasing 
over time, and not decreasing as would have been expected in theory. The timely prosecution 
of firms for collusion is as important as the timely detection of collusion because delays in 
prosecution undermine the effect of penalties in terms of deterrence. This has implications for 
the efficacy of a deterrence-based framework, especially where cartel prosecutions are mostly 
resolved through settlement. This may have the unintended effect of rewarding firms for delays 
in finalising cases, instead of penalising them. It also has the perverse effect of encouraging 
stable cartels to continue colluding, knowing that if detected, sanction is delayed and can be 
reduced by late settlement. Also, firms that would ordinarily have settled early could learn that 
early settlement results in higher real penalties, compared with later settlement, which would 
have the effect of disincentivising firms from settling early. This challenge for South African 
cartel enforcement is best revealed by a critical review of the enforcement record, as presented 
in this chapter. The challenge of delays undermining deterrence is often overshadowed by both 
the attention paid by the popular media to the identity, nature and size of the firms penalised 
for collusion and the accompanying public discontent over the depth and scale of collusion. 
There are several policy implications that flow from this study. First, some cartel prosecutions 
involve settling cases where firms have violated competition laws in other markets (e.g. 
collusion in milling and bread markets) and where leniency applications have been received. 
Examples of these include collusion in the bread, milling, steel and construction markets. In 
such instances, the Commission should consider ensuring that penalties imposed on firms for 
bundled settlements take into consideration the scope of the collusion as well as delays in 
finalising the cases. This requires a proactive approach to penalties, settlements, and leniency. 
To ensure that deterrence is effective from a settlements and penalties perspective, competition 
authorities should look to expedite the finalisation of investigations, prosecutions, and 
imposition of penalties. To the extent that delays are outside the control of the Commission, 
the penalties imposed should be set at levels higher than those for firms settle early. It is 
important to note that most of the cartel cases handled by the Commission are settled, and not 
contested litigation cases. Competition authorities can also consider adding interest to the 
penalty amount for the period between the year for which the penalty is calculated and when it 




derived from applying time-value of money techniques, suggest that there is a need for the 
competition authorities (comprising the Commission, the Tribunal and the CAC) to review and 
reconsider their approach to penalties, and to shift their attention to deterrence. 
For the Commission, this means that when deciding and negotiating settlement agreements, it 
should particularly consider insisting on higher effective penalties for delayed settlements, 
especially where there are no legitimate developments in cases that would have occasioned the 
delays. Firms that delay settlements ought to face penalties that are higher, in real terms, than 
those that settle cases earlier. This can be achieved by implementing a clear policy where 
settlement discounts are progressively reduced as time passes. This should apply without firms 
having to settle cases such that at some point they do not enjoy the benefits of the settlement 
discounts. This may especially be the case if firms do not settle within the first year of the cartel 
being detected. This policy approach will ensure that firms have the incentive to settle early 
rather than delaying. It will also help to ensure that the expected benefits of having leniency 
and settlement procedures are preserved, because the longer a case takes and the more effort, 
resources and time that the Commission puts into a case, the less likely that settlement will 
generate the anticipated benefits. At this point, there is no consistent demonstrable evidence in 
all the cases that have been concluded that delays in settlements have been penalised through 
reduced settlement discounts. This may well be because most cases are resolved through 
settlements that are outcomes of bargaining between the Commission and firms. The 
bargaining often starts with the firm proposing a penalty to the Commission, the lowest possible 
penalty that it would be willing to pay. This is tantamount to markedly rewarding firms that 
settle late and consume the Commission’s time and resources, and this undermines deterrence. 
On its part, the Commission ought to ensure that it cuts the prevalence of cases that lie fallow 
after other cartel members have settled. Examples of such cases include those in the bread and 
milling markets, which have been idle for years subsequent to the settlement of cases by other 
cartel members, without any contestation by the firms that had not yet settled. These are 
apparent inefficiencies on the part of the Commission. The Tribunal also should consider 
tightening its role and approach to settlement agreements, by taking a more proactive approach 
towards holding both the Commission and the firms being penalised accountable for the 
penalties proposed in settlement agreements. This role is of course subject to the limitation that 




The CAC, on the other hand, when approached with appeals relating to the quantum of the 
penalty, should consider the extent of time delays in determining the penalties to be imposed, 
and should assess whether there are legitimate causes for delays, rather than opportunistic 
behaviour. This may be a controversial issue given that firms have a legitimate right to protect 
and defend their interests, and the exercising of such rights should not be viewed as 
unreasonable and punishable with higher penalties. Exercising such rights should be seen in 
the context of the need to achieve deterrence, and only legitimate defences of the rights of firms 
should be allowed to delay the finalisation of cases. As mentioned previously, there have been 
cases where firms delay cases by engaging in frivolous litigation in different court systems, 
and this has continued for several years. Such behaviour should be discouraged through higher 
penalties. 
The legal system should also proactively encourage firms to come forward and settle cases 
with the Commission. This could entail actively implementing a system of penalties and 
discounts for settlement. The Commission’s guidelines for determining penalties envisages 
this, but up to this point, the evidence has not been clear that the principles set forth are being 
applied in all cases. These are not easy issues to address, but it is possible for the Tribunal and 
the CAC to make rational judgment calls on the legitimacy of issues raised in cases. Courts 
routinely weigh up evidence and assess the conduct of firms to determine the validity of claims 
and the legitimacy of behaviour, and such findings must be clearly reasoned and articulated in 
judgments to signal a clear change in approach. Reviews and appeals should not be allowed to 
be used as opportunistic instruments for lowering penalties and to unduly delay the finalisation 
of cases in order to dilute the impact of penalties. Such behaviour ought to be discouraged so 
that the incentives to firms are consistent with the aim of competition law, which is to deter 
firms from colluding.  
Areas for further study include developing tools to better understand the incentives of firms to 
settle, and how firms delay paying penalties in this context. This is a dynamic process, which 
is not captured by the static considerations that characterise much of the theory and policy 
debates. There has been some work on understanding the incentives for firms and competition 
authorities to resolve cases through settlement procedures, and a substantial part of this 
research has been limited to the desire to save costs. Not much attention has been paid to the 
time dimension, which influences the willingness and timing of settlements between the 




cartel enforcement policy in South Africa. The author argues that an optimal cartel enforcement 
policy would be one that considers discount rates for penalties and uses sanctions in a manner 
that dynamically incentivises early settlement or finalisation of cases by progressively and 
more aggressively penalising delays in settling cases. This is especially the case where the 
cartel enforcement record is characterised by significant delays, often lasting several years, in 





Table 4.9: Results of GMM panel regression analysis of the impact of penalties, funding, 
and leniency on the number of firms prosecuted for collusion in South Africa 
xtdpdsys: number of firms prosecuted = f (penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to 
detect collusion), robust 
System dynamic panel-data estimation Number of observations = 108 
Group variable: sector Number of groups = 6 
Time variable: year  
 Obs per group: min = 18 
 average = 18 
 max = 18 
  
Number of instruments = 85 Wald Chi2(4) = 742.88 
 





Z P > |z| [95per cent conf. interval] 
Firms (lag 1) -0.0118051 0.0738324 -0.16 0.873 -0.156514 0.1329037 
Penalties 0.0762079 0.0077113 9.88*** 0.000 0.0610940 0.0913219 
Funding 0.1201338 0.1081013 1.11 0.266 -0.091741 0.3320085 
Leniency 0.3612205 0.0891094 4.05*** 0.000 0.1865693 0.5358717 
Constant -2.203364 1.979087 -1.11 0.266 -6.082303 1.6755760 





Table 4.10: Results of GMM panel regression analysis of the impact of the number of 
firms, penalties, funding, and leniency on the durations of investigation and prosecution 
of firms for collusion in South Africa 
xtdpdsys: duration = f (number of firms, penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to 
detect collusion, trend), robust 
System dynamic panel-data estimation Number of observations = 108 
Group variable: sector Number of groups = 6 
Time variable: year  
 Obs per group: min = 18 
 average = 18 
 max = 18 
  
Number of instruments = 101 Wald Chi2(5) = 21.41 
 





Z P > |z| [95per cent conf. interval] 
Duration (lag 1) 0.2011604 0.0759655 2.65 0.008 0.0522708 0.3500500 
Firms -0.0029772 0.1253959 -0.02 0.981 -0.2487434 0.2427997 
Penalties 0.0299354 0.0148344 2.02 0.044** 0.0008604 0.0590103 
Funding -0.4636224 0.1840989 -2.52 0.012** -0.8244497 -0.1027951 
Leniency 0.0532201 0.1236850 0.43 0.667 -0.1891980 0.2956381 
Trend 0.1409171 0.0344340 4.09 0.000*** 0.07342770 0.2084065 
Constant 7.7786310 3.2322320 2.41 0.016** 1.44357400 14.11369 







Table 4.11: Present value of penalties for collusion 




PV of penalty Penalty discount 
caused by delay 
Penalty discount 
caused by delay 
Tiger Brands 0.8 R98,784,870 8.2% R92,241,224 R6,543,646 7 % 
Foodcorp 2.0 R45,406,360 8.4% R38,350,457 R7,055,903 16 % 
SAA, SA Airlink, SA Express 2.1 R20,000,000 8.3 % R16,833,545 R3,166,455 16 % 
Trident Steel 2.8 R8,563,836 7.6 % R6,899,159 R1,664,676 19 % 
Keystone Milling Co. 3.0 R6,730,349 8.4 % R5,228,994 R1,501,355 22 % 
Pioneer Foods 3.1 R195,718,614 8.4 % R150,996,801 R44,721,813 23 % 
Amalgamated Metals Recycling CC 3.2 R3,264,945 8.3 % R2,510,642 R754,302 23 % 
Abeddac Metals CC 3.2 R4,965,794 8.3 % R3,818,543 R1,147,250 23 % 
Universal Recycling Company 3.2 R18,061,597 8.3 % R13,888,815 R4,172,782 23 % 
McCoys Glass Wholesalers CC 3.3 R2,487,451 7.6 % R1,943,173 R544,277 22 % 
Afrisam South Africa 3.4 R124,878,870 8.1 % R94,575,771 R30,303,099 24 % 
Glass South Africa 3.4 R4,395,023 7.6 % R3,390,147 R1,004,876 23 % 
National Glass Distributors 3.4 R414,615 7.6 % R319,818 R94,797 23 % 
Pioneer Food 3.7 R660,000,000 8.3 % R487,688,429 R172,311,571 26 % 
Lafarge Industries South Africa 3.8 R148,724,400 8.1 % R109,621,733 R39,102,667 26 % 
Power Metals 3.8 R12,773,588 8.3 % R9,309,763 R3,463,825 27 % 
Northern Hardware and Glass 3.9 R214,531 7.6 % R159,312 R55,219 26 % 
Lufthansa 3.9 R8,500,000 9.1 % R5,953,514 R2,546,486 30 % 
SAA 3.9 R20,000,000 9.1 % R14,008,269 R5,991,731 30 % 
Carolina Rollermeulle 4.0 R4,417,546 8.2 % R3,186,725 R1,230,821 28 % 
Stefanutti Stocks Holdings 4.0 R55,864,536 7.6 % R41,223,501 R14,641,035 26 % 
Hochtief Construction AG 4.2 R1,907,793 7.6 % R1,390,082 R517,711 27 % 
National Scrap Metals Cape Town 4.3 R17,730,974 8.3 % R12,486,086 R5,244,888 30 % 
Singapore Airlines 4.3 R25,106,692 7.9 % R17,961,719 R7,144,973 28 % 
Basil Read Holdings 4.4 R94,936,248 7.8 % R67,232,737 R27,703,511 29 % 
G Liviero & Son Building 4.4 R2,011,078 7.8 % R1,424,222 R586,856 29 % 
Haw & Inglis Civil Engineering 4.4 R45,314,041 7.8 % R32,090,872 R13,223,169 29 % 
Hochtief Construction AG 4.4 R1,315,719 7.8 % R931,777 R383,942 29 % 








PV of penalty Penalty discount 
caused by delay 
Penalty discount 
caused by delay 
Raubex 4.4 R58,826,626 7.8 % R41,660,326 R17,166,300 29 % 
Rumdel Construction Cape 4.4 R17,127,465 7.8 % R12,129,470 R4,997,995 29 % 
Stefanutti Stocks Holdings 4.4 R306,892,664 7.8 % R217,337,783 R89,554,881 29 % 
WBHO Construction 4.4 R311,288,311 7.8 % R220,450,728 R90,837,583 29 % 
Murray & Roberts 4.4 R309,046,455 7.8 % R218,863,072 R90,183,383 29 % 
Esorfranki 4.4 R155,850 7.8 % R110,371 R45,479 29 % 
Vlaming 4.4 R3,421,662 7.8 % R2,423,181 R998,481 29 % 
Tubular Technical Construction 4.4 R2,634,667 7.8 % R1,865,840 R768,827 29 % 
Aveng Africa 4.4 R306,576,143 7.8 % R217,113,626 R89,462,517 29 % 
Guiricich Bros Construction 4.4 R3,552,568 7.8 % R2,515,887 R1,036,681 29 % 
WBHO Construction 4.7 R10,244,136 7.6 % R7,186,837 R3,057,299 30 % 
Harding Allison Close Corporation 4.8 R78,822 7.6 % R54,949 R23,873 30 % 
B and E International 4.8 R8,158,447 7.6 % R5,651,610 R2,506,837 31 % 
Cycad Pipelines 4.9 R3,394,151 7.6 % R2,336,399 R1,057,752 31% 
N17 Toll Operators 4.9 R424,121 7.6 % R291,948 R132,173 31 % 
Civcon Construction 5.2 R798,386 7.6 % R539,240 R259,146 32 % 
Isipani Construction 5.4 R10,280,295 7.7 % R6,765,458 R3,514,837 34 % 
Giuricich Coastal Projects 5.5 R149,429 7.6 % R98,403 R51,026 34 % 
Foodcorp 5.7 R88,500,000 8.0 % R56,311,562 R32,188,438 36 % 
Pele Kaofela 5.8 R437,624 7.7 % R281,196 R156,427 36 % 
Enviroserve 5.8 R10,209,519 7.9 % R6,483,301 R3,726,218 36 % 
South African Airways 6.2 R18,799,292 8.0 % R11,494,000 R7,305,292 39 % 
Murray and Roberts Ltd 6.3 R64,141,799 7.7 % R39,406,033 R24,735,766 39 % 
Dura Soletanche-Bachy 6.4 R988,589 7.7 % R603,467 R385,122 39 % 
Air France – KLM 6.5 R18,634,640 8.0 % R11,094,327 R7,540,314 40 % 
British Airways Plc 6.5 R12,204,730 8.0 % R7,266,213 R4,938,517 40% 
British airways Plc 6.5 R21,765,297 7.9 % R13,063,444 R8,701,853 40 % 
Geomechanics CC 7.3 R1,650,503 7.8 % R931,609 R718,895 44 % 
Delatoy Investments 7.4 R4,136,122 7.9 % R2,298,820 R1,837,302 44 % 
Guiricich 7.7 R900,000 7.8 % R494,179 R405,821 45 % 
Martinair Cargo 7.9 R5,758,250 7.9 % R3,077,136 R2,681,114 47 % 








PV of penalty Penalty discount 
caused by delay 
Penalty discount 
caused by delay 
Rodio Geotechnics 8.8 R885,963 7.9 % R441,158 R444,805 50 % 
Edilcon Construction 8.9 R10,510,680 7.9 % R5,199,398 R5,311,282 51 % 
SA Metal Group 9.0 R22,430,000 7.9 % R10,998,844 R11,431,156 51 % 
Ton Scrap 9.7 R3,500,000 8.0 % R1,619,069 R1,880,931 54 % 
Cape Gate 9.8 R40,000,000 8.0 % R18,243,695 R21,756,305 54 % 
Blinkwater Mills 10.0 R10,112,504 8.0 % R4,555,238 R5,557,267 55 % 
Ben Jacobs Iron and Steel 10.1 R2,995,923 8.0 % R1,340,592 R1,655,330 55 % 
Bothaville Milling 10.3 R4,211,386 8.0 % R1,859,451 R2,351,935 56 % 
Brenner Mills 10.3 R12,000,872 8.0 % R5,263,637 R6,737,235 56 % 
Pride Milling 10.5 R10,624,960 8.0 % R4,598,619 R6,026,341 57 % 
Godrich Milling 10.6 R4,354,467 8.0 % R1,872,184 R2,482,283 57 % 
Progress Milling 11.3 R2,120,000 8.0 % R859,922 R1,260,078 59 % 
TWK Milling 11.7 R1,845,864 8.0 % R724,117 R1,121,747 61 % 








Table 4.12: Results of random and fixed-effects panel-regression analysis of the impact 
of penalties, funding, caseload, and leniency on the number of firms prosecuted for 
collusion in South Africa 
xtreg: number of firms prosecuted = f (penalties imposed, funding of the Commission, use of leniency to detect 
collusion) 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
Firms Random effects incl. 
caseload and funding 
Fixed effects incl. 
caseload and funding 
Random effects 
excl. funding 
















































Extensive collusion has been detected in South Africa over a period of more than 20 years, in 
many instances with firms participating in collusion over several years. Some firms participated 
in cartels in multiple markets or belonged to a group of firms in which another firm was also 
prosecuted for collusion. Some of the key cartels in South Africa cartelised multiple products 
within the same market. Overcharge estimates from studies of various South African cartels 
show that the cartels have been able to raise prices above competitive levels for a sustained 
period. These justify active cartel enforcement by competition authorities. The Commission 
has received widespread recognition for its successes in enforcement activities against cartels, 
mostly measured in terms of number of cartels detected, penalties collected and evidence that 
it has stopped harmful conduct based on estimated overcharges. 
Despite all this, no study has examined the cartel record with a view to understanding the 
characteristics of collusion and the institutional features of selected key cartels in South Africa. 
Similarly, there are limited empirical studies examining the pricing dynamics of multi-product 
firms participating in multi-product cartels that have operated over different collusive phases 
intermingled with non-collusive phases. The cartel enforcement record has also not been 
examined comprehensively across its different components to critically evaluate its efficacy 
from a deterrence perspective. With the above background in mind, this dissertation set out to 
answer the following three broad questions: 
(i) Research question 1: What are the characteristics of detected South African cartels, and 
what are the institutional features of selected key cartels? 
(ii) Research question 2: What is the pricing behaviour of multi-product firms involved in 
collusion and the extent of harm that they impose on consumers? 
(iii) Research question 3: What have been the key drivers of cartel enforcement in South 
Africa, and how effective has cartel enforcement been when examined through the lens 
of efficiency and deterrence? 
These questions are answered in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively, of this dissertation. The 




5.1 Summary of main findings 
5.1.1 Chapter 2: Characteristics of South African cartels focusing on institutional 
features of selected key cartels 
Selected key cartels detected in South Africa have relied on many of the same institutional 
structures that the theoretical and empirical literature show as aiding collusion. Detected cartels 
in South Africa, as predicted in the theoretical and empirical literature, have had to navigate 
challenges ranging from difficulties in aligning disparate interests and cheating to the threat of 
entry or expansion by firms outside the cartels. Evidence from the cartel enforcement record 
shows that these difficulties do not make cartels inherently unstable and that South African 
cartels often endure for several years. 
Four institutional features of major South African cartels were studied. The first, 
communication, which is central to collusion, seems to have involved a mix of different forms, 
comprising meetings, bilateral telephonic and email communication and, in some instances, 
extensive information-sharing arrangements. In some cartels, cheating is detected through 
customer relationships and price-matching clauses. This suggests that the basic sales 
infrastructure at the level of individual firms could be used to support collusion. This 
infrastructure complements imperfect cartel-level information exchanges, enhancing the 
chances of successful collusion. Cartels that shared extensive information, including 
aggregated, less-frequent production cost information developed more entrenched knowledge 
of their rivals’ businesses. If production processes are not dynamic (involving continuous 
change), rivals will have a greater chance of monitoring fellow cartel members’ pricing 
behaviour, even with imperfect information on discounting. The firms that faced more complex 
challenges appear to have enhanced the collusive mechanism, e.g. by agreeing on list prices 
and discounts for different classes of customers. 
The second is the vertical nature of collusion in some of the cartels. This feature suggests that 
such arrangements existed to stabilise and make collusion more effective, by enhancing the 
ability to align interests, keep incentives intact, deal with external threats more effectively in a 
co-ordinated way, and enhance the exercising of cartel market power along the value chain. 
Ordinarily, a cartel at one level of the value chain is harmful to the interests of the other level, 
by both reducing demand and raising the costs of production. As such, firms at one level are 




cartel members were suppliers of key inputs to downstream competitors, including those 
outside the collusive ring. For most of these downstream rivals, the next best alternative source 
of inputs was imports. In this area, the input markets were in some instances protected using 
import-parity pricing and trade tariffs, instituted at the request, or with the support of cartel 
members or the trade associations representing the cartel members. Trade policy tools were 
costless mechanisms for limiting the threats posed by imports. 
The third feature relates to how some South African cartels shared economic rents from 
collusion. The results of the study show that South African cartels used a wide variety of 
mechanisms to share the cartels’ rents. These included market or customer allocation, joint 
ventures, sub-contracting, and some form of payment schemes. Interaction across multiple 
markets and over time helps cartels to simultaneously share rents and institute overarching 
structures that subsist over time. Collusion in the construction industry shows that the quid pro 
quo nature of collusion is best understood when one examines cartel behaviour at a macro level, 
with individual contracts/projects reflecting how rents were distributed across firms. 
The fourth feature relates to how cartels dealt with threats of entry and expansion. There was 
some evidence suggesting that some cartels used trade policy tools strategically to limit the 
destabilising threat of entry and expansion by firms outside the collusive arrangement. Entry 
and expansion using imported inputs undermines the collusive price of upstream inputs and 
erodes the downstream profitability of collusion. 
5.1.2 Chapter 3: Pricing dynamics of a multi-product cartel 
Multi-product cartels priced their products to maximise profits, given demand and supply 
conditions. As a result, one could have expected overcharges that varied by product, with some 
products having higher and statistically significant overcharges, while others were lower and 
not statistically significant. Products with higher overcharges experienced greater overcharge 
volatility than those with lower overcharges, possibly because higher overcharges create scope 
for cheating. The size of overcharges on different products was affected by the assumptions 
made about the nature of the transition between collusion and competition. 
A multi-product cartel that lives through multiple collusive phases will experience variations 
in overcharges over time. This confirms that differences in market conditions during different 
phases affect the ability of the cartel to raise prices to the same degree. Overcharges are likely 




in the second phase were higher than those in the third phase. There were several potential 
reasons for this. A first reason was that the third phase emerged out of a price war, and the 
cartel was trying to re-establish itself. A second reason was that significant cost increases were 
experienced in the third phase, together with emerging from a price war in the face of an 
economic slowdown. It is possible that the cartel did not manage to fully exert itself in the third 
phase. A third, this phase coincided with greater cartel enforcement, which might have altered 
the cartel’s price path. 
The variability of overcharges on different products and over collusive phases has implications 
for cartel harm, penalties and damages proceedings, which are still rare in South Africa. Harm 
and damages must not be generalised through averages over different products and over time, 
without considering product-specific and phase-specific overcharges, especially where there is 
evidence that the cartel experienced instability and changing market conditions. 
The dissertation also shows that the way a cartel transitions between collusion and competition 
affects overcharge estimates, meaning that estimation methods need to be adapted or equipped 
to deal with different forms of transition. 
5.1.3 Chapter 4: A critical examination of South Africa’s 20-year cartel enforcement 
record 
The findings in Chapters 2 and 3 provided a case for a critical examination of the efficacy of 
the cartel enforcement record over the 20 years since the inception of the modern competition 
law regime. This was done in a comprehensive way to include an assessment of how effectively 
cartel enforcement tools have been used to detect and deter collusion. As is widely accepted, 
the author found that penalties and leniency together with settlements have driven cartel 
enforcement in terms of detection and prosecution. They were augmented by increased levels 
of funding over the years, which have increased the Commission’s capacity. 
Leniency and settlements have, however, not resulted in resource and time savings, which the 
Commission could have diverted to detecting other cartels. The duration of investigating and 
prosecuting firms has progressively increased over time. This is contrary to the predictions that 
underlie leniency and settlements, especially considering that over 90 per cent of prosecutions 
are resolved through settlements, and leniency. Econometric analysis of the relationship 
between the duration and key drivers of enforcement activity do not show a statistically 




results were not statistically significant. The dissertation categorises the sources of the 
prolonged investigation and prosecution of firms into four groups: first, an increased case load 
and complexity of cases; second, inefficiencies on the part of the Commission in case handling; 
third, strategic delays by firms in order to pay lower real penalties; and fourth, firms waiting to 
assess the strength of cases before committing to settlement decisions. Consequently, many 
firms are penalised only after a significant period has passed. 
The dissertation posits that significant delays in finalising investigations and prosecuting firms 
has resulted in defendants paying heavily discounted penalties. This supports the view that 
firms have the incentive to delay payments as long as possible, since this reduces the size of 
the real penalties they eventually pay. The benefit of delays in paying penalties seems to 
outweigh the benefit of lower penalties due to the early settlement of cases. These delays are 
likely to undermine the deterrence effects of penalties. 
The next section summarises the contributions of this dissertation. 
5.2 Summary of contributions 
The contributions made by this dissertation can be split into empirical and policy contributions, 
with the former discussed in section 5.2.1 and the latter in section 5.2.2. 
5.2.1 Empirical contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the body of empirical literature on collusion and cartel 
enforcement by presenting a systematic study of cartels and cartel enforcement (as presented 
in Chapter 2 and 4) and presenting a new method for the estimation of overcharges in a multi-
product setting (in Chapter 3). The systematic analysis of cartels and cartel enforcement in 
Chapters 2 and 4, follows the methodology of the relevant international literature, including 
the well-known work by Porter (2005) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) as discussed. 
Specifically, these chapters entailed comprehensively discussing the current industrial 
organization and competition policy literature on aspects of cartels and cartel enforcement. 
Therefore, the selection of characteristics, as well as the case study method employed, has a 
sound basis in economic theory and the related policy literature with several policy implications 




Chapter 2 shows that collusion in South Africa was extensive and durable, lasting several years 
on average. Most of the institutional features of the key South African cartels studied were 
consistent with those identified in the economic literature. Cartels use various mechanisms to 
manage internal and external threats. The important salient features observed in this 
dissertation relate to communication, mechanisms for rent sharing, the vertical features of 
collusion and the strategic use of trade tariffs. 
The key South African cartels used a combination of different forms of communication and 
monitoring. The sales team infrastructure and relationships with customers can provide 
information on cheating by cartel members. This infrastructure does not require cartel-specific 
investments and, as such, is costless. Further, a cartel and its individual members do not need 
to centralise every aspect of their market intelligence to monitor cheating. These aspects are 
complementary and reduce the uncertainty created by imperfect centralised information. They 
are augmented by the learning effects derived from information exchange and repeated 
interaction. 
Economic theory should incorporate the impact of complementary forms of communication if 
it is to advance to explaining collusion in instances where cartels face imperfect information. 
The uncertainties faced by cartels may be lower than the theory predicts. It is important to 
incorporate into the theory, the complementarities among the different forms of communication 
and monitoring that cartel members can use, and how these reduce uncertainty to sustain 
collusion. This is likely to advance the theory beyond focusing on the imperfections of cartel-
level information. Admittedly, this may vary from cartel to cartel depending on each cartel’s 
circumstances. Uncertainty is a permanent feature of most businesses, and firms learn to 
operate under such conditions. Collusion is one area where cartel members must adapt and 
manage the uncertainty to tolerable levels. Communication and monitoring are areas where the 
competition authorities could help further develop knowledge of collusion by fully 
investigating and reporting, in their public decisions, the various components of 
communication and monitoring that happen in cartels. This should be the case even if a case is 
settled. 
The dissertation highlights the vertical nature of some of the major cartels in South Africa and 
points to the contribution that this feature makes to cartel stability and harm. The dissertation 
shows that the vertical structure of cartels stabilises collusion and enhances the ability of the 




appears to have helped align the interests of cartel members and to have addressed external 
threats from downstream and upstream firms that may have destabilised the collusive structure 
as they grew. It is important to account for the vertical effects when examining cartel harm. 
The contribution of Chapter 2 to understanding especially the institutional features of cartels 
fits well into the international literature that recognises variation in cartel behaviour. It 
identifies factors that may well manifest in other developing-country and indeed developed 
country contexts. Further, the nature of the study is similar to that of leading published and 
widely cited studies on collusion such as Porter (2005) who studied organisational features of 
cartels and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) who examined the determinants of cartel success. 
The study in Chapter 2 is rooted in economics literature and reveals some factors which are 
often not directly/fully incorporated in economics theory and in studies of collusion. For 
example, the use of complementary communication methods, which might explain how cartels 
sustain collusion when certain aspects of monitoring are not centralised by the cartel. The study 
calls for further theoretical work to incorporate some of the findings. It is my view that this 
will contribute to the advancement of economics theory on collusion and help better understand 
collusion. 
The empirical methods in Chapter 3 are new to the literature on cartel overcharges and 
damages. As the author explained in that Chapter, the panel model used is capable of estimating 
multi-product cartel overcharges. This is highly relevant in circumstances where a significant 
number of cartels involve multi-product collusion. The theoretical basis for the overcharges 
model used in Chapter 3 is consistent with the nature of cartel overcharges models used in the 
international literature, which mostly take a reduced-form specification. The dissertation shows 
that a multi-product cartel will exert itself in a variable way, by product and over different 
collusive phases. Variation of overcharges on different products and over time in a multi-
product setting might reflect a cartel optimising cartel pricing across a portfolio of products or 
markets and adapting to temporal market conditions. This is not something that is often dealt 
with in most empirical studies of overcharges. 
As far as Chapter 4 is concerned, a South African focus is a particular benefit in terms of 
contribution. South Africa is viewed favourably internationally among its developing-country 
peers in terms of competition law enforcement, including active cartel enforcement. As a result, 
a review of the South African experience potentially contributes to improvements in the 




to also note that most jurisdictions follow the same cartel enforcement paths in terms of markets 
investigated with some multi-national companies participating in cartels in multiple 
jurisdictions and enforcement tools used (leniency, settlement procedures and penalties). The 
challenges identified and examined in this dissertation relating to the South African cartel 
enforcement record are therefore not unique to South Africa. For example, heavy-reliance on 
leniency, the inability of leniency to generate savings in time and resources for the authorities 
and the impact of delays in imposing penalties on deterrence also apply to jurisdictions such as 
the EU and the US. As such, the contribution to the efficacy of cartel enforcement has potential 
to apply in other jurisdictions. 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the use of penalties for cartel deterrence could be 
developed further to explicitly account for the impact that delays have on deterrence. This 
dissertation shows that delays in the imposition and payment of penalties has a significant 
downward impact on the present value of the penalties paid. Firms appear to have made a trade-
off between paying a lower negotiated penalty with early settlement (close to the beginning of 
the investigation) versus paying a lower discounted penalty resulting from delays in the 
finalisation of cases. South African firms routinely pay penalties after a prolonged lapse in time 
since the beginning of the investigation, even where there is leniency, and most cases are 
resolved through settlements. 
More generally, theoretical advances are typically based on new insights emerging in the 
descriptive literature. For example, Chapter 2 which deals with the characteristics and 
institutional features of collusion in South Africa points to areas for future theoretical and 
empirical research. One such area is collusion under conditions of imperfect communication 
where cartels use complementary methods of communication and where some methods are less 
formalised. Such findings can contribute to the development of theory by providing theoretical 
IO scholars with insights that they can incorporate in existing or new game-theoretic models 
of cartel behaviour. This in turn then contributes to advancements in economics theory and 
empirical research. 
It is worth mentioning that most studies on collusion that have been published in international 
peer-reviewed economic journals are based on cases studies of cartels that occurred in 
particular jurisdictions. Examples of this include Morton (1997) who studied entry deterrence 
by British cartels; Levenstein and Suslow (2011); and Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith (2013) 




is concerned, published contributions related to cartel overcharges and damages estimation 
typically relate to specific case studies (see example of the German cement cartel). In addition, 
applied or empirical research on competition policy, based on South African case studies, has 
been published in several international journals over the past 15 years. For example, Khumalo, 
Mashiane and Roberts (2014) who study overcharges from the South African pre-cast concrete 
pipes cartel; Mncube (2013) who studied strategic entry deterrence in the bread cartel; Mncube 
(2014) who studied overcharges from the South African wheat flour cartel; Boshoff and van 
Jaarsveld (2019) who study recurrent collusion in the South African cement cartel. This 
dissertation adds to this body of empirical research, contributing with the use of techniques and 
producing findings that are not in these previous studies. 
5.2.2 Policy contributions 
There are several policy contributions made by the dissertation. The first policy contribution is 
that the future of effective cartel deterrence may lie in the ability of competition authorities to 
understand the characteristics and institutional features of cartels, and using these, to screen 
for, or gather forensic evidence of collusion. 
The second policy contribution made by the dissertation is that informal communication may 
well be supported by the nature of the relationships between employees of different firms. 
Investigating communication in cartels may require the use of more forensic tools. 
The third policy contribution in terms of policy is that competition authorities should examine 
the interplay between cartels at different levels, especially where firms take part in cartels at 
different levels, rather than treating cartels at each level of the value chain as separate 
infringements. Treatment of the cartels as being separate is likely to yield only partial 
appreciation of the full scope of collusion and its impact, leading to under-deterrence. 
Fourth in terms of policy contributions made by the dissertation is that cartel investigations, or 
screening for collusion, should also entail searching for the existence of joint ventures, the 
incidence of sub-contracting, cross-payments, cross-supply, or toll-manufacturing 
arrangements between firms suspected of collusion. This is especially the case in those markets 
where contracts with customers are tender-based. Forensic investigation of tendering behaviour 




The fifth policy contribution is that multi-product firms suspected of collusion in one market 
should be screened for collusion in other markets, and the links between collusion in various 
markets should be examined because the management of collusion likely takes a quid pro quo 
structure that spans more than one market and product. 
Sixth in terms of policy contributions is that in markets where imports present the next best 
alternative source of supply of key inputs – other than the firms suspected of cartel conduct – 
investigations of collusion should also incorporate an examination of the activities of cartel 
members and their trade bodies in advocating for or supporting the imposition of trade tariffs 
on competing imported products. This matters for understanding how a cartel deals with 
external threats, and it is also important with respect to consideration and design of remedies. 
The seventh policy contribution is that given the variability of overcharges by product and over 
time, the right approach when determining penalties and damages should account for these two 
aspects, rather than assuming overcharge constancy along the two dimensions. 
The eighth policy contribution – given delays and the prolonged nature of the investigations 
and prosecutions of firms – is that an optimal cartel enforcement policy would be one that 
considers the discount rates on penalties resulting from delays, and that uses sanctions in a 
manner that dynamically incentivises the early settlement, or finalisation, of cases by 
progressively and more aggressively penalising delays in settling cases. Further, competition 
authorities should consider adding interest to the penalty amount for the period between the 
year the penalty is calculated and when it is paid. This will enhance and preserve the deterrence 
effects of penalties. 
The next section highlights suggested areas for future research. 
5.3 Future research 
The dissertation identifies several areas of future research. The first area of potential future 
research is the need to further examine, at both theoretical and empirical levels, the drivers and 
determinants of firm incentives to encourage or engage in collusion at more than one level of 
the value chain, given the impact of exercising market power at one level on demand and costs. 
The second area of future research, related to the first area, regards the need to develop a 
framework for examining cartel overcharges where cartels have vertical features to them. 




said to exist, with little or no attention paid to the vertical aspects of collusion. This requires 
both theoretical and empirical consideration, since it will involve examining the interplay 
between upstream and downstream markets and considering the trade-offs involved, which are 
likely to affect overcharges. Related to harm from collusion is the potential need to examine 
whether reliance on indirect communication affects the size of overcharges achieved. Related 
to harm from collusion is the potential need to examine whether reliance on indirect 
communication affects the size of overcharges achieved such cartels and whether these differ 
significantly from those imposed by cartels characterised by more direct communication. 
In the third area of potential future research, any prospective future examination of cartel 
dynamics and estimation of cartel overcharges in markets where imports are an important 
source of potential constraints on various products should more explicitly consider the strategic 
use of trade policy tools by cartels to restrict the threat of external destabilising factors and to 
maintain supra-competitive prices. This will mean that prospective future studies should 
examine how the cartel price path is affected by trade policy tools. A further related area for 
future study relates to the willingness and role of government, whether inadvertently or as a 
result of trying to achieve other policy objectives such as supporting domestic industry. This 
should include how governments can balance legitimate need for policy intervention in certain 
markets against the risks to the competitive process and the impact on consumers and the 
economy. 
A fourth area of potential future research is empirical and theoretical work on the optimum 
design and implementation of leniency, settlements, and penalty policies where firms 
strategically delay finalising cases and where the competition authority inefficiently handles 
cases. Both undermine deterrence. This will entail also examining the key drivers of the timing 
of firms’ decisions to settle cases with the competition authorities, to account for the benefits 
that firms get from delaying cases. There is significant emphasis on firm incentives to settle 
early, appearing as though this is the dominant strategy. The cartel enforcement record shows 
that the dominant strategy of firms in South Africa may be to strategically delay settlement as 
long as possible, even where there is leniency. Empirical studies of firm sensitivity to penalties 
that get progressively higher with delays in settlement will contribute to better cartel 
enforcement policy. 
This dissertation is a response to the need to examine collusion in South Africa in terms of its 




understanding the institutional factors contributing to its pervasiveness and durability. In 
addition, the dissertation was aimed at examining the harm resulting from a multi-product 
cartel that had lived through different collusive phases. Having identified the key institutional 
features of selected key South African cartels, including those that warranted emphasis, and 
having shown that multi-product cartels impose significant overcharges, the next area for 
examination was the cartel enforcement record. This resulted in a need to rethink the 
Commission’s approach to penalties. This is important in terms of deterrence, given that 
leniency – which has hitherto been a key driver of cartel detection – has declined, and penalties 
remain the main tool for achieving deterrence. When the probability of detection declines, 
deterrence requires an increase in the level of penalties. At present, the deterring effects of 
penalties have been undermined by prolonged investigations and finalisation of cases, which 
have resulted in firms paying heavily discounted real penalties. Adding interest to the penalty 
amount for the period between the year the penalty is calculated and when the penalty is paid 
could help mitigate the negative impact of delays on penalties as a deterrence tool. This 
dissertation proposes an optimal cartel enforcement framework that incentivises the early 
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